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THE  LIBRARY 

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STUDIES  IN  HISTORY,  ECONOMICS  AND  PUBLIC  LAW 

EDITED  BY  THE  FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
OF  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 

Volume  XCVIII]  [Number  1 

Whole  Number  223 


ORIGINS    OF    MODERN    GERMAN 
COLONIALISM 

1871-1885 


BY 

MARY  EVELYN  TOWNSEND,  Ph.D. 

Instructor  in  History  at  Teachers  College 
Oolumbia  University 


COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY 

SALE  AGENTS 
New  York  :  Longmans,  Green  &  Co. 
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1921 


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1 

ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN 
COLONIALISM 


STUDIES  IN  HISTORY,  ECONOMICS  AND  PUBLIC  LAW 

EDITED  BY  THE  FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
OF  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 

Volume  XCVIII]  [Number  1 

Whole  Number  223 


ORIGINS    OF    MODERN    GERMAN 
COLONIALISM 

1871-1885 


MARY  EVELYN  TOWNSEND,  Ph.D. 

Instructor  in  History  at  Teachers  College 
Columbia  University 


COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY 

SALE  AGENTS 
New  York  :  Longmans,  Green  &  Co. 
London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son,  Ltd. 
1921 


Copyright,  1921 

BY 

MARY  EVELYN  TOWNSEND 


3a 

MY  PARENTS 


CO 


I 


o 

si 

»0 


4CS959 


PREFACE 

"  Germany  renounces  in  favor  of  the  Principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  all  her  rights  and  titles  to  her  over- 
seas possessions."  ^ 

The  Great  War  brought  to  an  abrupt  conclusion  the 
colonial  history  of  modem  Germany.  It  is  a  history  whose 
facts  are  now  complete,  but  whose  story  is  as  yet  untold. 

The  present  study  is  an  effort  to  write  the  first  chapter 
of  the  story,  to  trace  the  beginnings  of  modem  German 
colonialism.  It  is  designed  to  embrace  only  the  first  fifteen 
years  of  the  empire  and  to  include  nothing  in  the  history  of 
Prussia,  except  in  so  far  as  Prussian  influence  affected  im- 
perial action. 

To  be  sure,  the  years  from)  1871  to  1885  antedate  the 
adoption  of  official  colonization;  for  it  was  not  until  April 
24,  1884,  that  Bismarck  proclaimed  imperial  protection 
over  the  settlements  of  the  merchant  Liideritz  in  Southwest 
Africa ;  yet  these  earlier  years  are  important  in  two  respects. 
Abroad,  they  marked  the  first  steps  of  expansion  which 
generally  introduce  in  any  country  a  colonial  policy,  such 
as  the  establishment  of  trading  stations,  factories,  planta- 
tions, naval  bases  and  favorable  commercial  treaties.  At 
home,  in  Germany,  the  first  fifteen  years  of  the  empire  con- 
tained beneath  their  surface  the  motives  and  forces,  the 
tendencies  and  currents  which  actuated  colonial  expansion. 
Any  history  of  the  movement  would  be  far  from  complete 
without  a  study  of  its  primary  causes,  its  dominating  in- 
fluences, since  they  imparted  to  it  distinctive  characteristics 
which  persisted  throughout  the  life  of  imperial  Gennany. 

1  The  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Gennany.  1919.  article  no. 
71  "  '7 


8  PREFACE  [8 

The  available  material  on  German  colonization,  especially 
that  in  English,  deals  almost  exclusively  v^itli  the  external 
aspect ;  it  affords  only  fleeting  glimpses  of  the  elements  and 
forces,  the  groups  and  parties,  at  work  within  the  nation, 
which  were  responsible  for  outward  activity.  Such  a  point 
of  view,  moreover,  conveys  the  impression  that  the  German 
Government  imposed  a  colonial  policy  upon  the  nation  on 
April  24,  1884;  and  consequently  that  modern  German 
colonialism  dates  from  that  year.  Only  a  few  brief  ac- 
counts of  any  colonial  activity  before  1884  seem  to  exist, 
and  hence  the  strength  and  significance  of  the  internal 
movement  remains  underestimated. 

The  present  study  proposes  to  concern  itself  primarily 
with  the  internal  history  of  colonialism.  It  is  based  upon 
such  sources  as  the  Reichstag  Debates,  White  Books, 
government  docimients,  records  and  letters  of  Bismarck, 
official  publications  of  colonial  and  other  societies,  as  well 
as  propaganda  literature,  programs  of  political  parties, 
periodicals,  newspapers,  histories  of  trading  and  banking 
companies.  It  has  been  necessarily  limited  to  material 
available  in  the  United  States,  as  German  archives  have 
been  inaccessible  for  several  years;  but  the  value  of  the 
documents  in  the  Columbi_a_University_  and  New  York 
Public  Libraries,  the  Congressional  Library,  and  the  Hohen- 
zollem  Collection  in  the  Harvard  University  Library,  have 
made  less  serious  the  impossibility  of  consulting  sources 
only  to  be  found  in  Germany. 

The  writer  is  glad  of  this  opportunity  to  express  her  in- 
debtedness to  Professor  Carlton  J.  H.  Hayes  whose  work  in 
German  History  has  inspired  this  study.  For  his  constant 
encouragement  and  advice  as  well  as  for  his  patient  and 
laborious  correction  of  manuscript  and  proof  she  is  deeply 
grateful.  She  is  also  under  obligation  to  Professor  Charles 
D.  Hazen  whose  kind  interest,  assistance  and  criticism  she 
acknowledges  with  sincere  appreciation. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface  7 

CHAPTER  I 

Introduction 
Colonialism  and  the  National  Mind 

A  new  German  psychology  in  1871            13 

Conditions  favorable  to  the  colonial  idea 13 

National  unification.    .       13 

Navalism. 14 

Results  of  the  Industrial  Revolution 15 

Conditions  unfavorable  to  the  colonial  idea .    .  17 

Opposition  of  the  Government     ....           17 

Prevailing  economic  theory  of  laissez-faire 19 

General  indifference 20 

Summary 20 

CHAPTER  n 

The  Theory  of  Colonialism 

The  existence  of  a  definite  colonial  theory  in  1871 22 

Elements  of  the  theory 22 

The  German  tradition  of  colonialism  based  on  general  German 

history  and  Prussia's  colonial  efforts 2^ 

Contributions  of  historians 26 

Contributions  of  political  scientists 28 

Contributions  of  emigration  societies 30 

Contributions  of  explorers  and  natural  scientists 31 

Contributions  of  missionaries 33 

Failure  of  theoretical  colonialism  to  influence  Government  ....  35 

Summary 35 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Rise  of  Commercial  Colonialism:  Direct  Action  versus 
the  Power  of  Ideas 
The  silent  development  of  commercial  colonialism  beneath  theo- 
retical colonialism 36 

9l  9 


lO 


CONTENTS  [lo 


VAGB 

Survey  of  the  achievements  of  commercial  colonialists 36 

In  Africa 37 

In  the  South  Seas 3Q 

In  South  America ...  42 

Demands  of  commercial  colonialists  for  government  protection  .   .  43 

Petitions  from  merchants  and  traders .    .  44 

Propaganda 47 

Petitions  from  consuls 48 

Work  of  the  Centralverein  fur  Handelsgeographie  und  Deutsche 

Interesse  iin  Auslande 51 

Summary 52 

CHAPTER  IV 

Government  Reaction  to  Commercial  Colonialism  and  the 

Appearance  of  a  Colonial  Party 

Government  response  to  the  demands  of  the  commercial  colonialists.  54 

The  inadequacy  of  "  diplomatic  guardianship  " .    .  56 

The  resulting  political  and  economic  crisis  in  the  South  Seas  .  57 
Changed  attitude  of  Government  toward  commercial  colonial- 
ism evident  by  1879 62 

Manifestations  of  a  new  policy  of  protection 63 

Official  protests  against  the  interference  of  other  nations  .  63 
Treaties  of  trade  and  amity  with  Tongan  and  Samoan  Is- 
lands    64 

Establishment  of  a  quasi-protectorate  in  Samoa 74 

Indirect  protection  to  commercial  colonialism 74 

Effect  of  the  changed  policy  of  Government  upon  the  colonial  party.  76 

Reasons  for  confidence  in  their  position      77 

Their  demand  for  a  state-directed  colonialism 80 

The  appearance  of  a  definite  colonial  party  in  the  Reichstag.  ■  82 
Coalescence  of  colonial  enthusiasts  throughout  country  under  the 

leadership  of  commercial  colonialists 82 

•Summary 83 

CHAPTER  V 

Colonialism  a  National  and  Political  Issue 

The  task  of  the  colonial  party  to  make  colonialism  a  national  issue.    85 

The  three  methods 85 

Propaganda  and  counter  propaganda 86 

The  achievement  of  political  identity:  the  colonial  party  a  sup- 
port to  Bismarck 99 


/ 


Il]                                          CONTENTS  II 

Identification  of  commercial   colonialism   with  administrative 

speculation  overseas 109 

Summary 112 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Test 

The  introduction  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  into  the  Reichstag.  ■  113 

The  antecedents  of  the  bill 113 

The  reasons  for  its  being  a  test-case  of  colonialism 114 

The  intention  of  the  Government  to  inaugurate  a  colonial  policy  by 

the  bill 115 

Analysis  of  Bismarck's  attitude   ....       118 

Analysis  of  supporters'  attitude 119 

The  opposition  to  the  bill 121 

The  rejection  of  the  bill 124 

The  press  comments  as  reflecting  the  attitude  of  the  country  .    .    .  125 

The  results  of  the  bill's  failure 128 

The  effect  on  Bismarck 128 

The  effect  on  the  colonial  party  and  movement 131 

Summary 134 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Triumph 

The  partnership  of  the  Government  and  colonial  party  in  winning 

popular  support  for  colonialism    •    .       136 

Work  of  the  colonial  party ....  136 

Formation  of  Kolofiialverein 137 

Renewed  propaganda 145 

Activity  overseas 148 

Work  of  the  administration 151 

Bismarck's  diplomatic  caution 152 

Bismarck's  direct  and  indirect  support  of  colonialism 154 

Bismarck's  creation  of    chauvinism  in    Germany  to   launch  a 

state-directed  colonialism 160 

In  the  South  Seas 161 

In  Africa 163 

The  first  act  of  a  state-directed  colonialism — the  telegram  of 

April  24,  1884 169 

Lack  of  national  support  for  a  colonial  policy 169 

Summary 169 


12                                          CONTENTS  [I2 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  VIII 

National  Inauguration  of  State-directed  Colonialism 

The  parliamentary  struggle  over  the  Steamship  Subsidy  Bill  .    .    .  170 

The  connection  of  the  bill  with  colonialism 171 

The  supporters  of  the  bill  and  of  Bismarck 172 

The  opposition 174 

Bismarck's  campaign  against  the  opposition 178 

Great  colonial  activity 178 

Presentation  of  a  limited  colonial  program 179 

The  arousing  of  a  nationalistic  patriotism 182 

The  rapprocIiente7it  with  France 185 

The  Congo  Congress 185 

The  parliamentary  deadlock 187 

Bismarck's  quarrel  with  England 188 

The  Chancellor's  success 191 

National  inauguration  of  a  state-directed  colonialism 192 

Summary 192 

Conclusion 
The  dominating  forces  responsible  for  modern  German  colonialism, 

The  influence  of  the  economic  class 194 

The  influence  of  Bismarck 195 

Characteristics  of  modern  German  colonialism  largely  due  to  the 

circumstances  of  its  origin 195 


CHAPTER  I 
Introduction 

colonialism  and  the  national  mind 

The  founding  of  the  German  empire  in  1871  not  only 
remade  the  map  of  Germany,  but  it  also  reconstructed  the 
national  mind.  The  psychology  of  the  new  Germany  in 
its  relation  to  overseas  expansion  is,  therefore,  important  as 
a  point  of  departure  for  any  study  of  tlie  origins  of  modern 
German  colonialism. 

Many  circumstances  conspired  to  direct  the  German  mind 
/of  1 87 1  to  the  thought  of  colonization.  In  the  first  place, 
the  intense  nationalism  and  patriotism  engendered  by  the 
wars  of  unification  found  a  natural  outlet  in  enthusiasm  for 
expansion.  Now  that  Germany  had  become  a  nation,  she, 
like  the  other  great  states  of  Western  Europe,  must  express 
her  self -consciousness  in  the  extension  of  her  nationalism  to 
a  colonial  empire.  She  too  must  pass  through  her  phase  of 
overseas  expansion  and  the  impression  of  her  individuality 
upon  other  lands.  Furthermore,  those  Germans  who  had 
left  the  Fatherland  in  its  days  of  weakness  and  insignifi- 
cance,— the  days  of  the  German  Confederation, — to  es- 
tablish their  lives  and  fortunes  abroad,  desired  now  to  be 
united  again  to  a  glorified  Germany.  After  1871,  it  meant 
something  to  be  able  to  say  "  Ich  bin  ein  Deufschcr  Burger." 
Petitions  even  from  Latin  America  demanded  the  establish- 
ment of  German  naval  stations  in  Bolivia,  Ecuador  and 
Costa  Rica.  The  passion  of  nationalism  worked  two  ways, 
both  centrifugally  and  centripetally,  towards  the  encourage- 
13]  13 


14         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [14 

ment  of  colonial  foundations.  Moreover,  after  the  succes- 
sion of  triumphs  from  1866  to  1871,  Germany  was  over- 
flowing with  an  exuberant  energy  and  needed  a  single  aim, 
a  fixed  purpose  toward  which  to  direct  it.  What  could 
serve  better  as  an  objective  than  colonial  expansion? 

Another  result  of  the  wars  of  unification  had  been  the 
impetus  given  to  the  growth  of  a  navy.  Germany  had 
proved  herself  supreme  on  land ;  why  not  strengthen  herself 
upon  the  sea?  A  navy  necessitates  naval  bases  and  coaling 
stations,  hence  colonies.  Both  Prince  Adalbert  of  Prus- 
sia, Chief  of  the  Navy,  and  Vice-Admiral  Livonius, 
strongly  advocated  their  acquisition.^  And,  as  the  enthus- 
iasm for  naval  greatness  grew,  it  paved  the  way  for  colonial- 
ism. 

A  further  stimulus  to  navalism,  besides  the  national 
motive,  was  an  awakened  trading  instinct.  Since  Germany 
had  won  the  right  to  be  a  nation,  she  remembered  her  com- 
mercial ancestry  and  tradition ;  she  began  to  exalt  the  Hanse 
towns.  In  the  eighteen-seventies,  German  overseas  com- 
merce was  considerable,  and  commerce  always  demands  pro- 
tection. A  gradual  growth  of  the  navy  commenced  during 
these  early  years:  in  1871,  Wilhemshafen  became  a  naval 
base  on  the  North  Sea;  -  on  December  31,  1871,  the  Prus- 
sion  Ministry  of  Marine  became  the  Imperial  Admiralty; 
and  in  1874  a  navy  bill,  providing  for  eighteen  gun  boats 
and  twenty  smaller  ships,  passed  the  Reichstag  with  no  op- 
position.* 

The  growth  of  the  navy  and  its  results  proved  of  the 
utmost  importance  in  the  history  of  colonization.  "  Officers 
of  the  navy  now  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  diplomats, 

1  Livonius,  Unsere  Flotte  (Berlin,  1871). 

^Koschitzky,  Deutsche  Kolonialgeschichte,  2  vols.    (Leipzig,   1887), 
vol.  i,  p.  155. 
*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1874,  Aktenstuck,  no.  62,  p.  770. 


15]  INTRODUCTION  1 5 

intellectuals  and  traders,  to  further  colonial  expansion." 
Indeed  in  1875,  Vice-Admiral  Livonius  compiled  a  report, 
recommending  the  immediate  need  of  colonies.  He  showed 
that  Germany  had  not  attained  what  England  had,  be- 
cause of  government  neglect,  and  he  urged  that  since  Ger- 
many had  now  achieved  unity,  it  was  high  time  that  she 
acquired  colonies.^  The  Government  suppressed  Livonius' 
report,  however,  pigeon-holed  it  and  prevented  its  publica- 
tion until  1885,  because  Bismarck  feared  it  might  precipitate 
political  difficulties  with  other  nations.  The  Vice-Admiral 
also  urged  the  advisability  of  placing  Zanzibar  under  German 
protection  and  of  establishing  a  protectorate  in  East  Africa. 
Likewise,  Prince  Adalbert  of  Prussia,  who  was  called  the 
"  Builder  of  the  German  Fleet "  and  who  did  everything  in 
his  power  to  advance  the  navy,  thought  that  the  two  policies, 
naval  and  colonial,  should  go  hand  in  hand.  He  became 
General  Inspector  of  the  Navy  in  1870,  went  to  England  to 
study  shipping  in  1873,  and  was  thus  a  person  of  knowledge 
and  authority.^  As  he  expressed  it,  "  For  a  growing  people, 
there  is  no  prosperity  without  expansion,  no  expansion 
without  an  overseas  policy,  and  no  overseas  policy  without 
a  navy." 

Possibly  more  conducive  to  the  thought  of  colonialism  than 
jthe  political  influence  of  a  triumphant  nationalism,  was  the 
r  economic  condition  of  Germany  from  1870  to  1875.  Given 
a  country,  strong  and  united  after  years  of  division  and 
weakness,  given  the  introduction  of  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion with  its  consequent  manufacturing  and  commercial 
boom,  augmented  by  the  billion-dollar  war  indemnity  from 
France,    and    given    the    resulting   over-production    of    all 

'Lewin,  The  Germans  and  Africa:  Their  Aims  on  the  Dark  Continent 
(London,  1915),  p. 31;  -vide,  also  Livonius,  Kolonialfragen  (Berlin.  1885). 

*  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Biographie,  vol.  xlv,  p.  788. 


1 6        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [  j  6 

kinds  of  cormnDodities,  what  circumstances  could  be  more 
favorable  for  colonial  expansion  ?  The  era  of  security  after 
1870  developed  industry  and  trade  to  a  remarkable  degree, 
as  is  too  well  established  to  need  further  exposition  here. 
But  the  fact  must  be  emphasized  that  the  "commercial  in- 
stinct is  the  origin  of  all  colonial  conquest,"  and  hence  a 
veritable  hot-house  atmosphere  for  the  culture  of  the 
"  colonial  idea  "  existed. 

Furthermore,  the  extraordinary  over-development  and 
over-production  led  to  speculation  and  inflated  values,  as  is 
also  too  well  known  to  need  elaboration.  The  agrarian 
crisis  coincided  with  industrial  misery;  ten  thousand  peas- 
ant proprietors  were  sold  out  each  year  by  the  Department 
of  Justice;  the  new  industry,  thanks  to  free  trade,  was 
submerged  under  England's  products;  French  merchandise 
triumphed;  the  sum  available  for  industry  from  the  war 
indemnity  had  been  exhausted  and  the  terrible  crisis  and 
panic  of  1873  resulted.  Again  we  must  concern  ourselves 
only  with  the  effect  of  this  state  of  affairs  up>on  the  national 
mind  in  relation  to  colonialism.  The  necessity  of  financial 
recuperation  was  widely  felt.  When  conditions  proved 
too  narrow  at  home,  both  for  capital  and  labor,  again 
there  loomed  large  the  opportunity  for  expansion  abroad. 

Such  was  the  character  of  the  national  psychology  in 
so  far  as  it  was  receptive  to  the  thought  of  colonization. 
As  we  have  seen,  certain  factors  influenced  the  German 
mind  of  1871  to  entertain  the  idea  of  overseas  expansion. 
These  wereT^an  enhanced  national  consciousness  expressed 
by  Germans  both  at  home  and  abroad ;  a  swollen  purse  re- 
quiring objects  for  expenditure,  and  then  a  depleted  purse 
in  need  of  large  dividends  regardless  of  risk;  an  abnor- 
mally inflated  production  demanding  outlet  markets;" mush- 
room industries  clamoring  for  raw  materials ;  an  overstocked 
labor  market  using  emigration  as  a  safety-value ;  and  finally. 


I-r]  INTRODUCTION  ly 

an  ever  growing  navy  promising  protection  to  oversea  ven- 
tures and  investments^  Assuredly,  such  influences  would 
seem  to  have  produced  a  mental  atmosphere  most  propitious 
for  the  growth  of  any  idea  of  colonialism. 

We  must  consider,  on  the  other  hand,  the  imfavorable 
elements  in  the  national  psychology  which  were  inimical 
to  the  notion  of  expansion  throughout  those  early  years. 
Here  we  find  definite  obstacles  and  hostile  factors.  In 
the  first  place,  there  was  the  absolute  opposition  of  the 
Government  and  the  ruling  class;  for  colonial  policy  in- 
volved expense,  friction  with  other  powers,  perhaps  war; 
it  would  inevitably  interfere  with  Bismark's  well  known 
scheme  to  secure  the  hegemony  of  Germany  in  Europe  by 
concentration  upon  the  strengthening  of  internal  resources 
and  the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  with  England. 
Indeed,  on  January  9,  1868,  the  Chancellor  wrote  to  von 
Roon:  "All  colonial  enterprise  must  be  left  to  private  in- 
dividuals ;  all  the  advantages  claimed  for  the  mother  country 
are  for  the  most  part  illusions.  England  is  abandoning  her 
colonial  policy;  she  finds  it  too  costly  ....  Germany  has 
no  navy  and  conflicts  with  other  powers  are  inevitable.''  ^ 

It  is  apparent  that  the  writings  of  colonial  partisans  as 
well  as  the  press  propaganda  worried  Bismark  at  the  time, 
because  he  ordered  the  press  to  announce  that  the  North 
German  Confederation  contemplated  no  annexations  and, 
also,  because  he  instructed  Consul  von  W^eber,  in  Samoa, 
to  avoid  scrupulously  anything  which  might  lead  to  a  mis- 
understanding with  the  United  States."  He  was  not  at  all 
certain  how  the  sentiments  for  expansion  would  be  inter- 
preted abroad.  He  was  consistent,  therefore,  when  he  re- 
fused the  colony  of  Mozambique  which  Portugal  offered 

^  Zimmerinann,    Geschtchte    der    Deutsche)!    Kolonialpolitik    (Berlin, 
1914),  p.  6. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  9. 


1 8         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [  i  g 

for  purchase/  as  well  as  the  protectorate  proffered  by  the 
Sultan  of  Znlu  in  1867. 

After  the  battle  of  Sedan,  Bismarck  had  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  secure  colonies  had  he  desired  them :  on 
October  23,  1870,  Theophile  Gautier,  an  Under-Prefect, 
came  to  him  from  the  Empress  Eugenie,  to  propose  that 
Germany  take  Strassburg  and  its  vicinity,  Cochin  China 
and  two  million  francs,  instead  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but 
Bismarck  would  not  consider  it."  Gautier  then  suggested 
that  Alsace-Lorraine  be  made  a  buffer  state;  whereupon 
Bismarck  replied,  "If  the  king  and  I  return  home  without 
having  secured  Alsace-Lorraine  unconditionally,  we  should 
be  received  with  stones,"  which  indicated  that  the  acquisition 
of  colonies  was  apparently  a  predominant  desire  neither 
of  the  administration  nor  of  the  large  majority  of  German 
people.  When,  during  the  peace  preliminaries  at  Versailles 
on  February  9,  1871,  France  again  offered  to  relinquish  her 
colonies  in  China  and  elsewhere  in  place  of  Alsace  Lorraine, 
Bismarck  replied,  "  I  will  have  no  colonies.  For  Germany 
to  possess  colonies  would  be  like  a  poverty  stricken  Polish 
nobleman  acquiring  a  silken  sable  coat  when  he  needed 
shirts."  ^ 

At  this  time,  Bismarck  seemed  either  to  fail  to  realise 
the  value  of  colonies  or  else  to  prefer  to  postpone  their  ac- 
quisition until  the  nation  was  stronger.  The  latter  opinion 
appears  the  more  correct,  in  view  of  the  political  situation  at 
the  time.  Engrossed  first  in  his  task  O'f  unifying  and 
centralizing  the  empire,  then  absorbed  in  his  bitter  struggle 
with  the  Church,  Bismarck  had  little  opportunity  to  apply 

1  Zimmermann,  op.  cii.,  p.  i. 

*Cannstatt,   "  Fiirst  .Bismark's   Kolonial   Politische  Initiative,"   Zeit- 
schrifi  fiir  KolonialpoUtik,  June,  1908,  p.  438. 

'  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  3  vols.    (Berlin,  1889),  vol.  i, 
p.  63. 


I 


19]  INTRODUCTION  ig 

himself  to  external  expansion.  Furthermore,  the  guiding 
principle  of  his  foreign  policy,  the  isolatioin  of  France  and 
the  maintenance  of  friendship  with  England,  would  inhibit 
any  activity  likely  to  cause  friction  with  foreign  Powers, 
especially  when  Germany's  navy  was  not  strong. 

Moreover,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  such  personages 
as  Bucher,  Prince  Adalbert  and  Admiral  Livonius,  he 
lacked  the  support  of  official  circles  for  any  colonial  policy. 
Politicians,  ministers  and  bureaucrats,  the  practical  states- 
men of  the  day,  did  not  possess  sufficient  sympathy,  under- 
standing and  imagination  to  appreciate  the  movement  for 
colonies  which,  as  we  shall  see,  was  in  a  very  embryonic 
and  experimental  stage.  As  a  class  they  were  too  conserva- 
tive to  venture  on  untrodden  paths. 

//'^In  the  second  place,  the  prevailing  economic  doctrine  of 
)the  times,  that  of  laissea-faire,  would  also  prevent  colonial 
(^  expansion.  This  was  the  era  of  the  ascendency  of  the 
National  Liberal  party  and  Bismarck  was  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  free  traders,  who  considered  colonies  an 
anachronism.  To  have  fostered  anything  at  variance  with 
the  free-trade  principle  overseas  would  also  have  aroused 
the  antagonism  of  England.  To  be  sure,  a  small  group  of 
economists,  composed  of  List,  Wappaus.  Wagner,  and 
Roscher,  had  begun  twenty-five  years  before  to  break  away 
from  the  Manchester  School,  and  to  urge  a  colonial  policy; 
but  the  predominant  national  school  of  political  economy  in 
Germany  did  not  yet  regard  even  German  emigration  from 
anything  but  the  cosmopolitan  view-point.  Friedrich 
Kapp,  a  well  known  representative  political  economist  of 
the  time,  who  became  Government  Commissioner  for 
Germans  in  the  United  States  in  1866,  emphasized  entirely 
the  cosmopolitan  idea.^     He  was  the  author  of  several  booksl 

^ Allgemeine  Deutsche  Biographic,  vol.  li,  pp.  22,  Z2- 


20         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [20 

on  emigration  which  showed  no  interest  whatsoever  in  a 
narrow,  nationalistic  colonialism/ 

Lastly,  from  Bismarck's  own  lips  we  have  the  statement 
that  "  No  country  should  engage  upon  colonial  activity, 
\  unless  a  strong  public  opinion  supports  it;  "  ^  and  when  in 
these  first  years,  public  opinion  was  not  avowedly  opposed 
to  colonialism,  it  was  indifferent.  The  following  sentiments 
may  be  termed  fairly  characteristic  of  most  Germans  who 
thought  on  the  subject  at  all. 

Colonialism  is  a  sad  political  anachronism.  The  voices  which 
would  persuade  us  to  take  this  dangerous,  neck-breaking  course 
have  become  less  as  the  nation  grows  more  powerful.  There  is 
no  room  for  German  colonies  now.  Even  other  countries  which 
have  had  colonies  have  wearied  of  them.  Colonies  are  only  out- 
lets for  business.  .  .  .  Germany  has  a  constant  stream  of  emi- 
grants going  out  to  enrich  the  world.  It  is  claimed  that  this  is  a 
national  loss  and  should  be  stopped.  But  these  emigrants  keep 
alive  the  German  spirit  and  should  not  be  interfered  with,  either 
to  direct  or  to  hinder.^ 

Desire  for  colonies  should  be  considered  chimerical.  They  are 
an  anachronism.  The  advantages  of  colonialism  are  very  few  and 
the  expense  very  great.  Beyond  our  frontiers,  we  wish  to  seek 
nothing  Imt  peace.*  ^ 

in  oummar)°  we  may  say  that  the  national  psychology 
resulting  from  the  unification  of  the  empire  was  influenced 
by  certain  political  and  economic  factors  in  favor  of  colon- 
ization. On  the  other  hand  the  effect  of  these  factors  would 
seem  to  -bo  far  outweighed  by  the  hostility  of  the  Govern- 

^Vide  Kapp,  Aus  und  Uber  Amerika  (Berlin,  1876). 

* Hahn-Wippermann,  Fiirst  Bismarck,  5  vols.  (Berlin,  1891),  vol.  v, 
p.  4. 

•Lammers,  Deutschland  nach  dem  Krieg:  Ideen  su  einen  Programme 
Nationaler  Politik  (Leipzig,  1871). 

*Cheradame,  La  colonisation  et  les  colonies  allemandes  (Paris,  1905), 
p.  28,  quoting  from  Meyers,  Konversation  Lexikon,  art.  "  Kolonieen." 


21  ]  \  INTRODUCTION  21 

merit,  by  tpe  iHftH3pie.ii'iUS  international  situation,  by  the 
dominant,  Antagonistic  economic  thought  of  the  day,  and 
by  the  apatny  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  German  people. 
'  In  theTiraki,  the  German  national  mind  during  the  early 
years  of  the  empire  did  not  regard  with  approval  the  adop- 
tion of  an  imperial  colonial  policy-t-indeadTt  was  distinctly 
opposed  to  any  idea  of  expansion  overseas. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Theory  of  Colonialism 

It  has  often  been  said  that  England  built  up  her  colonial 
empire  in  "  a  fit  of  absent-mindedness,"  which  aptly  des- 
cribes the  lack  of  any  pre-conceived  plan  of  British  expan- 
sion. To  apply  this  statement  to  Germany,  however,  would 
be  to  convey  a  wholly  erroneous  impression ;  for  the  German 
colonial  empire  was  acquired  with  presence  rather  than 
absence  of  mind.  While  it  may  be  an  English  character- 
istic to  construct  a  policy  to  fit  the  facts,  it  is  indeed  a  dis- 
tinctive habit  of  the  Germans  to  formulate,  at  the  very  out- 
set, an  abstract  theory  as  a  guide  to  practice. 

During  the  early  years  of  the  empire,  colonial  expansion 
was  predominantly  an  idea,  projected  and  promulgated  by 
the  so-called  doctrinaires  and  intellectuals,  as  well  as  sup- 
plemented by  certain  definite  currents  within  the  national 
life.  To  be  sure,  the  belief  manifested  itself  in  different 
ways :  with  some  of  its  exponents,  it  assumed  the  form  of 
a  general  national  policy  to  be  preached  and  urged;  with 
some,  a  vision  to  be  realized  at  a  future  time;  while  with 
others,  it  seemed  a  compelling  necessity  for  immediate  action. 
Whatever  various  means  of  expression  conveyed  the  idea, 
they  all  united,  nevertheless,  to  form  a  distinct  colonial  cult, 
whose  existence  at  the  dawn  of  the  empire  is  evident  to  the 
most  superficial  observer. 

A  closer  scrutiny  of  the  colonial  theory  reveals  its  various 
elements.  In  the  first  place,  the  nucleus  was  a  national 
tradition  of  expansion  conferred  upon  the  new  Germany  as 

22  [22 


23]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  2^ 

a  heritage  from  Prussia  and  extending  back  to  the  emigra- 
tory propensities  of  the  earhest  Teutonic  tribes. 

Both  the  general  history  of  Germany  and  the  specific 
colonial  experiments  of  Prussia  contributed  to  the  founding 
and  fostering  of  the  tradition,  of  which  our  survey  must 
be  very  brief.  To  begin  with  the  thirteenth  century  as  a 
point  of  departure: — the  Teutonic  Knights  commenced  to 
supply  an  historic  background;  they  penetrated  eastward 
and  achieved  conquests  in  the  Baltic  lands.  Animated  by  a 
keen  religious  zeal,  they  added  the  impulse  of  romance  to  the 
tradition.  Later,  the  Hanse  Merchants  succeeded  them 
with  their  world-renowned  exploits.  Although  they 
founded  their  settlements  and  far-flung  factories  only  in 
the  interests  of  trade  and  not  for  colonization,  strictly  so- 
called,  still  they  imparted  a  strength  and  tenacity  to  the 
tradition  of  colonialism  and  they  made  it  one  of  peculiar 
and  lasting  influence.  Down  through  the  centuries,  even 
into  the  twentieth,  the  fame,  the  initiative,  the  striking 
success  of  the  Hansards  have  survived  as  favored  subjects 
of  German  pen  and  tongue.  In  the  fifteenth  century,  more- 
over, Germany  boasted  an  explorer  and  cosmographer.  a 
friend  and  contemporary  of  Columbus  and  Magellan, 
Martin  Behaim  of  Nuremberg.  He  traveled  under  the  pat- 
ronage of  the  Portuguese,  but  bequeathed  to  his  native  town 
a  globe  of  the  known  world.  Germans  like  also  to  recall 
the  memory  of  the  Augsburg  Welser,  who  in  the  middle 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  under  Charles  the  Fifth,  under- 
took to  colonize  Venezuela  as  a  militar}^  conquest.  "  without 
any  serious  prospects  of  commercial  advantage." 

Specific  Prussian  activities  supplemented  the  general 
background  of  German  history  and  made  the  colonial  tradi- 
tion  far  more  real.^     Prussian  colonialism  began   in   the 

1  Qieradame,  op.  cit.,  passim. 


24         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [24 

seventeenth  century.  The  Great  Elector  was  early  in- 
spired with  imperial  ambitions  and  attempted  to  realize  them 
even  before  the  treaty  of  Westphalia.  He  established  an 
Elast  India  Company  as  early  as  1647  ^.nd  granted  it  a 
charter;  but  the  company  existed  only  on  paper.  In  1650, 
he  purchased  from  the  Danes  Tranquebar  and  the  Fort  of 
Danesburg,  both  situated  on  the  southeast  coast  of  India; 
but  he  was  soon  obliged  to  relinquish  them  because  he  had 
no  resources  with  which  to  protect  and  maintain  them. 

Meanwhile,  the  Great  Elector  sent  out  an  expedition  to 
reconnoitre  the  coasts  of  Guinea  in  1 676-1 677,  for  he  had 
built  up  a  considerable  navy  in  his  efforts  to  consolidate 
his  new  possessions  on  the  Baltic  Sea,  after  1648.  The 
result  was  a  treaty  concluded  with  the  native  chiefs;  it 
placed  under  the  Great  Elector's  protection  the  territory 
on  the  Gold  Coast  between  Axim  and  the  Cape  of  Three 
Points.  The  Great  Elector  then  founded  in  1682  a  Com- 
mercial Company  to  which  he  gave  a  monopoly  of  trade  on 
this  coast  for  twenty  years.  In  1683,  the  agent  of  the 
Company,  Frederick  von  der  Groeben,  established  a  factory 
and  built  the  Fortress  Gross  Friedrichsburg.  Two  years 
later  another  agent  built  two  more  forts  and  the  natives  of 
Taccorary  placed  themselves  under  Prussian  protection,, 
which  greatly  excited  the  envy  of  the  Dutch.  In  1686, 
negotiations  for  a  naval  base  on  Arguin  Island  were  con- 
cluded, and  concessions  for  the  Company  were  secured  from 
France  and  Holland  by  the  treaties  of  1683- 1685.  The 
port  of  Emden,  where  the  business  was  centralized,  was 
enlarged  and  the  operations  of  the  Company  extended  to 
Hamburg.  All  these  efforts,  however,  met  with  very 
mediocre  results.  At  the  end  of  four  more  years,  the  Com- 
pany's capital  had  to  be  increased  by  one-quarter  in  order 
to  enable  its  enterprises  to  survive  at  all,  and  the  Prussian 
Government  was  obliged  to  come  to  the  rescue.     But  the 


25]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  25 

Dutch  were  all  powerful  on  the  coast  of  Guinea  and  in  1687, 
picking  a  quarrel  with  Prussia,  they  seized  the  territory  oc- 
cupied by  her,  a  calamity  which  almost  synchronized  with 
the  death  of  the  Great  Elector. 

His  successor,  Frederick  the  First  of  Prussia,  had  no  in- 
terest whatsoever  in  colonies,  save  in  the  pleasure  he  took 
in  receiving  the  negro  ambassadors  from  Guinea.  The 
fortunes  of  the  Company  went  from  bad  to  worse.  After 
laborious  efforts  the  restitution  of  its  territories  was 
secured,  but  financially  it  was  ruined.  In  1691,  its  debt 
amounted  to  900,000  thalers  and  the  Prussian  treasury  had 
again  to  come  to  its  rescue.  The  War  of  the  Spanish  Suc- 
cession created  a  new  enemy,  the  French  Corsairs,  who 
together  with  the  Dutch  were  a  menace  to  the  African  set- 
tlements. Finally  Frederick  William  the  First,  in  171 7,  at- 
tempted to  retrieve  the  situation  by  transferring  the  rights 
of  the  African  Company  to  the  East  India  Company,  an 
expedient  which  proved  entirely  without  success.  More- 
over, the  French  in  Senegal  and  the  Dutch  in  Guinea  re- 
newed their  attacks  upon  Prussian  territory  in  1720. 
Frederick  William,  however,  had  a  greater  desire  for  money 
wherewith  to  pay  his  soldiers  than  for  overseas  expan- 
sion, and  accordingly,  in  1725,  he  ceded  to  the  Dutch  all  the 
Prussian  African  interests  for  the  small  indemnity  of  7,200 
ducats;  and  Prussia  disappeared  from  Africa. 

The  Great  Elector's  efforts  in  America  and  the  Orient 
met  with  the  same  failure.  In  1685,  he  attempted  an  estab- 
lishment in  the  Antilles  and  by  a  contract  with  the  Danes 
gained  a  part  of  the  Island  of  Saint  Thomas,  where  he  tried 
to  maintain  a  slave  station;  but  this  enterprise  lacked  the 
support  of  his  successors  and  the  land  reverted  to  the  Danes. 
The  East  India  Company  somewhat  re\nved  after  Prussia 
had  gained  a  foothold  in  Africa  but  its  efforts  to  improve 
conditions  there  in  171 7  finally  ruined  it. 


26         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [26 

Thus  the  Prussian  colonies  of  the  seventeenth  century 
had  only  an  ephemeral  existence:  they  were  imposed  from 
above  and  were  at  no  time  in  favor  with  or  supported  by  the 
nation ;  their  collapse  was  "  the  failure  of  a  strong  initia- 
tive to  overcome  the  prejudices  of  a  whole  people."  The 
Great  Elector  was  obliged  to  depend  on  Dutch  agents,  the 
country  was  too  young  to  support  colonization  overseas,  and 
it  encountered  too  strong  rivals  in  the  field.  Prussia's 
colonial  history  ended  in  1725.  It  left  no  durable  trace 
and  people  even  forgot  the  efforts  of  the  Great  Elector. 
Nevertheless,  when  another  colonial  enthusiasm  arose  in  the 
late  nineteenth  century,  it  proved  convenient  and  expedient 
for  its  exponents  to  hark  back  to  the  general  history  of 
Germany  and  to  the  imperial  ambitions  of  Prussia,  and  to 
revive  them  as  a  national  tradition.  They  had  certainly 
pointed  the  way  both  figuratively  and  geographically,  and 
could  easily  serve  as  a  precedent  for  new  imperial  aims. 
Indeed,  the  very  fact  that  the  early  attempts  had  failed, 
largely  because  of  powerful  rivals,  provided  another  argu- 
ment for  the  new  Germany,  in  her  fresh,  united  strength,  to 
attempt  a  retrievement  of  that  failure  and  to  achieve  a 
triumphant  realization  of  what  might  be  readily  represented 
and  accepted  as  a  great  national  ambition. 

In  the  second  place,  professors,  historians,  and  political 
scientists  contributed  to  the  colonial  idea  by  voicing  the 
national  tradition.  Their  writings  and  influence  established 
the  theory  of  colonial  expansion  as  a  positive,  prevailing 
doctrine  in  intellectual  circles  during  the  early  years  of  the 
empire.  Indeed,  for  thirty  years  before  1870,  the  greatest 
German  thinkers  had  been  pointing  out  the  necessity  for 
expansion,  and  the  later  minor  protagonists  merely  re- 
flected the  ideas  already  formulated  by  their  forerunners. 
Their  theory  of  national  expansion  received  neither  support 
nor  s}Tnpathy  from  official  and  commercial  classes,  at  first, 
and  was  thus  mainly  restricted  to  the  university  world. 


27]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  27 

Treitschke  and  Droysen  represented  the  view  of  nation- 
alist historians  and  naturally  urged  the  expansion  and  pro- 
jection of  German  nationality.  Treitschke  especially  had 
an  enormous  influence.  He  was  appointed  to  a  chair  in  the 
University  of  Freiburg-im^Breisgau  in  1863,  subsequently 
going  to  the  Universities  of  Kiel,  Heidelbeig  and  finally,  in 
1874,  Berlin.  Added  to  his  academic  was  his  political 
influence,  for  he  entered  the  Reichstag  in  1870  where  he  re- 
mained for  nearly  twenty  years.  As  everyone  knows. 
Treitschke  stood  for  the  Pan-German  doctrine  in  its  fullest 
extent  and  taught  that  Germany's  most  pressing  need  was  the 
acquisition  of  colonies.  It  is  merely  a  crystallization  of  his 
earlier  teachings,  when  he  writes  in  his  Politics :  ^  "  People 
from  elder  states,  who  have  been  disciplined,  go  out  and 
found  new  states  ....  Every  virile  people  has  established 
colonial  power  ....  All  great  nations  in  the  fulness  of 
their  strength  have  desired  to  set  their  mark  upon  barbarian 
lands  and  those  who  fail  to  participate  in  this  great  rivalry 
will  play  a  pitiable  role  in  time  to  come.  The  colonising 
impulse  has  become  a  vital  question  for  every  great  nation.'' 
He  preached  with  brutal  frankness  that  Germany  should 
prepare  for  the  eventual  seizure  of  the  British  colonies  in 
order  that  Teutonic  influence  should  be  supreme.  "  Eng- 
land's colonial  policy  has  not  been  fortunate  at  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope*.  The  civilization  which  exists  there  is 
Teutonic,  is  Dutch  ....  If  our  nation  had  the  courage 
to  construct  with  determination,  construct  an  independent 
colonial  empire,  a  collision  of  our  interests  and  those  of 
England  would  be  unavoidable."  In  this  century  of 
national  states  and  of  armed  nations,  a  cosmopolitan  trad- 
ing power  such  as  England  can  no  longer  maintain  herself 

^Treitschke.    Politics    (Berlin,    1898),    translated    by    Dugdale    and 
DeBille  (London,  1916). 
*  Treitschke,  Deutsche  Kdmpfe  (Berlin,  1879). 


28         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [28 

for  any  length  of  time."  ^  In  1885  he  merely  confirmed 
what  he  had  written  twenty  years  before :  "  Only  those 
states  which  possess  navies  and  control  territories  overseas 
can  rank  in  future  as  great  Powers."  " 

Minor  exponents  of  the  phase  of  the  colonial  theory, 
which  Treitschke  represented  were,  Franz  Mauer,^  whose 
pamphlet,  Die  Nkoharen,  and  whose  articles  in  the 
Rhenische  Zeitung  in  1865,  recommended  the  annexation 
of  naval  stations  as  footholds  of  national  strength,  and  J.  J. 
Sturz,*  "  der  Vorkampfer  deutscher  Ubcrseepolitik,''  who 
had  been  most  active  in  promoting  colonization  in  Brazil. 
The  writings  of  the  latter  were  quite  numerous,  Kann  iind 
Soil  ein  Ncudeutschland  Geschaifen  Werden,  and  Die  Krisis 
der  Deutscher  Aiis-wanderung  und  ihre  Benutsung,  appear- 
ing in  1862  and  Die  Deutche  Auswanderung,  in  1868. 
These  pamphlets  urged  direction  of  German  emigration  to 
Brazil  and  settlement  there,  while  later  in  Der  IVieder- 
gezuonnen  Welttheil:  Ein  Neues  Gemeinsames  Indien, 
(Berlin  1876),  he  advised  a  German  protectorate  in  East 
Africa. 

Many  years  before  the  nationalist  historians  advocated 
colonial  expansion,  List  had  promoted  the  subject  from  his 
own  point  of  view,  political  economy.  He  broke  with  the 
prevailing  laissez-faire  and  cosmopolitan  school,  and  urged 
colonialism  as  part  of  a  national  program.  In  his 
National  System  of  Political  Economy  (1841)  he  advised 
a  strong  colonial  policy  in  all  of  its  phases. 

A  vigorous  German  consular  and  diplomatic  service  ought  to  be 

^Ibid.,  Turkei  und  die  Grosse  Macht  (1876),  in  Deutsche  K'dmpfe, 
p.  677. 

*Ihid.,  Deutsche  Kolonisation  (Berlin,  1885),  in  Hausrath,  Treitschke 
(London,  1914),  pp.  195-216. 

*Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  5. 

*Ibid.,  p.  5- 


29]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  29 

established.  .  .  .  Young  explorers  should  be  encouraged  to  travel 
through  these  countries  and  make  impartial  reports  upon  them. 
Young  merchants  should  be  encouraged  to  inspect  them.  Young 
physicians  should  go  and  practice  there.  Enterprises  should  be 
founded  and  supported  by  stock  companies  and  taken  under  gov- 
ernmental protection.  Companies  should  be  formed  in  the  Ger- 
man seaports  in  order  to  buy  land  in  foreign  countries  and  settle 
them  with  German  colonists ;  also  companies  for  commerce  and 
navigation,  whose  object  should  be  to  open  new  markets  abroad 
for  German  manufacturers  and  to  establish  steamship  lines ;  and 
again,  mining  companies  should  be  established  whose  object  would 
be  to  devote  German  knowledge  and  industry  to  winning  great 
mineral  wealth.  .  .  .  Colonies  are  the  best  means  of  developing 
manufactures,  export  and  import  trade,  and  finally  a  respectable 
navy.^ 

Lothar  Bucher,  a  member  of  the  Prussian  Foreign  Min- 
istry, revived  List's  ideas,  on  the  eve  of  the  empire,  by  his 
articles  in  the  Norddeutsche  Allegemeine  Zeitung  for 
February,  1867.  He  pointed  out  that  everything  which 
List  had  recommended  for  Prussia  had  been  accomplished 
except  the  acquisition  of  colonies,  and  urged  the  speedy 
establishment  of  a  colonial  kingdom,  naming  Timor,  the 
Philippines  and  St.  Thomas  as  objects."  Also  in  his  Bilder 
aits  dcr  Fremdc  ^  Bucher  had  expressed  himself  in  favor  of 
colonies.  Likewise  advocating  List's  theory,  was  the  work 
of  Ernst  Friedel,  whose  book,  Die  Griindnng  Prciiss- 
Deutschcn  Colonicen  in  der  Indischen  Ozean  (1867).  em- 
phasized opportunities  for  expansion  in  the  Far  East,  es- 
pecially recommending  Formosa.  "Maritime  commerce, 
ships  of  war,  colonies,  are  all  terms  which  complement  each 
other,"  he  said.  "  The  value  of  each  is  diminished,  if  one 
is  lacking."  * 

^List,  National  System   of  Political  Economy    (1&41),   translated  by 
Lloyd  (London,  New  York,  1904),  pp.  347,  216. 
'  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  5,  note  6. 
'Bucher,  Bilder  aus  der  Fremde  (Berlin,  1862-3). 
*Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 


30         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [30 

The  political  scientists,  Roscher,  Wappaus,  Hoffken,  stres- 
sed another  point  of  view,  that  of  economic  necessity.  Like 
List  they  antedated  the  nationalist  historians.  They 
preached  colonialism  for  the  overflow  of  population  as  well 
as  for  the  benefit  of  trade,  and  demonstrated  the  value  of 
colonies  as  new  production  and  consumption  centres.^  At 
first,  German  economists  had  considered  emigration,  so 
great  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  a 
loss  to  Germany.  But  these  men  were  the  first  to  accord 
to  it  a  national  character,  for  they  regarded  it  rather  as  an 
important  factor  in  opening  new  markets,  raising  naviga- 
tion receipts,  etc.  Roscher  first  advanced  such  a  theory  in 
1848,  and  it  became  his  main  thesis:  "Germany  must  ex- 
pand on  the  sea  and  over  the  sea  into  foreign  lands  if  it 
wants  to  make  up  for  the  sins  of  past  generations.  New 
areas  for  production  and  consumption  must  be  secured  for 
our  national  interest,  be  they  gained  by  means  of  political 
or  economic  colonization." " 

Gradually,  the  growing  birth  rate  in  Germany  and  the 
responsibility  for  increasing  agricultural  products  greatly 
strengthened  the  economic  aspect  of  the  colonial  idea. 
Wappaus'  Geographic  und  Statistik  des  Kaiserreichs  Brazil- 
iiims  ^  particularly,  and  the  many  publications  and  brochures 
of  the  Central-z'erein*  f  iir  Handelsgeo graphic  und  Deutsche 
Interesse  in  Aiislande,  founded  in  1868,  contributed  to  ita 
support  and  perpetuation. 

One  more  potent  factor  in  promoting  colonization  for 
economic  reasons  was  the  influence  of  the  many  societies 
and  of  the  organized  efforts  for  emigration  founded  during 

*  Wappaus,  Deutsche  Auswanderung  und  Kolonisation  (Leipzig,  1846). 

*  Roscher,   Kolonieen,  Kolonialpolitik   und  Auswanderung    (Leipzig, 
1856),  second  edition. 

•Wappaus,  Geographie  und  Statistik  etc.  (Leipzig,  1871). 
4  Cf.  infra,  p.  51. 


31  ]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  31 

the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  the  writings 
of  the  theorists,  as  well  as  the  tremendous  streams  of 
emigrants,  had  stimulated.  To  mention  only  a  few :  the 
Berlin  Colonial  Society  (1844),  for  the  colonization  of  the 
Mosquito  Coast,  Prince  Solm's  colony  in  Texas  (1840),  the 
Society  for  the  Protection  of  Emigrants  (1844),  the  Stutt- 
gart Society  (1844),  which  promoted  settlements  in  South 
Chile,  the  Hamburg  National  Colonial  Society  (1849), 
which  founded  Dona  Franziska,  the  National  Society  for 
German  Emigration  (1848)  in  Frankfort,  and  many 
others/  They  supplied  advice,  information,  and  material 
aid  to  emigrants.  It  is  true  that  these  organizations  had 
died  out  by  the  year  1870,  except  the  Hamburg  Society,  the 
Frankfort  branch  of  the  National  Society,  and  a  Dresden 
association.^  Their  traditions  still  persisted,  however,  and 
reinforced  by  the  theories  of  new  advocates,  formed  an  im- 
portant element  of  the  colonial  idea.  Especially  was  this 
true  when,  as  the  seventies  progressed  and  emigration  as- 
sumed enormous  proportions,  societies  were  formed  'at 
Cologne,  Leipzig,  and  Frankfort,  to  prepare  the  mother 
country  for  the  occupancy  of  distant  lands. 

As  we  have  seen,  it  was  first  German  tradition,  and  then 
historians  and  political  scientists,  who  fostered  the  idea  of 
national  expansion.  Now  in  the  third  place,  explorers  and 
geographers  added  numerous  accounts  of  travels  and  re- 
searches in  natural  science  to  tlie  colonial  theory. 

Since  the  eighteenth  century,  Germans  of  this  t^-pe  had 
been  interested  in  Africa  and  had  done  much  to  increase 
knowledge  and  to  excite  curiosity  concerning  lands  beyond 
the  sea.  From  1840  to  1870,  and  especially  immediately 
preceding  the  period  under  re\new,  many  German  travelers 

^Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  312. 

^Jahrbuch  fiir  Xattonokdnotnic  und  Statistik,  1884,  p.  12. 


32         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [32 

and  scientists  had  been  busy  penetrating  the  unknown  places 
of  the  earth.  Gustav  Mann  had  studied  flora  in  the  region 
of  the  Niger ; '  Dr.  Bastian  of  Bremen  had  made  a  tour 
of  the  world,  writing  a  book  about  Africa;"  Heinrich 
Barth,  of  Hamburg,  had  been  the  first  European  to  ex- 
plore the  Hinterland  of  Kamerun;^  the  geologist  Karl  von 
Fretsch  had  devoted  himself  to  the  mineralogy  of 
Morocco;*  Karl  Mauch,  upon  returning  from  the  Trans- 
vaal, had  ended  one  of  his  speeches  saying,  "  May  this 
beautiful  land  some  day  become  a  German  colony."^ 

The  expedition  of  Dr.  Otto  Kersten,  Baron  von  Decken 
and  Richard  Brenner  in  East  Africa  had  called  forth  a  re- 
q'.est  from  the  Sultan  Zimba  of  Wituland  for  the  official 
protection  of  Prussia,  coupled  with  an  offer  to  render  all 
aid  and  hospitality  to  German  travellers  and  settlers.*  In 
1864,  Baron  von  Decken  had  written  from  the  River  Zuba 
that  a  colony  there  would  be  most  advantageous,  especially 
after  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal."'  Dr.  Otto  Kersten 
likewise  shared  and  spread  this  idea  in  his  work,  Uber 
Kolonisation  in  Ost  Afrika  (Wien,  1867),  recommending 
the  River  Zuba  as  a  most  favorable  means  of  entrance  to  the 
interior  and  the  settlement  of  such  regions  as  Momba  and 
Victoria  Nyanza.^  J.  J.  Stiirz  promoted  the  same  plan 
later  after  Brenner's  death.  He  advocated  consuls  for  East 
Africa,  the  erection  of  a  railroad  and  the  payment  of  state 

'Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  20. 
*Ibid. 

'Coppius,   Hamburg's   Bedeutung   auf  dem   Gebiete   der   Deutschen 
Kolonialpolitik  (Berlin,  1905).  p.  5i- 
Ubid. 

'Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  2>2- 
"Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  7. 
''  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  4,  note  5. 
^ Ibid.,  op.  cit.,  p.  8,  note  9. 


33]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  33 

subsidies  to  a  steamship  line  from  Germany.'  All  these  men 
either  lent  the  weight  of  their  influence  to  the  theorists  who 
were  building  up  the  colonial  idea  or  else,  by  their  direct 
contributions,  became  members  of  the  group  themselves. 

Many  journeys  to  distant  lands  were  undertaken  at  the 
expense  of  the  German  Society  for  the  Discovery  of  the 
Interior  of  Africa,  founded  by  Professor  Bastian,  on  April 
30,  1873,-  ^s  well  as  of  the  German  African  Society, 
founded  in  1876,  which  was  a  branch  of  the  International 
African  Association.^ 

The  contribution  of  scientists  and  travelers  to  the  colonial 
theory  received  a  decided  stiimulus  from  the  International 
Congress  called  at  Brussels  by  King  Leopold  of  Belgium  in 
1876  and  from  the  organization  of  the  African  International 
Society  which  resulted.  Likewise,  the  journeys  of  Stanley, 
Nachtigall  and  Rholfs  awakened  new  interest  in  the  Dark 
Continent,  in  travel  and  exploration  in  general,  and  in  the 
question  of  German  colonization  in  particular. 

Finally,  missionary  zeal  contributed  to  the  colonial  theory 
which  existed  in  1871 ;  and  like  the  enthusiasms  for  emigra- 
tion and  exploration  it  had  also  crystallized  into  societies. 
These  became  active  centers  of  agitation  for  national  ex- 
pansion. Before  1870.  at  least  eight  strong  societies  for 
work  abroad  had  been  founded,  of  which  the  Barmen  Rhine 
Mission,  the  Bremen  ^Mission  and  the  Basel  Mission  were 
the  most  important.*  The  missions  encouraged  trade  and 
helped  colonists  and  travelers  wherever  they  carried  on  their 
work.  Their  publications,  reports  and  presentation  of  their 
needs,  formed  another  current  of  influence,  within  the  life 

1  Cf.  supra,  p.  28 ;  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  16. 

'Barth,   Die   von   1865-1S95   Fortschritten    der   Kentuiss    (Stuttgart. 
1898),  p.  73- 
'  Keltic,  op.  cit.,  p.  165. 
*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  103. 


34         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [34 

of  Germany,  which  disseminated  colonial  information  and 
aroused  interest  in  expansion. 

The  Barmen  Rhine  Mission  established  its  first  settle- 
ment in  Namaqualand  in  Southwest  Africa.  Knauer  estab- 
lished a  station  there  at  Gibeon^  in  1863  and  in  1864  Hahn 
was  sent  to  organize  a  missionary  colony  on  the  coast  at 
Otymbingue,  "  in  order  through  the  example  of  German, 
efficiency  and  activity  to  influence  the  natives."  ^  As  the 
missionary  Biittner  states  in  his  book,  entitled  Das  Hinter- 
land von  IVaWschbai  und  Angra  Pequena,^  this  settlement 
is  "the  first  piece  of  territory  overseas  acquired  by  Ger- 
mans." Other  stations  were  settled  in  Namaqualand :  one 
at  Windhook,  in  1867  and  one  at  Grootfontein  in  1873.* 
Indeed  the  missionaries  became  very  much  involved  in  trade 
throughout  the  region,  gained  a  strong  foothold  and  ex- 
erted a  great  influence  upon  German  colonisation.  In 
1868,^  Dr.  Fabri,  Inspector  of  the  Rhine  Mission,  asked 
from  the  Government  protection  of  its  work  in  the  Herero 
land,  but  was  refused.  Nevertheless,  by  the  year  1883, 
Fabri 's  society  controlled  ten  stations  or  more,  containing 
five  thousand  Christians,  in  South  West  Africa.^  Contem- 
poraneously, the  Basel  Mission  pursued  its  activities  in  a 
smaller  way  on  the  Gold  Coast  in  Togoland,  where  it  had 
first  entered  the  English  settlements  in  1853.^ 

Among  the  South  Sea  Islands,  German  missionaries  had 
also   been   active.     Two   missionaries  had   gone  to   New 

'Koschitzky,  o{>.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  103. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  40. 

'Oberlander,  Deutsch-Afrika  (Leipzig,  1885),  p.  162. 

*Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  40. 

^Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  8. 

*Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  40. 

'Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  172. 


35]  THE  THEORY  OF  COLONIALISM  35 

Guinea  in   1855,  several  to  North  Borneo,   the  Marshall 
Islands  and  to  the  Samoan  group.  ^ 

The  foregoing  summary  has  shoAvn  that  the  first  phase 
of  the  colonial  movement  in  modem  Germany  was  a  theory, 
an  idea.  Professors,  historians,  political  economists,  scien- 
tists, explorers  and  missionaries  had  constructed  and  dis- 
seminated theoretical  colonialism  more  or  less  uncon- 
sciously; they  had  made  it  a  definite  subject  of  discussion 
and  treatise  in  the  early  seventies.  Colonialism  thus  lived 
very  vitally  in  the  way  that  doctrines  and  convictions  sur- 
vive; but  it  was,  at  best,  very  abstract  and  largely  imprac- 
ticable. Indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  the  statesmen  of  the 
day  viewed  the  "  professor-led  multitude "  clamoring  for 
expansion,  with  the  hearty  dislike  with  which  the  initiative 
of  the  people  is  apt  to  be  regarded  in  Germany.  Likewise, 
Bismarck's  personal  distaste  for  all  things  impractical,  es- 
pecially for  "visionary"  professors  who  belonged  to  the 
political  opposition — as  they  did  in  the  early  seventies — 
militated  strongly  against  the  success  of  the  colonial  theory. 
In  short,  theoretical  colonialism  would  have  to  attain  a  much 
more  practical  significance  before  its  doctrinaire  ideas,  em- 
anating chiefly  from  university  circles,  could  command 
official  attention  and  response. 

^  Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  109. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Rise  of  Commercial  Colonialism  :  Direct  Action" 
Versus  the  Power  of  Ideas 

During  the  early  years  of  the  German  Empire,  as  we 
have  seen  in  the  preceding  chapter,  a  sort  of  theoretical 
colonialism  was  developing.  Beneath  its  surface,  how-, 
ever,  appeared  the  beginnings  of  a  real  commercial  expan- 
sion, silently  and  independently  transforming  theory  into 
practice. 

A  group  from  the  upper,  industrial  and  commercial  clas- 
ses, aided  by  the  banking  world,  initiated  the  movement; 
and  their  unobserved  activities,  in  contrast  with  the  abstrac- 
tions of  colonial  theorists,  have  suggested  the  sub-title  of 
this  chapter — direct  action  versus  the*  power  of  ideas. 
Gradually  they  placed  the  colonial  movement  more  in  ac- 
cord with  the  national  German  mind  of  1871-1875,  which 
was  attuned  to  the  pitch  of  practical,  political  and  economic 
achievement,  rather  than  to  idealistic  ventures  and  visions. 

A  survey  of  existing  German  trade  settlements  over  seas, 
in  the  dawning  years  of  the  new  empire,  is  essential  to  show 
the  foundations  upon  which  the  group  of  commercial 
colonialists  built.  For,  although  the  Prussian  Government 
had  officially  renounced  all  such  activities  since  1725,  in- 
dividual merchants  and  traders  had  undertaken  and  ac- 
complished much  upon  their  own  initiative. 

The  Hanse  towns,  in  line  with  their  old  tradition,  had 
provided  the  largest  number  oif  actors  for  the  commercial 
drama,  which  was  to  form  the  first  act  of  the  great  cycle  of 
36  [36 


37]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  37 

German  colonial  activities.  The  towns  of  Hamburg,  Bre- 
men and  Liibeck  had  never  entered  the  Zollverein.  They 
were  free  traders,  and  controlled  the  bulk  of  Germany's 
foreign  commerce.  They  had  brought  up  their  children 
with  ships  for  toys  when  their  little  Prussian  cousins  were 
playing  with  soldiers,  and  they  had  sent  their  youths  over 
seas  in  large  numbers.  There  was  scarcely  a  family  in 
these  towns  which  could  not  coimt  a  relative  or  acquain- 
tance d'  iiben. 

Africa  proved,  at  first,  the  chief  scene  of  their  activity. 
By  1 87 1,  many  Hamburg  and  Bremen  firms  had  secured 
strong  commercial  footholds  on  the  coasts  of  the  Dark  Con- 
tinent. To  E^st  Africa,  as  early  as  1844,  the  firm  of  Herz  ^ 
■  and  Son  had  sent  the  first  ship,  building  up  an  export  trade 
in  cowry  shells.  It  was  succeeded  by  the  firms  of  Hansing 
and  O'Swald.^  They  began  by  establishing  a  trade  with  the 
west  coast,  at  Lagos,  and  then  concentrated  their  efforts  in 
East  Africa  at  Zanzibar  in  1850.^  So  great  was  their  suc- 
cess, that  on  June  13,  1859.  a  trade  treaty  was  arranged 
between  the  Hanse  towns  and  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar,  which 
was  subsequently  extended  to  the  North  Germ^i  Confedera- 
tion in  1869  and  later  to  the  German  Empire.  The  firm  of 
O'Swald  controlled  most  of  the  commerce  and  by  the  year 
1874,  the  total  German  export  trade  from  Zanzibar 
amounted  to  three  and  one  half  *  million  marks,  three  times 
greater  than  that  of  England.  Indeed,  the  Sultan  hated  the 
English  and  was  the  friend  of  the  German  merchants,  to 
whose  efforts  must  be  entirely  credited  his  offer  ^  to  place  his 
country  under  German  protecion,  which  was  refused  by 

'  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 

^Ibid.,  p.  50. 

*  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  51,  and  Koschitzky,  vol.  i,  p.  244. 

*Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  244-245. 

^  Cf.  infra,  p.  50. 


4CS959 


38         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [38 

Bismarck  in  1874.  The  Zanzibar  trading-post  was  the  most 
important  in  East  Africa,  although  in  Witu  a  traveUing 
companion  of  Baron  von  Decken  had  estabhshed  very 
friendly  relations  with  the  rulers.  Later,  Clemens  Den- 
hardt  and  his  brother  Gustav  continued  to  foster  the  con- 
nection, and  it  became  the  nucleus  of  a  company  formed  in 
Berlin  in  1883.' 

The  successors  to  the  work  of  Hansing  and  O'Swald  in 
West  Africa  were  the  Hamburg  business  houses  of  Witt 
and  Biisch  and  G.  S.  Gaiser.  But  by  far  the  most  active 
firm  in  West  Africa,  dividing  and  sub-dividing  itself  and 
radiating  out  in  all  directions  was  that  of  C.  Woermann. 
First  entering  Liberia  in  1849,-  it  penetrated  and  spread 
through  territor}'  between  Gabun  and  the  Kameroons, 
founding  a  factory  in  Gabun  in  1862  ^  and  trading  stations 
on  the  Kameroon  River  in  1864.  Jantzen,  a  manager  for 
Woermann,  1 861 -i  871,  and  Thormahlen,  another  agent, 
formed  an  independent  firm,  setting  up  a  factory  in  Kame- 
roon in  iSy$.*  Their  trade  grew  enormously  and  by  1879 
they  owned  factories  along  the  coast  in  Great-Batanga,  on 
Bata  Bay,  and  on  the  Ogowe  River.  Later,  in  1879,  two 
other  managers  for  Woermann,  Wolber  and  Broehm, 
formed  a  partnership  on  this  coast,  thereby  giving  the 
House  of  Woermann  a  firm  grasp  on  the  entire  district  and 
placing  most  of  the  commerce  in  its  hands.  Its  packet 
boats  carried  on  regular  trade  with  all  the  West  African 
coast,  for  Germany  supplied  the  salt  for  most  of  this  part 
of  the  world  and  Hamburg  manufactured  the  gin  "  so  dear 
to  the  hearts  of  the  blacks." 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  p.  246. 
'Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  51. 

'  Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  64. 

*  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 


39]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  39 

Even  the  missionaries  engaged  largely  in  commerce  in 
West  Africa,  indeed  trade  seems  to  have  been  a  very  vital 
part  of  their  work.  In  1864,  a  stock  company,  with  capital 
of  7(X),ooo  M.  was  formed  in  Germany  to  support  the  com- 
mercial and  religious  work  of  the  Rhine  Barmen  Mission 
at  Otymbingue,  which  bought  the  land  and  buildings  of  the 
Walfisch  Bay  Copper  Company  and  carried  on  an  exten- 
sive business/  In  the  same  way,  the  Basel  Mission,  work- 
ing on  the  Gold  Coast  in  Togoland,  established  in  connec- 
tion with  its  trade  a  large  factory  at  Akra.^ 

The  following  figures  will  illustrate  the  subsequent 
growth  of  German  trade  in  West  Africa,  arising  from  these 
foundations. 

Year  Exports  io  Africa  Imports  to  Hamburg 

1879 279,252  M.  5,196,520  M. 

1880 335.080  6,735,090 

1881  30S.101  5.556.230 

1882 417,513  8475,100 

1883 442,774  9,105,150  3 

Africa,  however,  did  not  represent  the  only  stronghold 
of  the  practical  colonialists.  The  Hanse  towns  were  like- 
wise pioneers  of  trade  settlements  in  the  South  Seas.  So 
great  indeed  was  their  influence,  that,  as  early  at  1858,  a 
Prussian  sea  captain  was  asked  whether  Prussia  was  tribu- 
tary' to  Hamburg.* 

The  American  Captain  Wakeman,  in  his  report  ^  about 
Samoa,  writes,  in  1871,  of  calling  upon  T.  Weber,  agent  of 
the  Hamburg  House  of  Godeffroy.  and  of  finding  him  the 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  49. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  104;  Keltic,  op.  cit.,  p.  174. 
'Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.   128. 
*Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  62. 

^Report  of  Captain  Wakeman  to  H.  Webb  on  Samoa,  1S71  (New- 
York,  1872). 


40         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [40 

controller  of  the  Samoan  copra  trade.  The  House  of  God- 
effroy  became  important  in  the  island  as  early  as  1857.  It 
evidently  realized  that  Samoa  was,  as  Wakeman  describes  it, 
the  garden  of  the  Pacific  as  well  as  a  stragetic  commercial 
centre.  The  firm  began  to  buy  land  in  1857,  and  by  1859 
monopolised  all  the  trade.  Its  agent,  Theodore  Weber, 
entered  the  service  as  a  lad,  went  to  Samoa  in  1861,  and 
gradually  assumed  complete  control.  The  North  German 
Confederation  assisted  him  by  appointing  him  its  official 
representative.  It  was  due  to  his  management  that  numer- 
ous trading  depots  in  Oceania  were  created,  that  New 
Britain  was  added  to  the  sphere  of  the  firm's  commerce  in 
1 87 1,  and  that  the  traffic  in  oil  of  copra  was  organized  on 
a  vast  scale.^  Besides  copra,  this  House  carried  on  trade  in 
cocoa,  coffee,  and  sugar.  Each  year,  large  ships  left 
Europe  for  Apia,  the  headquarters  of  Godeffroy,  said  by 
Wakeman  to  be  the  best  distributing  centre  in  the  Samoan 
Islands.  With  its  headquarters  at  Apia,  the  firm's  activities 
ranged  from  Valparaiso  to  Cochin  China.  At  the  time  of 
the  Franco-Prussian  War,  its  trade  was  tremendous;  it 
controlled  stations  all  over  the  South  Seas,  and  the  English 
referred  to  its  head  as  the  "  South  Sea  King."  "  Rapidly 
the  House  of  Godeffroy  was  outstripping  the  English,  for 
whereas  in  1868,  there  were  thirty- four  English  ships  in 
Samoan  waters  and  twenty-four  German,  in  1871  there  were 
twenty-six  English  and  thirty-six  German,^  Moreover,  the 
activities  of  this  firm  were  well  known  in  Germany,  or  at 
least  the  House  of  Godeffroy  endeavored  to  make  them  so. 
For  in  1861,  Johann  Ceasar  Godeffroy  founded  the  Gode- 
ffroy   Museum    in    Hamburg    to    exhibit    the    geography, 

*  Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  115. 

^Geographische  Zeitschrift,  vol.  v,  1899,  p.  494. 

'Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  62. 


41  ]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  41 

ethnology  and  natural  history  of  Samoa,  for  which  pur- 
pose he  sent  out  many  expeditions.  He  also  published  the 
Journal  des  Museums  Godcffroy's  from  the  year  1871  until 
lB>yg,  when  the  firm  went  out  of  existence/ 
L  In  addition  to  Godefifroy  in  the  South  Seas,  was  the  firm 
of  Hernsheim  which  had  established  trade  and  acquired  land 
in  New  Britain  in  1875,  making  its  headquarters  at  White 
Bay  on  the  island  O'f  Matupi.-  These  islands  became  valu- 
able as  a  source  of  supply  for  workers  on  the  German  plan- 
tations in  Samoa,  and  this  firm  superintended  their  organiza- 
tion and  transportation.  _  Hernsheim  and  Company  also  ex- 
tended its  business  to  the  Caroline  Islands,  where  it  had  in- 
terests in  copra,  j  These  firms  were  forerunners  of  many 
powerful  business  houses  trafficking  in  the  South  Seas. 
Likewise  in  the  Fiji  Islands,  Hamburg  merchants  had  found 
sources  of  rich  vegetable  products,  had  bought  plantations 
and  invested  considerable  capital ;  ^  one  firm  alone  had 
made  an  outlay  of  two  and  one  half  million. 

The  possibilities  of  New  Guinea,  where  two  missionaries 
had  settled,  were  also  apparent  to  German  traders,  as  the 
many  letters  from  the  German  settlers  in  Australia  testified.'* 
Indeed  the  German  colonists  were  continually  writing  to  the 
Prussian  Ministry  of  Trade,  urging  the  settlement  of 
colonies. 

Though,  unfortunately,  no  definite  German  trade  statis- 
tics for  the  South  Seas  exist  for  these  early  years,  the  fol- 
lowing figures,  compiled  from  English  sources  for  the  years 
from  1868  to  1870  and  from  the  reports  of  German  consuls! 

'Meyers,  Konversation-Lexikon,  vol.  viii,  p.  74,  art.,  '' Godeffroy." 

-  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  232-239. 

^  Stenographische  Berichte   tiber  die    Verhaiidluugcn   dcs  Deulschen 
Reiclustages,  1879,  p.  1634. 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  201. 


42         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [42 

from  the  years  1873  to  1878,  will  convey  some  idea  of  its 
growth  and  extent. 


Year 

1868 
1869 
1870 
1873 
1874 
1875 


Total  Number  Ships  Trading 
with  Samoa  and  Tonga  Islands 

65 

56 

70 

57 

75 

97 


Year 


Imports 


Exports 


Total  German 

Marks  Marks 

1876 1,606,000  1,290,000 

1877 1,587,420  1,247,420 


Total 
Marks 

2,566,000 
2,503,400 


German 

Marks 

2,386,000 

2,216,800 


German  Ships 

24 
22 
28 
21 

SO 

Ships 
Total    German 


149 
136 


1878 1,595,600      1,395,600      2,576,400      2,427,200      120 


65 
72 1 


In  1879.  out  of  the  seven  existing  firms  in  the  Vavao 
group  of  the  Tonga  Islands,  six  were  German. 

In  one  other  part  of  the  world  we  find  also  a  conspicuous 
example  of  individual  German  colonial  initiative — in  the 
province  of  Rio  Grande  du  Sul  in  Brazil.  South  America 
had  become,  next  to  the  United  States,  the  great  goal  of 
German  emigration,  for  during  the  years  from  1871  to 
1880, 

556,142  emigrants  went  to  the  United  States. 


20,904         " 

"      "    Brazil. 

4,344 

"      "   other  South  American  States 

1,278 

"      "    Africa. 

1,301 

"      "    Canada. 

767 

"      "   West  Indies.' 

In  1872,  there  were  fifty  to  sixty  thousand  Germans  in 
the  province  of  Rio  Grande  du  Sul.  They  controlled  trade 
and  were  predominant  in  agriculture  and  industry.     Ham- 

^  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1877,  Aktenstiick,  no.  80,  p.  282. 
*Jahrbuch  fUr  Nationokonomie  und  Statistik,  1884,  p.  312. 


43]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  43 

burg,  alone,  sent  fifty  shiploads  of  goods  there  annually 
and  "  a  great  future  lay  before  this  province  as  a  support 
of  German  foreign  trade  and  as  an  excellent  acquisition  for 
colonial  expansion."  ^ 

Such,  then,  was  the  status  of  economic  ventures  and 
settlements  overseas  during  the  first  years  of  our  period. 
L.By  1875,  German  merchants  and  traders  had  individually 
made  themselves  prominent  in  Africa,  in  the  South  Seas, 
and  in  South  America,  and  their  activities  were  the  first 
symptoms  of  an  unorganized,  unarticulated,  colonial  policy.; 
Unconsciously  their  work  went  on  and  prospered.  "  The 
majority  of  the  German  people  did  not  know  about  the  Ger- 
man expeditions  overseas  nor  the  settlements  of  Hamburg 
and  Bremen  merchants  in  Africa  and  other  parts  of  the 
world."'--  But,  as  Coppius  remarks  in  his  excellent  mono- 
graph on  this  subject,  "  The  quiet  pioneer  activity  of  our 
Hamburg  merchants  could  not  fail  to  exert  a  great  influence 
upon  the  German  people,  even  though  they  did  not  under- 
stand the  significance  of  it."  ^ 

[Ever  growing  trade  and  constantly  expanding  merchant 
companies  with  their  settlements  naturally  required  protec- 
tion; indeed  the  efiforts  of  the  commercial  colonialists  were, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  seventies,  attracting  the  attention 
of  other  Powers  who  had  colonial  interests  at  stake.  These 
merchants  and  traders  thought  that  the  most  ostensible  ad- 
vantages gained  by  the  newly  established  German  unity  was 
a  greatly  enhanced  national  prestige;  and  they  considered 
that  it  should  now  be  depended  upon  to  make  itself  felt 
where,  from  their  point  of  view,  it  was  most  needed,  namely, 
overseas.     Foreign  trade,  they  said,   should  no  longer  be 

^  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1877,  Aktenstiick,  no.  80. 

*  Charpentier,    Entwickelungs    Geschichte    der    KolonialpoUtik     des 
deutschen  Reichs  (Berlin,  1886),  p.  13. 

*  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  61. 


44         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [44 

obliged  to  stand  aside.  "  The  German  with  his  flag  was 
destined  no  more  to  be  an  appendage  of  foreign  nations; 
to  go  through  the  world  with  his  cap  in  one  hand  and  a 
piece  of  gold  in  the  other."/  Had  not  these  men  risked 
everything  to  establish  their  factories  and  depots?  Why 
should  the  now  great  and  glorious  Fatherland,  in  the  first 
flush  of  its  new  life,  hesitate  to  come  to  their  aid? 
/  Such  was  the  new  note  which,  during  the  first  years  of  the 
empire,  began  to  make  itself  heard  above  all  the  theoretical 
arguments  for  expansion.  It  possessed  a  tremendous  ad- 
vantage over  all  the  other  appeals,  because  it  rested  upon 
a  practical  reality.  Its  protagonists  could,  so  to  speak, 
meet  the  Government  on  its  own  ground.  The  group  of 
practical,  commercial  colonists  made  no  such  demands  upon 
administrative  vision,  imagination  and  faith,  as  the  theorists 
did;  theirs  was  a  pragmatic  position;  they  could  point,  with 
justifiable  pride,  to  their  own  unsupported,  colonial  ad- 
ventures in  the  shape  of  trade  settlements,  could  demon- 
strate their  success  and  could  represent  it  as  the  duty  and 
obligation  of  the  nation  to  protect  and  foster  these  projects 
which  were  already  on  their  feet.  In  short,  the  colonial 
movement  became  a  business  proposition  and,  as  such,  had 
as  its  chief  promoters,  keen  business  men. 

At  first,  it  was  the  merchants  themselves  who  initiated  the 
agitation  by  demanding  protection  and  help.  They  made 
their  common  need  and  bond  the  subject  of  attack  upon  the 
administration,  both  by  propaganda  and  by  direct  petition. 
Gradually  they  were  joined  by  other  groups  of  interested 
individuals,  such  as  leaders  of  overseas  trading  speculations, 
possessors  of  land  claims,  etc.,  so  that  amid  the  exhorta- 
tions of  the  theoretical  colonialists  the  voices  of  the  com- 
mercial colonists  began  to  make  themselves  heard. 

The  eve  of  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  afforded  a  brilliant 
opportunity    for   urging   the   cause    of    expansion    on   the 


45]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  45 

grounds  of  national,  economic  and  commercial  welfare  of 
the  new  empire,  since  discussions  relative  to  the  dictation 
of  a  victorious  peace  are  generally  occasions  conducive  to 
the  flaunting  of  a  glorified  nationalism.  German  merchants 
in  Valparaiso,  for  instance,  raised  the  question  of  taking 
possession  of  Patagonia.  Others  advised  seizing  Madagas- 
car, the  Zulu  Islands,  the  purchase  of  Danish  Saint  Thomas. 
Many  were  the  demands  that  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  should 
include  France's  colonies.  The  traveler.  E.  von  Weber, 
wrote  in  the  National  Zeitiing,  September  20,  1870,  ad- 
vocating the  acquisition  of  Cochin  China.  Tahiti,  Marquesa 
Islands,  Reunion.^ 

The  most  significant  documentary  evidence,  however,  is 
a  petition  presented  to  the  Reichstag  of  the  North  German 
Confederation  on  November  30,  1870.-  The  document 
earnestly  requested  that  th^  port  O'f  Saigon,  a  strategic  naval 
base  in  China,  belonging  to  France,  be  demanded  in  the 
peace  settlement.  The  petition  was  drawn  up  by  a  group 
of  merchants  in  Bremen,  the  President  of  the  Chamber  of 
Commerce  at  Geuestemunde  and  by  some  merchants  and 
scholars  in  Berlin.  Herr  Adicks,  representing  the  firm  of 
Rickmers  and  Company  in  Bremen,  presented  it  and  the 
signatories  consisted  of  thirty-five  Bremen  firms,  three 
Berlin  firms  and  Professor  von  Holzendorf.^  It  is  signi- 
ficant to  note  that  the  most  influential  Bremen  firm  support- 
ing it  was  Mosle  and  Company,  whose  chief,  Alexander 
George  Mosle,  had  gone  to  Brazil  in  1848  and  established 
his  business  at  Rio  Janiero,  where  he  became  German  Con- 

*  Zimmermann,  o/?.  cit.,  p.  9. 

'Anlagen  des  Reichstages  des  Nord  Dentschcn  Buiidcs,  1870.  petition 
no.  13  under  no.  15. 
'Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  g. 


46         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [46 

sul  from  Bremen  to  Brazil/  Returning  in  1862,  he  made 
Bremen  the  headquarters  of  his  firm,  became  prominent 
personally  as  vice-president  of  the  German  Commercial  Con- 
gress, and  head  of  the  Geographical  Society  in  Bremen,  and 
later  emerged  as  one  of  the  most  vigorous  agitators  for 
colonialism  and  leaders  of  the  colonial  party.  Further- 
more, the  petition  was  endorsed  by  Prince  Adalbert  of  Prus- 
sia who  tried  to  influence  von  Roon  in  its  favor. - 

The  reason  advanced  for  the  acquisition  of  a  naval  sta- 
tion at  Saigon  was,  that  the  considerable  German  trade 
between  Hongkong,  Shanghai  and  Europe,  Japan  and 
China,  required  protection.  "  As  long  as  property  on  sea 
is  not  safe  any  more  than  on  land,  it  is  Germany's  duty  to 
afford  it  protection.  German  merchants  and  ship  owners 
must  not  be  obliged  to  turn  to  foreigners  for  protection."  ^ 

This  reason  was  not  considered  sufficiently  forceful,  how- 
ever, for  the  petition  was  dismissed  before  even  being  put 
to  the  vote.  Although  there  was  some  discussion,  everyone 
except  its  actual  promoters  spoke  decidedly  against  it.  The 
one  significant  exception  was  Meier,^  the  great  National 
Liberal  merchant  of  Bremen,  founder  of  the  North  German 
Lloyd.  Later,  in  1884,  he  became  a  warm  supporter  of 
colonialism,  but,  in  1870,  he  was  a  leading  representative 
of  the  free-trade  era.  He  was  careful  not  to  endorse  the 
petition  outright,  because  he  thought  it  would  lead  to  colon- 
ialism, which  he  conceived  of  as  an  outworn  policy,  an 
anachronism;  but  he  did  say  that  no  one  could  claim  that 
"  German  trade  does  not  need  protection." 

1  Poschinger,  Bismarck  iind  die  Parlementarier,  2  vols.  (Breslau, 
1894),  vol.  ii,  p.  130. 

*  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  3  vols.,  vol.  i,  p.  62. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Reichstages  des  Nord.  Deut.  Bundes,  Nov. 
30,  1870,  p.  42. 

* Bremische  Biographic  des  neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts  (Bremen,  1912), 
P-  309. 


47]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  47 

The  petition  from  the  merchants  of  Bremen,  who  were 
beginning  to  form  the  colonial  party,  was  duplicated  by  one 
to  Bismarck  from  the  merchants  of  Hamburg,  which  also 
concerned  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Frankfort.  They  de- 
sired that  Germany,  in  the  peace,  should  demand  Cochin 
China,  Martinique,  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon.^  Again 
Prince  Adalbert  of  Prussia  was  a  warm  advocate  and  had 
his  eye  especially  upon  Guadeloupe.  He  urged  von  Roon 
to  influence  Bismarck  but  the  latter  was  immovable.  The 
treaty  of  Frankfort  represented  no  interests  of  the  merch- 
ant colonialists. 

After  the  peace  settlement,  the  economic  enthusiasts  for 
colonialism  did  not  lose  hope,  but  took  refuge  in  propa- 
ganda, appealing  still  to  the  national  sentiment.  Some  ad- 
vocated annexing  the  Fiji  Islands,  the  Hebrides,  the  Philip- 
pines ;  while  from  America  came  German  voices  clamoring 
for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba,  Sumatra,  New  Guinea,  Pon- 
dicherry.  In  1871,  Samoa  was  proposed  as  a  naval  station. 
Das  Kleine  Journal  and  Die  Welt  Post  -  supported  the 
cause,  and  pamphlets  appeared  about  Germany's  interests  in 
the  East.  In  1871,  an  anonymous  brochure  came  out  in 
Berlin  entitled  Deutschlands  Interessen  in  Ost  Asien,  in 
which  the  author  regretted  that  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  had 
not  acquired  Cochin  China  as  a  naval  base  to  protect 
Germa.n  trade.  ^ 

Some  indication  of  the  strength  of  all  this  agitation  may 
be  gauged  by  the  fact  that   in    1871/   Bismarck   found   it 

^  Poschinger,  "  Bismarck  und  die  Anfange  der  deutschen  Kolonial- 
politik.  Nach  unveroffen-lichen  Quellen,"  Kolnische  Zeituug,  August 
19,  1907. 

'Herrfurth,     "Bismarck     als     Kolonialpolitiker,"     Zeitschrift     filr 
Kolonmlpoliiik,  Kolonialrecht,  October,   1909,  p.  723. 
*Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  12. 
*Cheradame,  La  Colonisation  et  les  colonies  allemandes,  p.  32. 


48         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [48 

necessary  to  announce  officially  in  the  press  that  Germany 
contemplated  no  expansion,  so  fearful  was  he  lest  the  voices 
of  these  partisans  might  arouse  the  attention  and  suspicion 
of  the  foreign  Powers.  Indeed  the  press  of  America, 
Australia  and  Spain  had  shown  itself  apprehensively  ex- 
cited by  the  flood  of  German  colonial  propaganda. 

Nothing  daunted  by  the  hostility  of  the  administration, 
the  merchants  and  traders,  the  practical  colonialists,  now 
inaugurated  a  direct  "  petition  policy,"  consisting  largely 
of  attacks  upon  the  Government.  They  demanded  protec- 
tion and  extension  of  overseas  trade  by  means  of  both 
consuls  and  trade  treaties,  and  actual  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory, naval  stations  and  the  establishment  oi  protectorates. 

The  consuls  and  other  government  officials  living  abroad 
assisted  the  merchants  in  many  instances.  Witnesses  to  the 
achievements  of  the  commercial  colonialists,  they  readily 
appreciated  Germany's  great  opportunity  to  support  trade 
and  they  added  the  weight  of  their  influence  in  importuning 
governmental  assistance.  Conspicuous  in  this  respect  was 
Theodore  Weber  in  his  double  capacity  as  agent  for  the 
House  of  Godefifroy  and  as  German  Consul  in  Samoa.  In 
1 87 1,  he  notified  Bismarck  that  the  United  States  had  pur- 
chased the  harlx)'r  of  Pago- Pago,  was  sending  a  war  ship  to 
Samoa,  and  was  arranging  treaties  with  other  islands.^  He 
considered  that  such  aggressive  acts  should  inspire  Germany 
130th  to  protect  its  already  existent  trade  and  to  acquire  an 
increased  influence.  He  urged  the  speedy  annexation  by 
Germany  of  some  point  in  Samoa. 

The  following  year.  Dettering,  the  Customs  Commis- 
sioner in  China,  besought  the  Government  to  establish  a 
foothold  on  the  coast  and  encouraged  individuals  to  ac- 
quire trade   concessions    in   the   Yangste  valley.      In   this 

'Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  10. 


49]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  49 

project  the  Crown  Prince  became  profoundly  interested  but 
was  silenced  by  Bismarck/ 

This  same  year,  1872,  the  Government  was  further  as- 
sailed from  the  opposite  part  of  the  globe,  by  a  petition 
from  the  colonists  in  the  Province  of  Rio  Grande  du  Sul  in 
Brazil  to  protect  and  foster  commercial  interests,  and  also 
to  abrogate  the  old  Prussian  restriction  (1859)  on  emigra- 
tion to  Brazil,  so  that.  "  A  modem  colonial  policy  may  be 
adopted,  which  by  means  of  trade  may  become  a  strong 
support  for  home  capital  and  industry." " 

From  Africa,  the  influential  firm  of  Woermann  on  the 
west  coast,  through  its  agent,  Joseph  Thormahlen.  petitioned 
the  administration,  on  April  22,^  1874,  for  a  consul  to  be 
stationed  at  Fernando  Po.  to  protect  its  commercial  in- 
terests in  Kameroon.  Likewise  from  South  Africa  came  a 
petition  from  E.  von  Weber,  who  was  developing  a  diamond 
mine.  Weber  tells  about  this  in  his  book,  Vier  Jahre  in 
Afrika,  1871-1875.*  "  In  response  to  a  patriotic  impulse 
which  would  not  let  me  rest,  I  dispatched  a  memorandum 
to  the  Kaiser  and  Bismarck,  urging  a  speedy  annexation  of 
Delagoa  Bay  and  the  establishment  of  a  German  protector- 
ate over  the  Transvaal."  ^ 

Two  men  broached  the  same  plan  to  the  Chancellor  later, 
in  1876,  although  by  that  time  it  had  become  much  more 
fully  developed.  Luderitz,  the  merchant,  was  one  of  them. 
They  represented  an  interested  group  and  they  had  gained 
a  personal  interview  with  Bismarck  because  of  the  rela- 

'  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  il. 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1S72,  petition  no.  51. 

^  Hamburgische  Correspondenz,  1874,  no.  327,  quoted  (by  Zimmermann, 
op.  cit.,  p.  II. 

*  Weber,  Vier  Jahre  in  Afrika.  1871-TS75,  2  vols.  (Berlin.  1879), 
vol.  ii,  p.  543- 

*  Weber,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  543. 


50         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [50 

tionship  of  one  of  their  number  to  a  high  official  in  the 
Foreign  Office.  They  im folded  a  complete  scheme  for 
founding  a  colony  in  South  Africa,  based  upon  the  economic 
necessity  of  Germany,  the  crying  need  of  directing  emigra- 
tion and  the  fact  that  the  Boers  desired  German  protection- 
Their  plan  was  to  establish  a  steamship  line  to  South 
Africa  and  to  construct  a  railway  to  the  Transvaal.  To 
finance  these  projects,  they  asked  a  state  subsidy  of 
100,000,000  M.  for  ten  years.  Bismarck  "  met  them  court- 
eously.'' but  rejected  the  proposition  on  the  grounds  that 
the  time  was  unpropitious  politically,  that  Germany  lacked 
sufficient  navy,  and  that  the  necessary  popular  impulse  for 
such  a  policy  of  expansion  was  wanting.' 

Again,  from  East  Africa,  came  an  offer  in  1874  from 
the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar  to  place  his  country  under  German 
protection.  The  offer  was  due  to  the  activities  of  the  firms 
of  Hansing  and  O'Swald  and  also  to  the  efforts  of  the  ex- 
plorers. Otto  Kersten  and  Richard  Brenner.-  Bismarck  re- 
fused it.  although  the  situation  for  German  traders  became 
very  critical  in  the  following  year.  A  German  company 
had  encountered  some  difficulty  alxDut  the  customs,  since  the 
old  customs  treaty,  made  in  1859  and  renewed  in  1869,  had 
expired.  England's  attitude  was  also  threatening.  She 
had  established  a  steamship  line  from  Aden  to  Zanzibar  and 
in  1875  had  commanded  an  Egyptian  fleet  which  had  an- 
nexed two  harbors  on  the  coast  to  lower  its  flag. 

In  the  same  year,  1875,  another  request  for  German  pro- 
tection and  activity  in  oversea  control  came  from  the  South 
Seas.  Von  Overbeck.  an  .Austrian,  who  had  acquired  some 
shares  of  an  .\merican  land  company  in  North  Borneo  and 
also  the  friendship  and  patronage  of  the  Sultans  of  Zulu  and 
Brunei,  begged   for  the  opportunity  to  surrender  them  to 

•Hahn-Wippermann,  Fiirst  Bismarck  (Berlin,  1891),  vol.  v,  p.  4. 
'  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  127. 


5 1  ]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  -  j 

Germany,  offering  to  sell  his  rights  and  land  shares  to  tlie 
Government.^  Consent  would  have  bound  the  Sultan  of 
Zulu  to  Germany,  reserved  the  north  shore  of  Borneo  for 
German  commerce,  and  greatly  strengthened  Germany's 
trade  position  in  the  South  Seas.  Administrative  heeding 
of  Consul  Sahl's '  letters  concerning  the  Fiji  Islands,  w(juld 
have  had  a  similar  effect.  Sahl  was  the  German  Consul 
in  Sydney  and  wrote  at  various  times  calling  the  Govern- 
ment's attention  to  the  fact,  "  that  much  German  capital  was 
invested  there  and  that  the  islands  owe  their  state  of  pros- 
perity and  progress,  for  the  most  part,  to  German  energy 
and  perseverance." 

Ample  proof  exists  that  there  were  indeed  imiumerable 
^petitions  of  the  same  kind.  And  it  is  without  doubt  that 
Germany,  thereby,  had  countless  opportunities  to  gain  over- 
seas positions  of  control,  as  urged  by  the  commercial 
colonial  partisans.  H.  Po.schinger  tells  of  the  existence 
of  a  collection  of  documents  in  the  Foreign  Office  entitled, 
Concerning  Plans  for  the  Founding  of  Colonies  and  NctiHxl 
Bases,  which  by  the  year  1885,  had  come  to  include  thirty 
volumes.^  Poschinger  adds  that  Gennany  would  have  had 
many  flourishing  colonies,  had  these  not  been  rejected;  but 
even  though  rejected,  they  were  not  without  a  certain  de- 
finite influence  and  force. 

Another  factor  in  the  work  of  "  direct  action  "  for  colon- 
ialism was  the  Central  Society  for  Commercial  Geography 
and  German  Interests  Abroad.*     Founded  in  1868,  by  the. 

'Herrfurth,  Bismarck  und  Die  Kolonialpolitik  (Berlin,  1909),  p.  6. 
Vide,  also  Zeitschrift  fiir  Kolonialpolitik,  October,  1909,  loc.  cit.,  p.  725. 

*Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  185.  IVeissbuch  1885.  part 
«i,  p.  3- 

*  Poschinger,  "  FiJrst  Bismarck  und  die  Anfange  der  Deut.  Kolonial- 
politik," Kobiische  Zeitung,  Aug.  31.  1906. 

*Koschitzky.  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  123.  Vide  also  Jannarsch,  "  Zentrall 
Verein  fvir  Geographie,"  SchmoUer's  Jahrbuch,  1883,  pp.  177-192. 


52         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [52 

traveler  and  explorer  Otto  Kersten,  it  had  developed  during 
the  early  seventies  into  one  of  the  most  important  means  for 
the  fostering  of  German  commercial  interests  overseas,  and 
at  home  it  represented  the  only  hitherto  organized  agency 
for  promoting  the  aims  of  economic  colonialism.  It  estab- 
lished branches  in  all  the  leading  German  cities  and  in  the 
chief  foreign  countries  where  Germans  were  settled,  and  its 
objects,  as  set  down  in  its  program,  were  those  of  dis- 
tinctly practical  colonialism : 

1.  Study  of  the  lands  where  Germans  had  settled,  their 
geographical,  social  and  economic  conditions  and 
mercantile  opportunities. 

2.  The  methodical  dissemination  of  knowledge  and  in- 
formation about  these  countries. 

3.  The  increase  of  communication,  both  physical  and 
spiritual,  between  these  countries  and  the  Fatherland. 

4.  The  encouragement  and  establishment  of  trade  and 
naval  stations. 

5.  The  acquisition  of  colonies. 

Moreover,  Der  Export,  a  monthy  magazine,  its  official 
organ,  which  the  Society  regularly  published,  together  with 
man>'  other  publications,  occupied  a  prominent  place  in 
literature  fostering  colonialism. 

To  sum  up,  the  second  phase  of  the  colonial  movement 
was  economic.  Throughout  the  first  five  years  of  the  em- 
pire, commercial  colonialism  had  assumed  definite  propor- 
tions. Abroad,  it  had  fostered  individual,  commercial 
activities  in  Africa,  in  the  South  Seas,  and  in  Brazil ;  while 
at  home,  its  protagonists  had  promoted  a  vigorous  campaign 
both  to  secure  governmental  protection,  the  most  urgent 
need  of  the  overseas  settlements,  and  to  further  the  cause  of 
expansion  itself.  Here  was  a  movement  which  could  not 
be  so  easily  disposed  of  as  that  of  the  colonial  theorists,  its 
predecessor  and  contemporary.     It  could  not  be  dismissed 


53]  THE  RISE  OF  COMMERCIAL  COLONIALISM  53 

as  impractical  because  its  actual  achievements  were  tcK> 
substantial  and  obvious;  its  needs  and  demands  were  too 
incessant  and  importunate.  What  was  the  reply  of  the 
Government?  The  answer  must  be  reserved  for  the  next 
chapter;  but  the  fact  that  a  situation  had  been  created,  re- 
quiring a  response  which  must  be  sooner  or  later  forth- 
coming, was  significant.  It  demonstrated  that  the  com- 
mercial colonialists,  who  represented  only  a  small  minority 
of  the  German  people,  had,  by  vitalizing  the  colonial  issue, 
rescued  it  from  the  realm  of  theoretical  debate  and  made 
it,  instead,  a  practical  and  live  reality  with  which  the 
Government  was  forced  to  reckon. 


CHAPTER  TV 

Government  Reaction  to  Commercial  Colonialism 
AND  THE  Appearance  of  a  Colonial  Party 

The  German  Government  was  at  first  extremely  weak 
and  indefinite  in  its  response  to  the  demands  of  the  com- 
mercial coloniaHsts.  Its  policy  consisted  principally  in  an 
extension  of  the  consular  service,  in  a  dependence  upon  the 
good  offices  of  foreign  consuls,  and  in  a  blind  reliance  upon 
the  doctrine  of  free  trade  and  equal  opportunity,  in  short, 
in  a  mere  "  diplomatic  guardianship."  Such  temporization 
and  make-shift  could  not  suffice  for  long,  however:  the  in- 
terests of  overseas  trade  were  to  become  too  great  a  factor 
in  the  national  life.  Indeed  by  the  year  1874  the  conse- 
quences of  commercial  colonialism  began  to  expose  the  in- 
adequacy of  "  diplomatic  guardianship  "  as  a  policy  of  trade 
protection,  to  create  a  strain  upon  international  diplomacy, 
and  to  force  the  administration  to  show  its  hand.  Even 
the  increased  consular  service — slight  as  it  was  in  the  eyes 
of  those  merchants  eager  for  administrative  colonial  acti- 
vity— began  to  arouse  the  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  other 
nations.  The  pressure  of  external  events  was  to  prove 
more  potent  than  words,  more  comprehensible  to  Bismarck 
and  his  ministers  than  the  weak  voice  of  a  small  minority 
of  the  German  people.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  neverthe- 
less, than  this  external  pressure  was,  in  its  last  analysis. 
caused  by  the  very  minority  of  practical  colonialists  whose 
activities,  now  to  be  reviewed,  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a 
definite  colonial  party. 

54  [54 


55]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  55 

During  the  years  1870  to  1875,  the  Government  extended 
and  increased  the  consular  service  and  practiced  "  diplo- 
matic guardianship"  everywhere;  but  it  emphatically  re- 
fused and  discouragied  each  explicit  demand  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  protectorate  or  naval  base  or  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  territcjry.  To  illustrate  :  the  petition  of  the  Brazilian 
colonists  for  consular  and  [wstal  service  was  granted,  and 
consuls  were  stationed  in  Africa  and  the  South  Seas;  but 
the  proposed  protectorates  over  Borneo,  Zanzibar,  and 
South  Africa,  and  the  acquisition  of  naval  stations  in  China 
and  Samoa,  as  well  as  the  granting  of  a  state  subsidy  in 
South  Africa,  were  all  rejected ;  indeed  any  projects  bor- 
dering upon  a  direct  colonial  policy  were  discouraged. 

The  reasons  vouchsafed  for  this  negative  and  noncom- 
mittal attitude  were,  in  the  main,  fear  of  foreign  friction 
and  lack  of  men  and  money.  ■*  The  brief  discussion  occa- 
sioned by  the  petition  of  the  merchants  on  November  30, 
1870,  to  include  Saigon  in  the  treaty  of  Frankfort,  con- 
tained all  the  grounds  of  its  refusal.  Baron  von  Hoverbeck 
thought  that  the  proposition  was  untimely  and  that  Germany 
could  not  afford  colonies.  Dr.  Schleiden,  a  Prussian  offi- 
cial, agreed  with  Ross,  a  fiamburg  merchant  (not  interested 
in  any  overseas  ventures),  that  such  a  policy  would  be 
politically  dangerous.  Other  objections  were  raised  on 
the  grounds  of  expense./^  Tn  vain  the  petitioner  ^liguel 
argued  that  the  acquisition  "of  Saigon  would  not  necessitate 
an  expansion  policy  but  was  merely  a  guarantee  of  trade 
protection.^  jHis  argument,  it  might  be  noted,  later  became 
a  classic  one  with  the  colonial  party  and  the  opponents  of 
colonialism  always  recognized  it  as  representing  the  enter- 
ing wedge  of  expansion.  Bismarck  expressed  the  same 
negative  policy  in  his  refusals  to  engage  in  any  active  pro- 

'  I'crhandlungen  des  Reichstages  des  Nofddeutschen  Bundes,  Nov, 
30,   1870,  p.  42.     Cf.  supra,  p.  45. 


56         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [56 

tection  of  the  commercial  colonialists.  He  rejected  the 
Hamburgers'  petition  for  French  colonies  with  the  rejoinder 
that  any  colonial  undertaking  was  premature ;  ^  he  declined 
Consul  Weber's  advice  for  colonial  activity  in  Samoa,  ad- 
monishing the  Consul  meanwhile  so  to  conduct  German  af- 
fairs as  to  "  avoid  any  friction  with  the  United  States,"  as 
well  as  to  be  most  tactful  and  **  to  promote  no  independent 
policy;  "  "  he  dampened  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Crown  Prince 
for  Commissioner  Dettering's  demands  for  a  naval  station 
in  China  by  directing  a  member  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  in- 
struct the  young  Prince  that  Germany  possessed  neither  men 
nor  money  for  such  adventures  and  could  not  afford  "  to  be 
weakened  from  without."  " 

It  becomes  apparent,  therefore, — so  far  as  we  are  able  to 
determine  with  the  materials  at  hand — that  the  official  at- 
titude towards  the  rise  of  commercial  colonialism  and  its 
demands  was,  until  1876,  a  forced  recognition  of  its  exist- 
ence and  a  refusal  of  its  petitions  for  protection.  The  easy- 
going practice  of  "  diplomatic  guardianship  "  could  hardly 
be  termed  a  real  response. 

Commercial  colonialism,  however,  was  gaining  a  momen- 
tum and  strength  to  be  demonstrated  not  directly  by  its  own 
advertisement  but  indirectly  by  events  which  it  precipitated. 
In  the  year  1875  ^  political  crisis  arose  in  the  South  Seas  in 
consequence  of  the  activities  of  the  commercial  colonialists, 
and  it  at  once  challenged  the  immediate  attention  of  the 
Government. 

On  October  10.  1874,  England  ordered  Sir  Hercules 
Robinson,  Governor  of  New  South  Wales,  to  annex  the 
Fiji  Islands.     The  act  was  an  earnest  of  those  prophetic 

^  Cf.  supra,  p.  47. 
'Zimmerman,  op.  cit.,  p.  11. 
3  Cf.  supra,  p.  48. 


cyl  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  57 

grumblings  in  the  English  press  against  Germany's  colonial 
ambitions  as  represented  by  other  merchants  and  traders  in 
Africa,  South  Seas  and  elsewhere.  At  first  the  German 
settlers  greeted  the  English  flag  with  joy  because  they 
thought  it  meant  greater  security.  They  had  always  been 
accustomed  to  depend  on  England  or  any  other  country  for 
consular  aid  when  their  own  was  lacking.  When  the 
German  Consul  at  Levuka  wrote  wamingly  to  Bismarck 
on  October  15,  1874,^  and  expressed  apprehension  for  the 
threatened  German  interests,  the  Chancellor  replied  on 
January  17,  1875,  that  he  "shared  in  no  way  the  appre- 
hension, being  rather  of  the  opinion  that  the  English  oc- 
cupation would  prove  very  advantageous  to  the  German  set- 
tlers; it  would  afford  them  the  security  and  protection  of  a 
strong  government."  ^ 

The  English,  however,  speedily  realized  the  worst  fears 
of  the  settlers  and  consuls.  In  the  first  place,  they  enacted 
the  Statute  of  Limitations  which  cancelled  all  debts  con- 
tracted by  the  Fijian  inhabitants  before  the  year  1871, 
thereby  dealing  a  severe  blow  to  the  German  merchants, 
"  who  for  many  years  had  been  creditors  for  considerable 
sums; "  and  in  the  second  place,  they  dispossessed  the  Ger- 
man settlers  and  evicted  them  from  their  lands  and  build- 
ings without  idemnity.  In  his  report  to  the  Chancellor  on 
October  31,  1874,^  Consul  Sahl  of  Sydney  made  the  first 
demands  for  reparation  for  damages  caused  by  the  Statute 
of  Limitations.  Letters  from  other  consuls  and  petitions 
from  those  dispossessed  followed.  The  House  of  Gode- 
ffroy  also  raised  a  cry.  Indeed  the  menace  to  German  trade 
and  commercial  interests  as  indicated  by  England's  action 

'  Hahn-Wippermann.  op.  cit.,  vol  v,  p.  185 ;  Weissbuch,  1885,  pt.  ii, 
p.  4. 

'  IVeissbuch,  1885,  pt.  ii,  p.  4. 
» Ibid.,  p.  3. 


58         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [58 

put  terror  into  the  hearts  of  German  colonists  and  traders 
in  the  South  Seas,  and  warned  them  that  all  other  indepen- 
dent islands  were  in  danger. 

Affairs  in  Samoa,  also,  contributed  to  this  crisis.     A  state 
of  civil  war  had  prevailed  there  since  1870.     The  conflict- 
ing interests  of  lingland  and  the  United  States  had  com- 
plicated and  aggravated  the  situation.     The  two  Powers 
had  attempted  to  secure  control  by  the  time-honored  method 
of  playing  off  against  one  another  the  rival  claimants  to  the 
throne,  the  families  of  Taimoa  and  Puletua.     Further  en- 
tanglements had  ensued  from  the  unscrupulous  actions  of  a 
Colonel  A.  B.  Steinberger,  a  wily  and  shrewd  adventurer 
from  America.     Steinberger  had  been  sent  to  Samoa  by  the 
State  Department  of  the  United  State  as  a  special  agent  in 
1872,  in  response  to  a  public  demand  for  information  about 
the  island.     Submitting  his  report  in  1873,  he  was  sent  back 
again  to  Samoa,  carrying  a  letter  from  the  President  and 
presents  to  the  chiefs,  his  official  relations  with  the  United 
States  to  be  severed   when   the   presents   were   delivered.' 
Two  months  prior  to  this  final  mission,  however. — as  shown 
from  his  papers  seized  upon  his  subsequent  arrest  by  the 
State  Department  in  1876 — ^he  was  in  Hamburg  and  there 
entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  House  of  Godeffroy  to 
estal:)lish  a  government  in  Samoa  and  identify  the  interests 
of  that  government  with  those  of  the  German  firm.     We 
quote  several  extracts  from  this  important  document  which 
shows  the  power  sought  by  the  merchants  in  Samoa,  and 
which  illustrates  the  direct  part  played  by  the  commercial 
colonialists  in  the  subsequent  political  crisis. 

Agreement  between  A.  B.  Steinberger  and  Messrs.  John  Ceo. 
GodeflFray  and  Son  of  Hamburg,  for  their  establishment  at  Apia. 
16  Sept.  1874. 

Crose,  American  Samoa.  A  General  Report  by  the  Governor  (Wash- 
ington, 1913),  pp.  6  et  seq. 


59l 


GOVERNMENT  REACTION 


1.  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger  proceeds  to  the  Samoan  Islands 
U.  S.  Commissioner,  in  order  to  establish  there  a  fixed  and  stable 
government  upon  the  principles  of  good  administration. 

2.  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger,  who  by  his  future  position  at  Samoa 
and  his  home  endorsement,  will  evidently  exercise  a  paramount 
influence  in  the  Samoan  Islands,  hereby  pledges  himself  to  the 
proper  and  legitimate  interests  of  the  establishments  of  Godeffroy 
and  Son.  at  Apia;  and  to  avoid  all  other  business  connections 
in  toto  in  America,  Europe,  Samoa. 

4.  J.  C.  Godeffroy  and  Son  promise  as  soon  as  the  established 
government  in  Samoa  is  recognized  by  U.  S.  of  America,  to  use 
directly  and  through  the  German  consul  at  Apia  all  the  influence 
they  possess  to  promote  the  recognition  of  the  Samoan  Govern- 
ment by  the  German  Empire.    .    .    . 

In  addition  to  the  above  general  stipulations,  it  had  been  agreed 
between  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger  and  Messrs.  Godeffroy  and 
Son    .    ,    .    , 

a.  Col.  Steinberger  is  to  procure  for  J.  C.  Godeffroy  and  Son  at 
Apia  the  Samoan  Government's  recognition  of  all  land  sales 
heretofore  made  to  the  managers  of  the  same  by  the  nations. 

b.  The  Government  is  to  permit  the  introduction  of  foreign 
labor.    .    .    . 

d.  The  harbor  duties  at  Apia  are  not  to  exceed,  say,  3  cts.  per 
ton.    .    .    . 

/.  A  per  cap.  tax  is  to  be  levied  upon  each  adult  male  inhabi- 
tant of  the  Samoan  group,  to  be  paid  to  Samoan  Government  in 
kind,  say,  copra,  cocoanut  fibre  and  other  articles  of  export.    .    .    . 

h.  All  copra  and  cocoa  fibre  obtained  by  the  Samoan  Goveni- 
ment  through  taxation  is  to  be  sold  to  J.  C.  Godeffroy  and  Son  at 
Apia,  at  the  price  of  Ij^  cent  per  pound.    .    .    . 

/.  The  Government  of  Samoa  is  to  grant  monopoly  for  the 
exportation  of  bark  of  "  Ua  "  or  paper  mulberry  to  J.  C.  Godef- 
froy &  Son.    .    .    . 

p.  The  firm  of  J.  C.  Godeffroy  &  Son  is  to  be  appointed  the 
banker  and  fiscal  agent  of  the  Samoan  Government. 

r.  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger  is  to  receive  $2.  per  ton  weight  on  all 
the  copra  and  government  fibre  sold  to  J.  C.  Godeffroy  and  Son. 

s.  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger  is  to  receive  a  commission  of  10%  on 
the  amount  of  purchase  of  all  other  produce  or  material  sold  by 
Government  of  Samoa  to  J.  C.  Godeffroy  and  Son. 


6o         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [60 

t.  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger  is  to  receive  a  commission  of  10%  of 
amount  of  all  purchases  made  by  Government  of  Samoa  from  J, 
C.  Godeffroy  and  Son.^ 

Steinberger  succeeded  for  a  time  in  establishing  a  gov- 
ernment in  Samoa  supported  by  the  powerful  German  firm. 
With  no  authority  whatsoever  he  declared  Samoa  an 
American  Protectorate.  The  United  States  immediately 
repudiated  the  act,  but  was  imable  to  destroy  Steinberger's 
rule  at  once.  England,  however,  during  his  temporary 
absence,  overthrew  his  government  by  supjx)rting  a  rival 
candidate  for  the  throne;  but  Steinberger  returned  and 
s>.t  up  a  new  king,  Malietoa,  A  quarrel  ensued  with  the 
United  States  consul  resulting  in  the  arrest  of  Steinberger's 
party  which  by  that  time  had  every  faction  against  it.  A 
united  government,  a  republic,  was  then  formed  in  1877, 
which  represented  both  royal  families,  Taimoa  and  Puletua, 
and  which  looked  to  the  interested  nations  for  support. 

All  these  disturbances  greatly  endangered  the  possessions 
and  interests  of  German  settlers,  and  they  therefore  ser- 
ved to  make  prominent  and  pressing  the  demands  of  the  com- 
mercial colonialists  for  governmental  protection  and  expan- 
sion. As  the  preamble  to  the  Samoan  Treaty  described  the 
situation,  "  the  rapid  and  incomparable  development  of  Ger- 
man trade  in  the  South  Seas  demands  a  place  where  it  can 
be  maintained  in  safety  outside  these  conflicts,  outside  the 
spheres  of  influence  of  other  nations."  ^  Indeed  it  was  ap- 
parent from  the  Australian  and  American  newspapers,  which 
began  to  urge  the  annexation  of  New  Guinea  and  Samoa  by 
their  respective  states,  that  other  nations  were  already  begin- 
ning to  grow  excited  and  to  apprehend  Germany's  possible 

*  Executive  Documents  of  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States,  for  the  second  session  of  the  forty-fourth  Congress,  1876-1877, 
vol.  ix,  document  44,  inclosure  i. 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  714. 


6i]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  6l 

expansion  overseas;  and  this  reacted  in  creating  a  coiniter 
apprehension  in  Germany/ 

Further  confirmation  of  Germany's  fears  and  additional 
support  to  tlie  appeals  for  trade  protection  were  not  lacking. 
Spain  also  appeared  to  be  alarmed  by  the  activities  of  Ger- 
many's commercial  colonialists.  The  Governor-General  of 
the  Philippines  had  for  several  years  resented  the  extension 
of  Germany's  trade  into  the  Spanish  colonial  possessions, 
particularly  with  the  Zulu  Islands  and  the  north  shore  of 
Borneo.  He  began  to  take  measures  to  stop  it.  In  August 
1873  he  ordered  the  cargoes  of  the  German  ships  Gazelle 
and  Marie  Louise  to  be  seized  by  a  Spanish  warship."-  A 
part  of  the  cargo  chanced  to  be  English,  which  fact  at  once 
forged  an  Anglo-German  bond  of  union  against  Spain.  In 
1874,  Spain  sent  a  note  to  both  Germany  and  England, 
ordering  all  ships  trading  \w\\\\  the  Pelew  and  Caroline 
Islands  to  touch  first  at  the  Philippinies  in  order  to  pay 
duty.^  She  thus  attempted  to  hamper  effectually  German 
trade  and  possible  settlement  in  the  archipelago. 

It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  accounts  that  the  jostling 
\  claims  of  a  new  economic  imperialism  in  the  South  Seas 
'  were  becoming  most  apparent.  Indeed  conflicting  national 
interests  were  rapidly  creating  a  political  and  economic  crisis. 
And  it  is  clear  from  the  statement  of  von  Kiisserow,  a 
former  Secretary  in  the  Foreign  office.*  that  more  such 
clashes  in  other  parts  of  the  world  were  apprehended.     He 

'  Zimmerman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  n-12. 

'^  Anlagcn  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1875,  Aktenstiick  no.  205,  pp. 
556-557- 

*  Koschitz:ky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  279. 

*  Heiiirich  von  Kiisserow  had  entered  the  Foreign  Ofike  as  an 
Under-Secretary  in  1863,  had  served  as  Secretar>--to-the-Legation  in 
Paris,  Washington,  London,  for  Prussia  and  the  North  German  Con- 
federation, 1864-1874,  and  as  delegate  in  the  Reichstag  of  the  German 
Empire,  1871-1874. 


62         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [62 

said,  "It  is  becoming  necessary  to  protect  Germany's  ship- 
ping from  piratical  attacks  in  Chinese  waters  and  on  the 
West  Coast  of  Africa;  to  guard  German  trade  settlements 
from  acts  of  power  in  the  South  Seas;  and  to  defend  Ger- 
mans from  legislation  directed  against  them  in  overseas 
states,  such  as  Haiti,  Venezuela,  Nicaragua,  Colombia,  and 
from  revolutions  in  South  America.''  ^ 

Gradually  external  events  were  making  the  German  Gov- 
ernment realize  the  utter  inadequacy  of  its  policy  of  mere 
"diplomatic  guardianship;"  threatening  dangers  abroad 
were  exposing  the  futility  of  attempting  to  protect  the  com- 
mercial colonialists  only  by  means  of  consuls.  Moreover, 
actual  conditions  resulting  from  the  activities  of  the  com- 
mercial colonialists,  were  demonstrating  to  Bismarck  clearly 
and  specifically  a  fundamental  truth — that  expansion  was 
inextricably  intertwined  with  political  power  and  prestige. 
I'^acts  were  vindicating  the  demands  of  the  commercial  col- 
onialists for  aid.  England's  action  in  the  Fiji  Islands  fully 
illustrated  that  she  adhered  to  the  doctrine  of  international 
free  trade  only  when  it  was  to  her  own  advantage  so  to  do; 
the  dream  of  "  equal  opportunity "  in  overseas  trade,  at 
which  the  commercial  colonialists  had  always  scoffed,  was 
being  rudely  and  finally  dispelled.  Events  were  proving 
that  the  tactics  pursued  by  England,  Spain,  and  the  United 
States  in  order  to  guard  their  several  interests  overseas 
could  only  l>e  met  on  the  part  of  Germany  by  the  adoption 
of  like  tactics. 

The  year  1875  marked  a  di.stinct  change  in  the  attitude  of 
Bismarck  toward  the  commercial  colonialists.  Instead  of 
his  former  attitude  of  antagonism,  indifference  or  mere 
"  diplomatic  guardianship."  he  commenced  to  display  an 
active  interest  in  the  demands  for  protection.     At  the  end 

*  Herrfurth,  Zeitschrift  fiir  Kolonialpol.,  igoo,  loc.  cit.,  p.  726. 


63]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  63 

of  the  year  1874,  Bismarck  had  appointed  von  Kiisserow 
Counsellor  to  the  Foreign  Office — and  had  entrusted  to  him 
the  conduct  of  all  the  overseas  trade  affairs.'  Von  Kiis- 
serow  was  a  close  friend  of  Lothar  Bucher,  almost  the  only 
Prussian  official  who  had  been  at  all  in  favor  of  colonies 
during  the  years  from  1868  to  1871.  Influenced  by  BiKher, 
von  Kiisserow  had  absorbed  an  enthusiasm  for  expansion, 
and  had  proved  his  zeal  by  the  assiduity  with  which  he  had 
negotiated  the  South  Sea  trade  treaties.  Indeed,  as 
Poschinger  says,  von  Kiisserow's  "  greatest  service  to  Ger- 
many was  that  he  had  gradually  overcome  Bismarck's  ob- 
jection to  the  annexation  of  colonies,  according  to  the  prc^- 
verb  *  Gutta  cavat  lapiden.'  "  - 

To  be  sure,  the  Government  did  not  manifest  its  altered 
policy  toward  commercial  colonialism  all  at  once,  but  rather 
by  three  progressive  steps;  first,  by  the  registering  of  pro- 
tests against  the  interference  of  other  nations;  second,  by 
the  negotiation  of  treaties  of  trade  and  amity  involving  in 
some  instances  the  acquisition  of  naval  stations;  and  finally, 
by  the  establishment  of  virtual  protectorates.  These  steps 
formed  the  usual  and  inevitable  prelude  to  a  definite  colonial 
policy. 

Bismarck  initiated  the  new  policy  in  March,  1875:  he 
sent  a  vigorous  note  to  Spain  protesting  against  her  customs 
regulations  which  were  hampering  German  trade  in  the 
Zulu  Islands.  On  this  occasion,  he  wrote :  "  Since  the 
German  Government  has  hitherto  entirely  refrained  from 
following  any  definite  colonial  policy,  it  is  all  the  more  called 
upon  to  defend  its  trade  from  attack  ....  Spain  cannot, 
according  to  any  of  the  otitworn  mercantilist  theories;  of 

1  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  18.     Cf.  p.  61,  note  4. 

'  Poschinger,  "  Aus  der  Denkwurdigkeit  Heinrich  von  Kusserorw," 
Deutsche  Revue,  February,  1908,  p.  189. 


64         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [64 

a  past  age  of  discover>%  assert  her  sovereignty  over  lands 
hitherto  open  to  trade,  where  German  merchants  have 
founded  factories  and  depots  at  great  cost,  sacrifice  and 
trouble."  ^  Spain  left  the  note  unanswered  but  desisted 
from  her  customs  demands. 

Also,  in  the  same  year,  on  x\pril  2y,  1875,  the  Foreign 
Secretary  von  Biilow  directed  the  German  Ambassador, 
Count  Mijnster  in  London,  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
British  Government  to  the  claims  of  the  German  settlers  in 
Fiji."  England  vouchsafed  no  response,  however,  but  Bis- 
marck, in  consequence  of  another  adverse  report  from  the 
consul  at  Levuka  concerning  Fijian  affairs,  adopted  a  much 
more  emphatic  tone  and  instructed  the  German  Ambassador 
in  London,  "  to  lose  no  opportunity,  to  make  it  understood 
that  the  Imperial  Goverrmwnt  has  a  vital  interest  in  the 
ivelfare  of  its  subjects  overseas."  ^ 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  concerning  the  unindem- 
nifiied  and  "  robbed  "  Germans  in  the  South  Seas,  dragged 
on  and  on.  It  became  more  and  more  heated,  it  magnified 
the  German  grievance  against  England's  "  crowding  policy," 
and  proved  a  potent  influence  in  the  development  of  the 
colonial  movement. 

Meanwhile,  the  Government  advanced  a  second  step.  It 
determine<:l  upon  a  policy  of  trade  protection  more  vigorous 
than  that  of  mere  protest,  with  which  to  combat  the  imper- 
ialistic actions  and  designs  of  England,  the  United  States 
and  Spain  in  the  South  Pacific,  as  well  as  to  demonstrate 
"  its  vital  interest  in  the  welfare  of  its  subjects  over  seas." 

This  second  stage  of  the  new  policy  was  marked  by 
the  treaties  of  trade  and  amity  drawn  up  between  the  years 
from  1876  to  1879.     In  these  treaties  the  German  Govem- 

'  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1875,  AktenstUck,  no.  205. 
'  Hahn-Wipperraann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  186. 
Ibid.,  p.  187.     Vide,  also,  Weissbuch,  1885.  Pt-  ii.  PP-  5-6. 


65]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  65 

ment  finally  departed  from  its  hitherto  ineffective  custom  of 
merely  guaranteeing  the  independence  and  safety  of  its 
overseas  subjects  by  diplomacy  and  consular  protection.  It 
v^as  forced  thereto,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  politico-econ- 
omic crisis  created  by  the  activities  of  commercial  colonial- 
ism. As  Bismarck  expressed  it  in  the  preamble  to  the 
Samoan  Treaty,  "  Should  the  empire  continue  its  policy  of 
refusing  the  acquisition  of  colonies  which  has  been  followed 
heretofore,  it  would  be  all  the  more  imperative  for  it  to 
preserve  the  neutrality  of  its  overseas  settlements,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  to  establish  the  complete  equality  of  op- 
portunity for  Germany  with  all  other  nations."  ^ 

A  brief  account  of  the  negotiation  of  the  treaties  of  trade 
and  amity  will  make  clearer  the  circumstances  of  their 
origin  as  well  as  the  influence  of  commercial  colonialism 
upon  their  consummation.  The  Tongan  Treaty  introduced 
the  new  polic}''.  The  immediate  causes  of  its  negotiation 
were  the  crisis  in  the  South  Seas,  rumors  that  England 
contemplated  more  annexations,  the  conclusion  of  a  com- 
mercial treaty  l^etween  the  United  States  and  the  Sandwich 
Islands,  and  the  conviction  that  the  only  independent  islands 
remaining,  as  well  as  the  most  valuable  to  German  trade, 
were  the  Samoan  and  Tongan  groups.  In  1875,  Germany 
sent  the  S.  S.  Gazelle  to  spy  out  the  land  in  the  South  Seas 
Archipelago.  Her  commander  anchored  in  the  harbor  of 
Nukualofa  on  December  13.  1875;  he  saluted  the  Tongan 
flag  and  assured  the  king  that  he  desired  nothing  more  than 
to  obtain  news  of  German  settlers.  King  George  received 
him  very  cordially  and  seized  the  opportunity  to  let  it  be 
known  that  he  desired  a  treaty  with  Germany  -  (ace  irding 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  714-715. 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschcv  Reichstages,  1877,  Aktenstiick  no.  80,  pp.  279 
et  seq. 


66         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [66 

to  the  German  account).  On  her  way  home,  the  Gaselle 
stopped  at  Apia  in  Samoa  where  her  captain  obtained  the 
first  information  of  the  civil  war  described  above.  His  re- 
jx)rt,  taken  in  conjunction  with  consular  and  mercantile 
advices  described  fully  the  revolutionary  state  of  affairs  and 
their  threatening  menace  to  German  interests,  and  finally  in- 
duced the  German  Government  to  order  the  steamship 
Hertha  to  proceed  from  the  East  Asian  Coast  to  Samoa.  ^ 
The  captain  of  the  Hertha  was  instructed  to  cooperate  with 
Consul  Weber  in  maintaining  tlie  strict  neutrality  of  Ger- 
many in  the  civil  conflicts,  in  encouraging  the  establishment 
of  a  strong  government,  and  in  obtaining  treaties  of  amity. 
The  steamship  Hertha  arrived  in  Samoa  on  October  2.  1876, 
but  the  turbulent  condition  of  the  islands  precluded  a  suf- 
ficiently stable  government  with  which  to  negotiate  treaties. 
Her  captain  then  proceeded  to  Tonga  where  he  began 
negotiations  with  King  George  on  October  27,  1876.  The 
result  was  the  Tongan  Treaty  of  November  i.  1876,  which 
guaranteed  reciprocal  commercial  freedom  and  ceded  to 
Germany  the  right  of  establishing  a  naval  station  on  the 
Vavao  Islands." 

In  Germany,  the  Reichstag  discussed  the  Tongan  Treaty 
on  April  1 1,  1877,  and  ratified  it  on  April  20,  with  little  or 
no  opposition.  Everyone  spoke  in  favor  of  it  witli  the  ex- 
ception of  Prince  Radziwill,  the  Catholic  Centrist,  who 
thought  it  might  be  interpreted  by  England  and  France  as 
a  political  move,  and  regretted  exceedingly  that  the  promot- 
ers of  the  treaty  seemed  more  interested  in  its  commercial 
advantages  than  in  its  cultural  and  religious  opportunities.'" 

The  discussions  in  the  Reichstag  einphasized  tAVO  salient 

'  Hahn-Wippennann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  714-715. 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  5. 

*  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  April  20,  1877,  p.  634. 


67]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  67 

points :  first,  that  the  treaty  was  a  new  departure  in  policy ; 
and  second,  that  it  inaugurated  a  policy  of  trade  protection 
and  not  one  of  colonization, — in  other  words,  that  it  was 
commercial  rather  than  political. 

"  I  welcome  this  treaty  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  policy," 
said  Dr.  Kapp.^  "  Every  German  patriot  must  be  filled 
with  joy  to  see  this  new  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office,"  ad- 
ded Dr.  Bunsen.- 

Von  Philippsohn,  Director  of  the  Foreign  Office,  implied 
that  it  was  the  earnest  desire  and  aim  of  the  administration 
to  protect  German  trade.  He  said :  "  A  comer  stone  only 
is  laid  ....  We  have  been  considering  this  treaty  for  a 
long  time  on  account  of  the  important  settlements  which  the 
Hanse  Towns  have  made  in  these  islands.  But  the  circum- 
stances had  to  be  favorable."  ^ 

Not  the  slightest  hint  of  an  intended  colonial  policy  ap- 
peared in  the  debates  or  in  any  documents  relative  to  the 
treaty.  Indeed,  the  preamble  to  the  treaty  expressly  and 
emphatically  stated  in  regard  to  Article  V.  providing  for  the 
acquisition  of  a  naval  base,  that. 

This  should  not  be  considered  as  the  establishment  of  a  colony, 
an  idea  which  the  Government  distinctly  and  particularly  repu- 
diates. .  .  .  The  negotiators  of  the  treaty  purposely  disregarded 
the  opportunity  of  establishing  a  settlement  (colony),  and  in 
accordance  with  the  intention  of  the  Imperial  Government,  secured 
the  necessary  land  only  for  a  naval  base.  .  .  .  Also,  in  order  that 
there  should  be  no  doubt  that  this  settlement  would  not  >«rve  as 
an  annexation  to  the  German  Empire,  the  term  "  coahng  station  " 
was  significantly  employed  and  the  full  sovereignty  of  the  King 
of  Tonga  was  expressly  guaranteed.* 

1  V erhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  April  11,  1877,  p.  378. 

*  Ibid.,  April  29,  1877,  p.  634. 
» Ibid. 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1877.  Aktenjtiick  no.  80,  p.  283. 


68         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [68 

Were  any  further  proof  necessary  to  substantiate  the  fact 
that,  at  this  time,  the  administration  contemplated  no  actual 
colonial  annexation,  but  only  overseas  trade  protection,  we 
have  Bismarck's  pencilled  notes  upon  the  margin  of  the 
proposed  Tongan  Treaty,  "What  is  a  coaling  station? 
Only  a  harbor  or  bay  on  the  coast?  Harbors  for  our  ex- 
clusive use  ?....!  am  concerned  lest  we  become  involved 
in  something  similar  to  an  imperial  colonial  policy  by  a 
factitious  support  of  the  navy."  ^  And  Bismarck  stub- 
bornly persevered  in  refusing  to  establish  the  coaling  station 
in  Tonga  authorized  by  the  treaty."  Nevertheless,  the 
initial  step  of  an  imperial  colonial  policy  had  been  taken,  a 
naval  base  had  been  officially  acquired,  and  had  it  been  oc- 
cupied, as  Delavaud  says,  Germany's  colonialism  would  have 
dated  from  1876." 

Concurrently  with  the  Tongan  Treaty,  the  Government 
also  adopted  a  more  energetic  policy  toward  Spain  in  re- 
gard to  trade  in  the  Zulu  Islands.  Although  Spain  had 
desisted  from  her  customs  demands  after  Germany's  and 
England's  note  of  March  4,  1875,  she  had  interfered  with 
the  German  Steamship  Munna  as  well  as  with  German  and 
English  merchants.  For  a  long  time  Germany  received  no 
reply  from  Madrid  to  her  many  complaints  and  Spain's  pro- 
crastination made  her  determine  to  effect  a  settlement  which 
would  be  final.  After  protracted  negotiations,  an  agreement 
was  reached  with  Spain,  on  March  11,  1877.  which  was 
incorporated  into  a  protocol.*     Thereby,  Spain  accorded  to 

^  Herrfurth.  Zeitschrift  fur  Kolonialpolitik,  1909,  loc.  cit.,  p.  726. 
Vide,  also,  Posching'er,  Kolnisch^  Zeitung,  loc.  cit.,  Aug.  31,  1906,  a 
quotation  from  letter  from  Brauer  to  von  Kiisserow,  June  30,  1876. 

*  Deutsche  Rez'tie,  1908,  loc.  cit.,  p.  189. 

*  Delavaud,  "  La  Colonisation  allemande,"  Annales  de  I'ecole  libre 
des  sciences  politiques,  October,  1887,  pp.  523-546. 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1877,  Aktenstiick  no.  205,  pp. 
556-557. 


69]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  69 

Germany  and  England  complete  freedom  of  trade  with 
Zulu. 

The  opportunity  to  rear  the  suj>erstructure  of  the  new 
policy  of  trade  protection  ujx)n  the  "  corner-stone,"  to  which 
von  Philippsohn  had  likened  the  Toiigan  Treaty,  pre- 
sented itself  very  speedily.  Afifairs  rapidly  shaped  them- 
selves for  the  negotiation  of  the  Samoan  Treaty  which  was 
to  extend  the  practice  of  trade  treaties,  in  short,  to  cap  the 
climax  of  that  system  which  the  Tongan  Treaty  had  begun. 
The  Tongan  Treaty  had,  in  fact,  accentuated  the  imperial- 
istic tension  and  had  increased  the  anxieties  of  watchful 
waiting.  Civil  war  still  persisted  in  Samoa  and  Germany 
adopted  the  aggressive  method  of  stationing  war  ships  near 
the  islands  to  guard  her  interests ;  indeed  for  that  one  pur- 
pose, the  Government  expended  2.609.560  M.  from  1877 
to  1880.^ 

Consul  Weber  strove  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the  Ger- 
man districts  in  Samoa  amid  the  clashes  of  English  and 
Americal  rivalry.  When  Malietoa  was  overthrown,  upon 
the  arrest  of  Steinberger,  in  1877,  and  a  united  government, 
a  republic,  was  established  under  the  patronage  of  the 
families  of  Taimoa  and  Puletua,  stability  was  not  yet  se- 
cured; for,  while  the  Taimoa  party  turned  to  both  the 
Queen  of  England  and  the  President  of  the  United  States 
for  protection,  the  Puletua  party  announced  that  Samoa 
wished  to  respect  the  equality  of  all  nations  therein.  The 
German  consul  and  the  commander  of  the  steamship 
Augusta  seized  this  opportunity  to  conclude  on  July  2.  1877, 
with  both  these  parties  an  agreement  which  promised  pro- 
tection to  German  settlers  and  merchants  in  case  of  civil 
war  or  interference  from  a  third  party,  and  which  guaran- 
teed the  neutrality  of  Germany." 

'^  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,   1880,  Aktenstiick  no.   101,  p. 
724,  Denkschrift  to  Samoa  Vorlage. 
2  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  715. 


70         ORIGINS  OP  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [70 

Germany's  agreement  with  the  Samoan  Government,  of 
course,  called  forth  "  demonstrations  of  power  "  from  both 
England  and  the  United  States.  Sir  Arthur  Gordon,  Gov- 
ernor of  the  Fijis,  visited  the  islands  in  the  capacity  of 
"  I>:>rd  High  Commissioner,"  and  established  a  court  to 
judge  all  differences  between  English  subjects  in  the  Pacific 
and  foreigners.^  His  action  made  it  appear  as  though 
England  were  premeditating  a  protectorate  or  annexation, 
wliich  alarmed  the  .Americans.  They  feared  losing  the  port 
of  Pago-Pago,  and  in  consequence,  the  United  States  con- 
cluded a  treaty  with  the  Samoan  government  to  establish  a 
coaling  station  at  Pag^o-Pago.- 

The  German  Government  declared  that  the  American- 
Samoan  Treaty  conceding  advantages  to  the  United  States, 
constituted  a  violation  of  the  German  agreement  with  Samoa 
of  1877,  and  also  that  it  would  not  tolerate  the  aggression  of 
Americans  upon  its  trade  settlements.  It  therefore  sent  into 
Oceania  the  S.  S.  Ariadne,  which  anchored  at  Apia  on  June 
28,  1878.  On  July  4,  German  warships  occupied  Apia  and 
Saluafata  on  tlie  Opolu  Islands  where  German  factories 
were  located.  The  Germans  forcibly  expelled  many  Cali- 
fornia traders  and  began  to  fortify  these  two  ports. 
Furthermore  in  November,  1879,  the  German  Government 
appointed  Captain  Zembsh  as  Official  Consul  General  to 
the  islands  of  Samoa  and  Tonga  and  his  instructions  seemed 
to  indicate  the  German  intention  of  establishing  a  protec- 
torate. The  reply  of  the  United  States  to  this  action  was 
to  send  a  warship  to  guard  its  interests.  Although  the 
Berlin  Cabinet  protestetl  that  it  did  not  wish  to  take  posses- 
sion of  Samoa,  but  desired  only  to  protect  German  commer- 
cial establishments,  it  had  created  a  "  Samoan  Crisis." 

'  Anvah's  de  fccole  Hbre  dcs  sciences  politiqiies,  he.  cit.,  1887,  p.  533. 
2Crose,  American  Samoa,  Report  of  Gozvmor  (Washington,  1913). 
P  7. 


71  ]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  7I 

Germany  next  pnx:eeded  to  turn  the  "  Samoan  crisis  "  to 
her  own  advantage.  On  January-  16,  1879,  the  German 
S.  S.  Albatross  joined  the  S.  S.  Ariadne  at  Samoa,  and  on 
January  24,  1879,  Captain  Werner  signed  the  Samrtan 
Treaty  of  Amity  \Ai\\  the  de  facto  Government  of  Samoa 
(Taimoa-Faipula's).  thereby  acquiring  the  right  to  estaWish 
a  coaling  station  at  Saluafata  on  the  Island  of  Opolu.  Be- 
sides the  usual  provisions  of  reciprocal  trade  advantage,  the 
treatv'  in  Article  V  ceded  to  Gennany  "  rights  which  the 
Government  of  Samoa  is  forbidden  to  grant  to  any  other 
nation."  Also,  the  "  Samoan  Government  will  not  grant  to 
any  other  nation  any  rights  in  Apia  which  it  does  not  grant 
first  to  Germany."  ^ 

In  addition  to  the  Samoan  Treaty,  other  treaties  nego- 
tiated by  Captain  W^emer  were  signed  at  the  same  time  and 
later  with  many  small  islands.  The}-  assured  Germany 
equal  rights  of  trade  with  other  nations  as  well  as  additional 
coaling  stations.  These  treaties  were:  on  November  12, 
1878,  with  the  King  of  EUice  and  Gilbert  Islands;  on  Nov- 
ember 29,  1878.  with  Chiefs  of  Marshall  and  Ralick  Islands, 
article  IX  granting  to  Gennany  the  port  of  Jaluit  as  a  coal- 
ing station  on  the  Island  of  Bonham;-  on  November  29. 
1878.  with  Chiefs  of  Duke  of  York  Islands  and  the  northern 
coast  of  New  Britain,  ceding  to  Germany  two  coaling 
stations,  Mioko  and  Makada; "  and  on  April  28,  1879,  with 
the  Queen  of  the  Society  Islands.^ 

A  similar  attempt  to  negotiate  trade  advantages  with  the 
Leeward  Islands  near  Tahiti  was  less  successful,  however. 
In  April,  1879,  the  frigate  Bismarck  conveying  Zembsch, 
the  Consul   General  of   Samoa   and   Tonj:ja,   appeared   at 

'  Anlagen  des  Dcutschen  Reichstagcs,  1879.  Aktenstuck  no.  23Q,  p.  725. 
Vide,  also.  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1878-1879,  p.  241- 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1879.  Aktenstiick  no.  239. 

*  Ibid.,  1880,  Aktenstilck  no.  loi. 


72         ORJGLVS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [72 

Raiatea  on  these  islands.  The  German  consul  at  Tahiti 
joined  him  and  the  Germans  remained  fourteen  days,  mak- 
ing maps  and  trying  to  persuade  the  chiefs  to  sign  treaties 
of  amity  and  trade  which  would  pave  the  way  for  the  instal- 
lation of  a  German  consul.  The  chiefs  refused  to  concede 
any  privileges  without  the  advice  of  England  and  France. 
The  chiefs  of  Bora-Bora  followed  their  example,  even 
though  some  of  them  "  had  accepted  as  many  as  five  hundred 
cigars  from  the  Germans."  ^ 

The  Reichstag  discussed  the  Samoan  Treaty,  together 
with  the  minor  treaties  with  the  small  islands,  on  June  13, 
1879,  and  ratified  them  by  a  large  majority  on  June  16, 

The  documents  and  discussions  of  the  Samoan  Treaty 
stressed  with  greater  emphasis  the  two  points  established  by 
the  Tongan  Treaty  debates :  on  the  one  hand,  they  indicated 
most  clearly  a  changed  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment toward  trade  protection  overseas;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  they  proclaimed  the  new  policy  to  be  limited  to  trade 
protection  only,  and  not  to  sanction  the  founding  of  colonies. 
Before  the  treaty  was  presented  to  the  Reichstag,  the  official 
DcKtscher  Reichs  Anzeiger  published  a  "  categorial  explana- 
tion, that  the  administration  did  not  think  of  occupying  the 
Samoan  Islands  as  a  result  of  the  difficulties  there;  that 
'  uberhaupt  '  the  Government  contemplated  no  colonial  an- 
nexations of  any  kind."  ^  Likewise,  von  Biilow,  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  in  presenting  the  treaty  said,  "  We  re- 
gard it  as  our  duty  to  protect  German  settlers  and  trade  in 
Samoa,  but  not  to  have  those  settlements  regarded  as  colon- 
ies. We  do  not  wish  to  found  colonies.  We  desire  no 
monopoly  against  others.  We  only  wish  to  guarantee  the 
rights  of  German  shipping  and  trade."  • 

'  Annales  de  I'ecole  etc.,  loc.  cit.,  1887,  p.  534. 

'Fabri,  Bedarf  Deutschland  da-  Kolonieen?  (Gotha,  1879),  p.  53. 

*  Verhmidluugen  dcs  Dentschen  Reichstages,  June  13,  1879,  p.  1603. 


73]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  73 

To  be  sure,  Dr.  Gareis  expressed  the  fear  that, 
"  Although  we  have  heard  repeatedly  from  all  sources  that 
the  Government  does  not  intend  to  carry  on  state-directed 
colonialism,  I  hope  this  is  true  ....  but  there  appear  a 
few  indications  of  it  ...  .  as,  for  instance,  the  actual  ter- 
ritory acquired  by  the  Government, — the  harbors  of 
Makada  and  Mioko  and  the  coaling  station  at  Jaluit.  If 
these  are  going  to  be  regarded  as  still  under  the  state  to 
which  they  belong,  then  no  colonial  policy  is  to  be  feared ; 
but  if  they  are  to  be  considered  as  parts  of  Germany,  then 
the  treaties  mean  colonialism."  ^  But  von  Biilow  replied: 
"  It  is  '  durchaiis  '  no  colonial  nor  monopolistic  policy  but 
merely  the  single  principle  that  where  I  have  planted  my 
foot,  there  shall  no  other  man  be  allowed  to  place  his."  * 

Also,  Prince  Radziwill  pleaded  that,  "  an  article  should  be 
added  to  the  treaty  providing  for  the  propagation  of  reli- 
gion, culture  and  civilization.  Has  Germany,  Uie  land  of 
thought,  no  other  interests  to  represent  in  these  islands  but 
those  of  the  merchant  and  trader?  "  *  But  von  Kiisserow 
responded :  "  Since  the  treaty  only  concerns  our  com- 
mercial policy,  we  cannot  insert  articles  which  do  not  deal 
directly  with  trade  and  commerce."  * 

Indeed,  the  administration  registered  itself  in  these  de- 
bates as  definitely  inaugurating  a  system  of  trade  protec- 
tion. It  indorsed  even  the  acquisition  and  purchase  of 
naval  stations,  the  inevitable  introduction  to  annexation, 
although,  at  the  same  time,  it  emphatically  denied  any  in- 
tention of  expanding  this  system  into  one  of  actual  colon- 
ization. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschcn  Reichstages,  June  13,  p.  1612. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  1614. 

*  Ibid..  June  16,  p.  1651. 
*lbid.,    Jvme  16,  1879,  p.  1652. 


74         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [74 

However,  before  the  expiration  of  the  year  1879,  already 
so  replete  with  examples  of  a  changed  administrative  at- 
titude, the  Government  took  the  third  step  in  its  policy 
towards  the  protection  of  overseas  trade — a  step  which  stop- 
ped just  short  of  actual  colonialism. 

After  the  ratification  of  the  Samoan  Treaty,  affairs  in 
Samoa  again  grew  tumultuous.  The  troubles  between 
Taimoa  and  the  old  King  Mailetoa  had  not  been  settled. 
Sir  Arthur  Gordon  had  restored  Malietoa  to  the  throne  and 
had  obtained  from  him  the  right  to  establish  a  naval  sta- 
tion. The  German  Consul  did  not  oppose  the  revolution  in 
government,  but  in  order  not  to  leave  England  predominant, 
he  concluded  with  Gordon  and  the  Commander  of  the 
United  States  warship  Lackawanna  a  Convention  designed 
to  maintain  order  in  Samoa.  The  Convention  decreed  that 
the  port  of  Apia  was  henceforth  to  be  governed  by  a  muni- 
cipal administration  composed  of  the  consuls  of  Germany, 
England  and  the  United  States  and  that  Malietoa  was  to 
be  recognized  as  king.'  Furthermore,  the  agreement  con- 
firmed all  Germany's  rights  acquired  by  the  Samoan  Treaty 
of  January  24,  1879."  The  Samoans  were  now  practically 
tinder  the  joint  protection  of  Germany,  England,  and  the 
United  States.  Germany  had  established  a  virtual  protec- 
torate, although  it  was  a  joint  one. 

Meanwhile,  the  German  Government  was  not  confining 
its  new  policy  to  direct  measures,  such  as  treaties  of  trade 
and  amity ;  it  was  furthering  the  interest  of  overseas  trade 
by  several  indirect  means.  For  example  in  1879  the  Gov- 
erranent  suddenly  created  a  special  department  of  the  For- 
eign Office  to  super\nse  overseas  trade  which  was  begin- 
ning to  assume  large  proportions.     However,  Bismarck's 

*  Malietoa  was  solemnly  proclaimed  king  on  December  23,  1879,  on 
board  the  S.  S.  Bismarck  in  the  harbor  of  Apia. 

*  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1880,  Akfenstuck  no.  loi,  p.  726. 


75]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  75 

"  swing  to  protection."  the  reversal  of  the  German  fiscal 
system  in  1879  from  free-trade  to  protective  tariff,  stands 
out  as  the  most  important  indirect  influence  upon  com- 
mercial colonialism.  Indeed  recent  imperialism  is  a  natural 
and  historical  corollary  to  a  protective  tariff.  And  in 
Germany's  case,  the  repudiation  of  free  trade  was  a  tre- 
mendous stimulus  to  the  colonial  movement.  The  time- 
honored  argument,  "  Colonies  are  an  anachronism  in  an 
era  of  cosmopolitanism,  are  out  of  spirit  with  the  age." 
could  now  be  completely  refuted ;  "  the  spirit  of  the  age  " 
had  changed. 

It  is  an  interesting  question,  though  essentially  outside 
the  scope  of  this  discussion,  whether  the  activities  of  the 
commercial  colonialists  may  not  be  considered  as  one  of  the 
many  causes  of  Bismarck's  "  s^ving  to  protection."  Had 
not  their  efforts  demonstrated  to  Bismarck  the  utter  futility 
of  his  dependence  upon  free-trade,  as  well  as  the  insepar- 
able connection  of  trade  protection  and  political  prestige? 
Who  would  appreciate  more  keenly  than  the  Chancellor  that. 
*'  as  a  result  of  the  Samoan  treaty,  all  changes  henceforth 
in  Samoa  will  depend  upon  the  consent  of  Germany?"* 
Bismarck,  as  we  have  seen,  had  trusted,  before  1874.  to  a 
liberal  trade  policy  to  open  all  countries  and  colonies  to 
Germany;  and  this  had  worked  fairly  well  so  long  as 
Gladstone  had  managed  affairs  in  England.  After  1874, 
the  doctrines  of  the  Manchester  School  began  to  seem  more 
ideal  than  practical ;  agitation  for  the  revival  of  protection- 
ism commenced  to  appear ;  with  the  progi-ess  of  industrv^  and 
shipping  and  the  increase  of  population,  an  imperialistic 
tendency  took  possession  of  every  nation.  The  commercial 
colonialists  had  grasped  these  changed  conditions  and  liad 

•  Annales  de  I'fcole  etc.,  1887,  loc.  cit.,  p.  535.  quoting  Nord.  Deut. 
Atlg.  Zt. 


76         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [76 

shown  that  equality  of  economic  opportunity  existed  no- 
where for  Germany.  May  not  some  roots  of  the  imperial 
tariff  policy,  perhaps,  be  found  in  the  first  responses  of  the 
Government,  reviewed  above,  to  the  commercial  colonial- 
ists and  their  importunities  for  trade  protection?  Was  it 
not  a  logical  step  from  these  first  responses  of  trade  pro- 
tection to  a  thorough-going  adoption  of  a  national  protec- 
tive tariff? 

We  have  now  reviewed  the  progressive  attitude  of  the 
Government  to  commercial  colonialism  from  1871  to  1879. 
We  have  observed  the  administration  gradually  yielding  to 
the  pressure  exerted  by  the  petitions  of  the  colonialists  and 
by  the  political  and  economic  crises  which  their  activities 
caused.  Step  by  step  we  have  seen  the  Government  ad- 
vance from  mere  "  diplomatic  guardianship  "  to,  first,  an 
attitude  of  protest  against  foreign  interference  with  Ger- 
man overseas  merchants  and  traders,  illustrated  by  the 
notes  to  Spain  and  the  complaints  to  England;  then,  to  a 
vigorous  policy  of  direct  and  indirect  protection  and  sup- 
port, indicated  by  the  Tongan,  Samoan  and  other  treatiesi 
and  the  adoption  of  protective  tariff;  and  finally,  to  the 
introduction  of  a  real,  although  unacknowledged  colonial- 
ism by  the  acquisition  of  naval  stations  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  quasi-protectorate  in  Samoa.  We  must  now  turn 
to  the  colonial  movement  itself  and  note  the  effect  upon  it 
of  this  changed  administrative  policy. 

We  last  witnessed  the  colonial  party  merely  in  an  em- 
bryonic stage.  It  consisted  of  a  group  of  commercial  col- 
onialists, who  based  their  claims  upon  their  own  achieve- 
ments, who  demanded  that  their  commercial  ventures  be 
protected,  and  who  crystallized  themselves  into  a  party  by 
the  similarity  of  their  attacks  upon  the  Government.  By  the 
year  1879,  these  protagonists  of  expansion  had  won  govern- 
mental protection  of  overseas  trade  and  had  gained  solid- 


77]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  yy 

arity  in  their  common  victory.  Emboldened  by  their  suc- 
cess, they  still  remained  in  the  vanguard  of  all  colonialists, 
and  they  had  the  temerity  to  introduce  into  the  Reichstag 
the  subject  of  state-directed  colonialism  and  the  actual  ac- 
quisition of  territory  for  colonies.  It  is  significant  that 
they  did  not  broach  the  subject  in  the  Tongan  Treaty  dis- 
cussions; but  two  years  later,  on  the  occasion  of  accepting 
the  Samoan  Treaty,  they  openly  urged  for  the  first  time  in 
the  Reichstag  official  annexation  of  lands  overseas. 

The  reasons  for  their  confidence  are  obvious:  in  1877, 
the  Government  had  distinctly  denied  that  it  regarded  the 
naval  station  acquired  by  the  Tongan  Treaty  as  in  any 
sense  a  colony,  and  Bismarck  had  strongly  asserted  his  ob- 
jection even  to  naval  stations;  but  in  1879.  conditions  had 
decidedly  changed.  The  first  sign  of  change  had  been  in 
1876,  when  Liideritz  and  his  friends  had  presented  the 
project  of  a  German  colony  and  protectorate  in  the  Trans- 
vaal. They  were  not  curtly  dismissed,  as  we  have  already 
noted;  Bismarck's  attitude  was  no  longer  one  of  absolute 
refusal,  although  he  still  regarded  the  project  as  immedi- 
ately impracticable.^  The  Chancellor  received  the  petitioners 
with  great  courtesy  and  personally  appeared  to  sympathize 
with  their  plan.  He  said  that  he  had  studied  the  question 
of  colonies  for  some  years  and  had  concluded  that.  "  A 
great  nation  like  Germany,  in  the  end.  could  not  dispense 
with  colonies ;  but,  as  much  as  he  was  in  principle  in  favor 
of  the  acquisition  of  colonies,  the  question  appeared  so 
complicated  that  he  hesitated  to  embark  upon  colonization 
without  adequate  preparation  and  a  definite  impulse  from 
the  nation  itself."  "  He  added  that  the  political  situation 
was  also  unfavorable  at  that  time — conditioned  as  it  was  by 

*  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkstvirt,  vol.  t.  p.  117.  Cf.  supra,  chap, 
ii,  p.  49- 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  3-4. 


-8         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [78 

the  jealousy  of  France,  the  sensitiveness  of  England,  the 
Kiilturkampf — ;  but  he  held  out  the  hope  that  something 
might  be  done  in  nine  or  ten  years,  "  when  there  shall  have 
been  created  a  deep-seated,  national  movement  in  favor  of 
it."  Besides  this,  the  Chancellor  said,  "  The  internal  situa- 
tion imist  change."  ^ 

Fabri  confirms  for  us  the  impression  of  a  change  in  Bis- 
marck's attitude.  He  wrote  in  February,  1879,  before 
the  ratification  of  the  Samoan  Treaty,  as  follows : 

"  Regarding  the  position  of  the  Chancellor,  it  seems  to  us 
doubtful  whether  he  really  maintains  a  merely  negative  at- 
titude in  regard  to  colonization.  Until  the  present  time  it 
has  always  been  well  understood  that  the  watchword  in  the 
Chancellor's  office  and  in  the  Foreign  Office  was  to  deny 
decisively  any  purpose  of  Germany  to  acquire  colonies.  But 
whether  this  decidedly  negative  policy,  on  the  part  of  the 
Chancellor,  himself,  does  not  mean  a  '  not  yet '  rather  than 
a  *  not  at  all,'  is  today  very  doubtful."  ' 

Moreover,  the  economic  situation,  resulting  from  the 
crisis  of  1873,  would  naturally  reinforce  a  change  in  Bis- 
marck's point  of  view ;  in  fact  it  exerted  no  inconsiderable 
influence  upon  it.  The  financial  crisis  of  1873  was  aggra- 
vated by  the  parallel  rise  of  socialism;  by  the  consequent 
anti-socialist  legislation;  by  a  diminution  of  the  labor 
market  and  by  an  increase  in  wages.  In  fact  the  sugges- 
tion has  been  advanced  that,  in  order  to  divert  men's  minds 
from  the  social  struggle  at  home,  Bismarck  was  more  in- 
clined to  encourage  colonial  adventures  abroad.  Added  to 
this,  the  startling  statistics  of  emigration  could  not  fail  to 
impress  the  Chancellor. 

•  Poschinger,  Zeitschrift  fiir  KolonialpoHtik,  October,   1909,  toe.  cit., 
P-  725. 
'  Fabri,  Bedarf  Deutschland  der  Kolonieenf,  pp.  54-55- 


( 


79]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  yg 

Year  Number  Emigronts 

1871    75,912 

1872   128^3 

1873   110,414 

1874   47,623 

1875    32,362 

1S76   29,626 

1877   21,964 

1878   24,217  1 

Ako,  by  the  year  1879,  the  Kidturkampf-  was  drawing  to 
a  close,  and  the  Kulturkatnpf  had  been  mentioned  by  Bis- 
marck himself  as  a  deterrent  to  the  official  consideration  of 
colonial  expansion. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  domestic  affairs  of  the 

nation,    together   with    Bismarck's   apparent    transition   to 

)  a  more  sympathetic  viewpoint,  created  favorable  conditions 

('    for  the  growth  of  the  colonial  party. 

y  Foreign  affairs  likewise  served  to  advance  the  colonial 
>  movement.  As  they  had  helped  to  precipitate  governmental 
action  abroad,  so  they  justified  and  strengthened  the  posi- 
tion of  the  commercial  colonialists  at  home.  A  newer 
foreign  imperialism  was  becoming  ever  mc^re  threatening. 
England  had  commenced  her  ambitious  activities  in  Egypt 
and  in  1877  had  annexed  the  Transvaal;  France  was  on  the 
eve  of  founding  her  second  colonial  empire.  Furthermore. 
Great  Britain  continued  to  ignore  Germany's  claims  in  re- 
gard to  the  indemnities  of  her  Fiji  Island  settlers.  Bis- 
marck had,  significantly  enough,  revived  the  correspondence 
relative  to  this  question  on  May  23,  1879.*  His  letter  to 
the  German  Ambassador  in  London  had  only  elicited  on 
June  17,  1879.  the  unsatisfactory  reply  from  Lord  Salis- 
bury, that  the  matter  had  been  brought  to  the  attention  of 

'  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,   1879,  Aktenstuck  no.   J87.   p. 
1431- 
*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  187. 


8o        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM      [80 

the  Colonial  Office.  Furthermore,  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
in  1878  had  served  to  being  the  German  public  into  closer 
contact  with  international  affairs;  it  had  revealed  more 
clearly  the  aims,  ambitions  and  relative  strengths  of  the 
other  great  powers,  while  it  must  have  demonstrated  the 
necessity  and  advisability  of  Germany's  speedy  acquisition 
of  possessions  overseas  in  order  to  enable  her  also  to  take 
part  in  the  imperialistic  game. 

The  colonial  party  was  encouraged  and  fortified  by  all 
these  circumstances — the  external  and  internal  political  and 
economic  conditions,  as  well  as  Bismarck's  apparently  more 
favorable  attitude.  It  saw  the  latter  exemplified  in  the 
increasingly  responsive  reaction  of  the  Government  to  com- 
mercial colonialism,  in  the  definite  yielding  to  demands  for 
trade  protection  overseas,  and  in  the  almost  aggressive 
actions  of  1879 — the  acquisition  of  naval  stations,  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  protectorate  and  the  adoption  of  a  protec- 
tive tariff.  Hence,  the  leaders  of  the  colonial  movement 
were  emboldened,  as  they  had  not  been  in  1876,  to  advocate 
publicly  in  the  Reichstag  the  next  steps  of  a  colonial  policy. 
And  they  dared  to  do  this  in  spite  of  the  Government's 
official  and  emphatic  repudiations  of  any  colonial  inten- 
tions. 

Mosle.  the  Bremen  merchant  of  the  firm  so  active  in 
presenting  the  petition  of  1870,  was  the  spokesman  for  the 
new  idea  that  Germany  should  acquire  colonies  at  once.'' 
He  indicated  the  tremendous  strength  of  German  trade  in 
the  South  Seas  as  an  argument  for  adopting  the  Samoan 
Treaty,  he  welcomed  the  policy  of  trade  protection  most 
heartily,  and  then  he  suggested  that  he  would  like  to  see  the 
policy  carried  further. 

I  am  entirely  agreed  that  the   German  Government  should  not 
'  Coppius,  op.  at.,  p.  62. 


8l]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  8l 

attempt  to  seize  for  itself  any  monopoly  in  Polynesia,  but  I  would 
indeed  rejoice,  should  the  Government  find  it  advantageous,  in 
Polynesia  or  in  any  other  part  of  the  world,  to  progress  from 
treaties  of  amity  and  trade  to  protectorate  treaties,  yes,  even  to  the 
annexation  or  seizure  of  lands  in  order  to  establish  its  own  col- 
onies. Should  a  favorable  occasion  arise,  I  should  not  hesitate  to 
encourage  the  empire  to  pursue  such  a  policy  at  once.  .  .  .  The 
arguments  against  it  are  unfounded.  ...  I  consider  the  establish- 
ment of  colonies,  both  for  the  encouragement  of  trade  and  industrj'-, 
and  the  general  prosperous  development  of  the  German  empire 
and  all  German  interests  as  not  only  highly  advantageous,  but 
indeed  necessary.^ 

Mosle  went  on  to  recommend  state  subsidies  for  steam- 
ship lines  to  Polynesia,  to  Japan,  and  to  China. 

The  bold  demand  of  the  commercial  colonialists  for  a 
thorough-going  colonial  policy  did  not  pass  unchallenged. 
Bamberger,  a  radical  leader  of  the  free-trade  party,  led  the 
opposition  to  colonialism."  He  not  only  attacked  the  com- 
mercial colonialists  for  taking  advantage  of  the  Samoan 
Treaty  to  press  their  extreme  demands  for  colonial  annexa- 
tions, but  he  also  accused  the  Government  of  a  secret 
sympathy  with  colonial  policy.  In  a  sarcastic  and  bitter 
speech  he  said :  "  Perhaps  Mosle  is  a  truer  interpreter  of 
Bismarck's  and  the  Government's  attitude  and  position  than 
the  official  press  and  the  preamble  to  the  treaty,  as  I  note 
a  difference  between  these  and  the  opinions  expressed  by 
their  advocates  in  the  Reichstag  ....  I  would  certainly 
describe  a  treaty  of  amity,  such  as  the  Samoan.  as  cos- 
mopolitan in  character,  but  this  one  is  not.     We  have  heard 

'  Verh-andhingcn  des  Deiitschen  Reiclistages,  June  i6,  1879.  pp.  1603 
et  seq. 

2  Ludwig  Bamberger  (1833-1899),  a  prolific  writer  on  political  econ- 
omy and  a  very  influential  member  of  the  Reichstag.  He  belonged  to 
the  left  wing  of  the  National  Liberal  party,  was  a  bitter  enemy  of 
Bismarck,  and  in  1880  was  foremost  among  those  who  repudiated  the 
National  Liberal  party  and  formed  the  Liberate  Vereinigung. 


82         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [82 

cosmopolitanism  decried  here  in  these  debates  as  a  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  trade,  as  a  defect  in  our  political  system.  .  .  . 
The  Government  seems  really  intent  upon  adopting  a  col- 
onial policy  which  is  beneficial  only  to  trade,  very  expensive 
and  apt  to  result  in  slave  labor."  ^  Other  members  of  the 
Opposition  raised  objections  to  the  treaty  on  the  same 
grounds,  and  they  all  confirmed  the  suspicion  that  a  colonial 
policy  was  planned  by  the  Government  and  concealed  in  the 
Samoan  Treaty.^ 

The  Opposition  voted  for  the  treaty  in  the  end,  however, 
but  only  as  a  treaty  of  trade  and  amity.  They  had  evidently 
been  convinced  by  the  Government's  emphatic  disavowals 
of  a  colonial  policy,  which  they  accepted  at  their  face  value. ^ 
The  violent  antagonism  displayed  toward  the  colonialists, 
nevertheless,  marked  the  first  cleavage  of  groups  in  the 
Reichstag  on  the  colonial  question  and  indicated  the  appear- 
ance of  a  definite  colonial  party  in  the  National  Assembly. 

Other  signs,  also,  pointed  to  the  growth,  coalescence  and 
strength  of  a  colonial  party  within  the  nation.  Various 
groups  which  promoted  expansion  for  different  reasons 
rallied  to  the  common  cause  and  enlisted  their  energies 
under  the  leadership  of  the  commercial  colonialists.  For 
example,  the:  Central  Association  for  Commercial  Geo- 
graphy and  German  Interests  Abroad,  founded  in  1868,*  un- 
derwent a  reorganization  and  reinvigo ration.  At  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Geographical  Society  at  Frankfort  on  January 
16,  1878,  Dr.  Franz  Moldenhauer  presented  his  pamphlet, 
Die  Eroterung  iiher  Kolonial  iind  Aiiswandernngsivesen. 
He  proposed  that  all  the  geographical  societies  (branches  of 

*  Verhandhingen  des  Deiitschen  Reichstag es,  June  13,  1879,  pp.  161  r 
et  seq. 

'  Ihid.,  June  16,  1879,  pp.  1650  et  seq. 

3  Cf.  supra,  chap,  iv,  p.  72. 

*  Cf.  supra,  p.  51. 


83]  GOVERNMENT  REACTION  83 

the  old  Central  Association),  should  unite  in  a  reorganized 
and  cooperative  effort  to  promote  colonialism  and  to  direct 
emigration.^  His  suggestion  was  carried  out,  thanks  partly 
to  the  influence  of  the  meeting  of  the  International  Congress 
for  Commercial  Geography  at  Paris  in  1878.  The  result 
was  a  new  society,  founded  on  October  9,  1878,  in  Berlin, 
by  Dr.  Jannarsch  and  Kersten,  still  called  the  Central  Asso- 
ciation and  possessing  practically  the  same  objects  as  the 
original  society  described  above.  The  new  organization, 
according  to  its  constitution,  aimed  to  increase  foreign 
trade,  to  direct  emigration,  to  disseminate  knowledge,  and, 
most  important  of  all,  "  to  bring  about  the  founding  of 
colonies  by  establishing  trade  and  naval  stations."  Further- 
more, it  continued  to  publish  Der  Export,  the  organ  of  the 
original  society,  and  issued  extensive  colonial  propaganda. 
It  collected  all  sorts  of  information  for  merchants,  geogra- 
phers, and  industrials,  building  up  a  considerable  correspon- 
dence. In  1879,  the  Central  Association  sent  an  exhibit 
of  German  trade  to  an  exposition  in  New  South  Wales  and, 
in  the  year  1883,  it  opened  a  Commercial  and  Geographical 
Museum  in  Berlin  and  a  library  attached.  With  a  steadily 
increasing  membership  reaching  three  thousand  in  1883,  the 
Society  became  an  exceedingly  influential  factor  in  crystal- 
lizing public  opinion  in  favor  of  colonization  and  in  streng- 
thening the  colonial  party. 

It  finally  appears  that  the  pressure  of  commercial  colonial- 
ism upon  the  Government  was  too  strong:  that  it  induced 
the  adoption  of  a  vigorous  policy  of  imperial  trade  protec- 
tion overseas;  and  that  the  favorable  reaction  of  the 
Government,  in  turn,  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a  definite 
colonial  party.  In  the  words  of  Mosle,  the  colonialists  wel- 
comed the  new  administrative  policy  of  trade  protection, 

^  Jahrhuch  fur  Natiotwlokonomie  und  Statistik,   1882,   p.   309,  note. 
Vide,  also,  Schmoller's  Jahrhuch,  1880,  p.  12. 


84         ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [84 

not  only  because  "  it  guarantees  the  security  of  their  business 
interests  abroad,"  but,  principally,  because  it  "  contradicts 
Bismarck's  supposed  indifference  to  commercial  colonialism 
and  points  the  "way  to  a  new  era,"  namely,  state-directed 
colonialism,  the  next  phase  of  the  expansion  movement. 


1 1 


CHAPTER  V 
Colonialism  a  National  and  Political  Issue 

The  promoters  of  the  colonial  movement  had  won  a 
significant  victory  in  securing  imperial  protection  for  over- 
seas trade.  They  lost  no  time  in  embarking  upon  a  cam- 
paign for  state-directed  colonialism  and  a  thorough-going 
policy  of  annexation.  However,  they  were  clever  enough 
to  remember  the  Chancellor's  objection  that  state-directed 
colonialism  could  not  be  undertaken  by  the  Government 
without  a  "  deep-seated  popular  demand  and  approval." 
Bismarck's  words  furnished  a  cue  as  to  how  next  to  pro- 
ceed ;  indeed  they  became  a  party  slogan.  It  was,  as  Fabri 
said,  "  A  difficult  time  in  Germany  to  create  a  general  and 
popular  movement  of  public  opinion  in  favor  of  colonies, 
which  would  overcome  the  party  quarrels,  .  .  .  especially 
as  the  colonial  party  is  lacking  in  political  experience  and 
individuality  as  well  as  in  any  influence  or  weight."  ^ 
Nevertheless,  the  leaders  devoted  themselves  to  the  task 
with  diligence. 

To  achieve  their  purpose  of  making  colonialism  a  political 
and  national  issue,  the  colonial  partisans  adopted  three  poli- 
cies. They  disseminated  propaganda ;  they  sought  to  create 
political  influence  for  the  colonial  party  in  order  to  render  it 
an  important  factor  in  party  politics ;  and  they  exerted  a 
special  economic  pressure  upon  the  Government. 

An  idea  of  the  efficacy  and  scope  of  the  first  part  of  their 
program  may  be  obtained  by  a  survey  of  the  propagandist 

^  Fabri,  op.  cit.,  p.  54. 
85]  85 


86        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [86 

literature  during  the  years  from  1879  to  188 1.  At  least  the 
quantity  which  they  produced  was  impressive:  forty  books 
appeared  upon  the  subject  of  colonization  from  1880  to 
1882/  All  the  propaganda  was  alike  in  that  it  based  the 
arguments  for  colonial  expansion  upon  vital  political  eco- 
nomic necessity  and  carried  a  stirring  appeal  to  patriotic 
emotion,  not  without  a  certain  jingoistic  ring. 

Foremost  among  the  propagandists  stood  Hiibbe-Schlei- 
den  and  Fabri.^  The  former,  a  lawyer  and  statesman,  was 
interested  in  a  mercantile  house  in  Hamburg,  had  been  an 
explorer  in  equatorial  Africa,  and  a  merchant  from  1875  to 
1877  i"  Gabun.  The  latter,  for  twenty-seven  years  In- 
spector of  the  Rhine  Mission,  which,  it  will  be  remembered, 
engaged  largely  in  trade  in  Namaqualand,  became  convinced 
of  Germany's  need  of  colonies  and  had  devoted  himself  to 
the  cause.  He  had  promoted  it  by  his  books,  by  his  articles 
in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  and  elsewhere,  by  his  speeches 
at  innumerable  gatherings,  and  by  a  many-sided  correspon- 
dence with  friends  of  a  colonial  policy  and  with  the  great 
industrials.  Fabri  occupied  the  position  of  honorary  pro- 
fessor at  the  University  of  Bonn,  and  founded  in  1880  at 
Dusseldorf  the  West  Deutch  Verein  fiir  Kolonisation  und 
Export.^  Hiibbe-Schleiden  later  became  business  mianager 
of  this  society.  Under  Woermann's  influence,  the  organ- 
ization tried  to  induce  bankers  to  finance  a  plantation  colony 

^Jahrbuch  fiir  Nationalokononvie  und  Statistik,  1884,  p.  327. 

'  Mosle  cited  these  two  writers  in  the  debates  over  the  Samoan  Treaty 
and  urged  that  the  Bureau  of  the  Reichstag  purchase  copies  of  their 
books  [Hiibbe-Schleiden,  Die  Ethiopieen:  Studieen  iiber  West  Afrika 
(Hamburg,  1879),  an  attempt  to  arouse  interest  in  these  sub-tropical 
people  as  affording  a  market  for  Germany.  Fabri,  Bedarf  Deutschland 
der  Kolonieen  (Gotha,  1879)]  'ind  distribute  them  to  all  members  of 
the  national  assembly.  Verhandliingen  des  Deiitschen  Reichstages, 
June  13,  1879,  P-  604. 

'  AUgemeine  Deutsche  Biographie,  vol.  xlviii,  pp.  473-475. 


8;]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  8/ 

in  Kameroon.  Indeed,  it  is  significant  that  both  Hiibbe- 
Schleiden's  and  Fabri's  writings  received  the  warm  sup- 
port and  patronage  of  the  firm  of  Woermann,  which  pubUcly 
expressed  the  hope  that  they  might  fall  on  fruitful  ground 
so  that  steps  would  immediately  be  taken  before  all  avail- 
able territory  was  seized  by  other  powers/ 

Thus  we  see  that  the  two  leading  propagandists  repre- 
sented within  their  lives  and  experience  all  the  various  cur- 
rents making  for  a  colonial  policy  and  underlying  the 
"  colonial  idea."  In  presenting  colonialism  as  a  national 
and  political  question,  however,  they  subordinated  their 
ecclesiastical,  intellectual  and  scientific  interests  to  the  com- 
mercial and  economic. 

Primarily,  we  may  say,  Hiibbe-Schleiden  represented  the 
political  and  Fabri  the  economic  aspects  of  the  question.  It 
is  Hiibbe-Schleiden,  however,  who  must  be  credited  with 
having  been  the  first  to  elevate  the  subject  of  acquiring 
colonies  to  the  plane  of  a  distinctively  national  policy.  A 
most  prolific  writer  upon  colonialism  and  a  tremendously  in- 
fluential factor  in  the  movement,  his  viewpoint  is  by  far 
the  most  original  and  significant  of  any  of  the  propagand- 
ists. He  is  the  prophet  of  a  new  era  for  Germany ;  an  era 
to  be  characterized  by  an  intense,  overgrown  nationalism, 
developing  into  a  grasping  imperialism,  which  was  to  lead 
straight  along  the  road  to  ultimate  downfall.  He  it  was 
who  cleverly  linked  up  colonialism  with  the  contemporary 
transformation  in  the  W eltanschaming  of  the  empire,  from 
a  liberal,  laisses-faire  cosmopolitanism  and  internationalism 
to  a  conservative,  individualized  and  narrow  nationalism; 
and  in  so  doing,  he  served  further  to  accentuate  and  ac- 
celerate that  change.  He  made  the  solution  of  the  colonial 
question  dependent  upon  the  already  visible  shift  in  the 

'  MitteUungen  der  Hamburg-Geographische  Gesellschaft,  1878-1879,  p. 
58,  quoted  by  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  2^. 


88        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [88 

national  mind  of  Germany;  he  identified  himself  and  colon- 
ialism with  the  "  younger  generation,"  the  more  advanced 
thinkers,  and  thereby  gained  for  the  movement  that  stimulat- 
ing quality  inherent  in  all  movements  which  claim  to  have 
escaped  from  the  reactionaries  and  to  be  apprehended  only 
by  "  more  enlightened  minds." 

A  quotation  from  Schiller's  Wilhehn  Tell  on  the  fly  leaf 
of  Hiibbe-Schleiden's  book,  Deutsch  Kolonisation,^  "  Es 
lebt  em  anders-denkendes  Geschlecht,"  gives  us  the  key  note 
to  his  thesis.  "  To  the  old  generation,  the  term  '  nationality  * 
has  only  an  ethnographical  content,  but  for  the  younger  it 
has  a  political."  Hence  the  outworn  international  idea 
clung  to  by  the  past  generation  must  not  be  allowed  to  block 
the  ambitions  of  the  present.  That  would  mean  suicide  for 
Germany.  "  The  luxury  of  a  cosmopolitan  Weltanschauung 
can  only  be  indulged  in  by  the  Great  Powers,  not  those  who 
still  must  struggle  for  greatness."  This  cosmopolitan- 
ism, he  thinks,  is  too  idealistic,  too  colorless;  the  practical 
fact  remains  that  nations  exist.  As  he  phrases  it,  "  This 
striving  after  cosmopolitanism,  this  internationalism,  is  to- 
day, for  any  non-Anglo-Saxon  race,  only  a  betrayal  of  its 
individual  nationality  to  the  English.  .  .  .  Germany  has  for 
one  hundred  years  sacrificed  its  civilization  to  England." 

Hiibbe-Schleiden  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  develop- 
ment of  a  self-conscious  national  feeling  as  well  as  of  a 
strong  overseas  policy,  which  in  trade  and  emigration 
acknowledge  only  a  national  flag,  were  questions  of  life  and 
death  for  Germany's  future.  "  Los  von  Nord  Amerika, 
Los  von  Gross-Britanien,"  was  his  slogan. 

In  order  to  demonstrate  how  the  German  nation,  racially, 
economically  and  culturally  might  ultimately  be  absorbed  by 
Great  Britain,  he  drew  a  most  graphic  picture  of  the  future, 
well  calculated  to  strike  terror  into  the  soul  of  every  patriot 

^Hiibbe-Schleiden,  Deutsche  Kolonisation  (Hamburg,  1881). 


§9]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  89 

and  incidentally  to  incite  a  keen  jealousy  of  England.  He 
attempted  to  depict  the  result  in  the  year  1980  of  the 
gradual  absorption  of  German  emigrants  into  other  lands, 
an  absorption  caused  by  the  non-existence  of  German  colon- 
ies. Estimating  by  the  contemporary  rate  of  emigration, 
he  constructed  the  following  table. 

Race  J850  1875                  1980 

English     55,817,000  90,564,000  907,000,000 

German    52,930,000  64,470,000  146,000,000 

Dutch    7,500,000  9,202,000          20,500,000 

Scandinavian    6,272,000  8,134,000          24,300,000 

Russian    63,010,000  83,790,000  275,000,000 

Romance  (Latin)    113,142,000  127,588,000  212,202,0001 

Germany  then,  by  the  year  1980,  would  be  in  the  present 
position  of  Spain  as  a  nation  and  the  Germans  would  be  the 
slaves  of  England. 

Likewise  he  exposed  the  "  Free-Trade  Parody,"  as  he 
termed  it.  He  showed  hcnv  the  practice  of  free  trade,  in- 
stead of  creating  equal  opportunity  for  all  merchants,  had 
enabled  England  to  increase  her  control  of  world  trade 
within  two  decades  (1855-1875)  from  sixty-one  percent 
to  seventy  percent. 

A  natural  corollary  to  the  foregoing  argument  was  Ger- 
many's mission  to  spread  her  Kultur  as  a  means  of  main- 
taining Deutschtum.  "  In  this  manner  a  country  exhibits 
before  the  world,  her  strength  or  weakness  as  a  nation."  " 
As  Hiibbe-Schleiden  said,  "  How  many  inventions  or  dis- 
coveries are  made  by  Germans  decades  before  they  are  even 
thought  of  by  Englishmen  or  by  Frenchmen  but  are  adver- 
tised to  the  word  as  of  English  or  of  French  origin. 
Hence  prestige  and  Kultnr  become  submerged."  ^ 

^  Hiibbe-Schleiden,  op.  cit.,  p.  38. 
*  Hiibbe-Schleiden,  op.  cit.,  p.  48. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


go        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [90 

In  this  same  connection  Hiibbe-Schleiden  emphasized  the 
fact  that  it  was  Germany's  duty  to  expand  and  preserve  her 
Kultur  not  only  for  her  own  sake,  but  to  advance  the  cause 
of  world  civilization.  He  also  made  this  idea  clear  in  an 
article  entitlled,  Kulturfahigkeit  der  Neger,  in  which  he 
pleaded  that  German  Kultur  if  spread  in  Africa,  would 
mean  progress  for  the  whole  negro  race.  Unfortunately, 
we  gain  the  impression  that  this  would  be  true  only  if 
Africa  proved  "  good  business;  "  if  not,  the  negro  was  in- 
capable of  culture. 

In  presenting  such  a  conviction  of  the  necessity  for  colon- 
ial expansion,  it  was  but  the  next  step  to  harp  upon  the 
"  honor  of  Germany."  This  "  honor  "  now  demanded,  Hiib- 
be-Schleiden claimed,  annexation  to  preserve  the  political 
position  of  the  Fatherland,  just  as  commercial  colonialism 
had  required  a  protective  tariff.  Indeed  it  did  not  demand 
much  insight  on  the  part  of  these  national  and  colonial  en- 
thusiasts to  cause  them  to  point  out  various  circumstances 
propitious  for  the  speedy  adoption  of  an  annexationist 
policy,  such  as  the  new  grouping  of  the  powers  after  the 
German  treaty  with  Austria  in  1879;  the  growing  strength 
of  the  navy  after  the  Naval  Bill  of  1878;  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  other  powers  on  economic  grounds  which 
a  colonial  policy  would  readily  afford. 

Supporting  Hiibbe-Schleiden  in  emphasizing  the  national- 
political  aspect  of  colonialism  were  such  men  as  E.  von 
Weber,^  who  recommended  the  annexation  of  the  Transvaal, 
Moldenhauer,^  and  Herman  Wagner.'  And  many  publi- 
cations of  the  Central  Association  advanced  similar  ideas. 
The  following  extract  is  an  example :  "  We  are  convinced 
that  the  organization  of  German  emigration  is  a  phase  in  the 

'  E.  von  Weber,  op.  cif. 

'  Moldenhauer,  op.  cit. 

'Wagner,  Uber  Grundung  deutschen  Kolonieen  (Heidelberg,  1881). 


ill 


^l]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  91 

evolution  of  Germany  towards  independence.  Just  as  the 
war  of  18 1 3  defeated  the  foreign  invader,  just  as  the  revo- 
lution of  1848  made  for  freedom,  just  as  the  year  1866 
deHvered  Germany  from  Austria,  and  finally  just  as  the  year 
1870  rescued  Germany  from  French  domination,  so  today, 
in  economic  life,  our  slogan  should  be  '  Los  von  Gross- 
Britanien,  los  von  Nord  Amerika.'  These  words  will  lead 
to  the  establishment  of  pure  German  colonies  and  the  expan- 
sion of  Dentschtum."  ^ 

The  economic  side  of  the  "  question  of  life  and  death  " 
for  Germany  was  also  exploited  to  the  utmost  by  propa- 
ganda and  here  it  is  Fabri  who  takes  the  lead.  He  wrote 
in  1879,  when  he  thought  the  fiscal  and  commercial  crisis' 
would  win  for  him  a  ready  ear.  He  represented  Germany 
in  his  book,  Bedarf  Deutschland  der  Kolonieenf  as 
economically  threatened  and  emphasized  the  social  results 
of  non-colonization.  He  presented  the  question  as  one  not 
so  much  of  political  power  and  prestige  as  of  actual  national 
and  material  existence.  "  The  colonial  question  is  not  pri- 
marily a  political  Machtfragc.  It  is  much  more  a  KuJtur- 
frage.  Economic  needs  in  connection  with  general  national 
crisis  demand  colonies."  " 

Fabri  dealt  in  a  practical  manner  with  the  ideas  of  the 
colonial  theorists  upon  emigration  and  focussed  attention 
upon  what  was  rapidly  becoming  a  dominant  motive  for 
expansion,  the  ever-swelling  stream  of  emigrants  from  the 
Fatherland.  Like  the  colonialists,  he  regarded  emigra- 
tion not  as  an  isolated  question,  in  the  manner  of  the  old 
economists,  but  as  a  subject  closely  connected  with  national 
and  social  questions.  Many  other  writers  between  the  years 
1879  and  1 88 1  followed  his  lead  in  this  respect. 

1  Der  Export,   no.   38,   Sept.,    1880,   quoted   by   Hiibbe-Schleiden    in 
Deutsche  Kolonisation,  p.  i. 
'  Fabri,  op.  cif.,  p.  56. 


92        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [92 

Some  idea  of  the  emigration  situation  which  furnished 
propagandists  like  Fabri  and  later  writers  with  their  alarm- 
ing arguments  may  be  gained  by  a  glance  at  the  following 
statistics. 


Years 

Number  of  Emigrants 

from  Germany 

1871-1880 

585,000 

1881-1883 

570,000  1 

1881 

210,547 

to  America. 

1875-1888 

815,374 

to  America  from  ports   of  Ham 
burg,  Bremen,  Antwerp,  .Stettin, 

Pointing  to  these  figures,  Fabri  led  the  way  in  urging 
state-directed  emigration  for  the  purpose  of  conserving  Ger- 
many's very  life.  He  demonstrated  graphically  and  alarm- 
ingly how  the  constant  loss  to  the  Fatherland  of  youth, 
talent,  skill,  business  ability  and  initiative  (for  it  is  always 
the  best  who  go) ,  was  continually  depleting  Germany  of  her 
vitality.  As  Moldenhauer  expressed  it,  "  This  stream  of 
emigrants  going  out  with  all  it  has,  furnishing  knowledge 
and  skill  to  our  national  enemies,  is  a  tax  in  gold  and  blood 
paid  by  Germany  tO'  foreign  lands."  ^  And  he  reckoned  the 
tax  at  300,000,000  M.  annually. 

Moreover,  here  was  the  economic  situation  at  home  of 
which  the  large  emigration  was  only  a  symptom.  Fabri, 
Professor  Herman  Wagner  *  of  the  University  of  Got- 
tingen,  Adolph  Wagner,^  Weber,  Frey.  Hiibbe-Schleiden,^ 

1  Herrfurth,  Bismarck  tend  die  Kolonialpolitik  (Berlin,  1909),  p.  23. 

~  Jahrbuch  fur  Nationalokonomie  und  Statistik,  1882,  p.  211. 
Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  71. 

*  Fabri,  op.  cit.,  p.  16. 

*  Wagner,   H.,    Uber  Griindung   Deutschen    Kolonieen    (Heidelberg, 
1881). 

*  Wagner,  A.,  "  Volksmehrung  und  Auswanderung,"  Augs.  Allg.  Zt., 
1880,  nos.  160-170. 

*Hiibb€-Schleiden,  Weltzvirtschaft  und  die  Sie  triebene  Kraft  (Ham- 
burg, 1881). 


93]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  93 

Geffcken  and  many  others,  all  pointed  out  that  only  the 
acquisition  of  colonies  could  solve  problems  arising  from 
the  increase  of  population  at  home  (a  preponderance  of 
birth  rate  over  death  rate  amounting  to  600,000  annually), 
the  consequent  over-stocking  of  the  home  market  with  both 
men  and  money,  the  lack  of  sufficient  opportunity  for  in- 
vestment, the  necessity  for  raw  materials, — all  those  condi- 
tions, in  fine,  which  caused  the  material  evil  of  emigration. 
They  argued  that  capital  was  now  engaged  in  wild  specula- 
tion at  home  rather  than  in  normal  investment  abroad;  that 
even  with  the  over-supply  of  the  labor  market,  men  of  the 
first  calibre  were  lacking  for  business  enterprise,  because 
they  had  emigrated  to  seek  a  less  stifled  atmosphere  for 
the  exercise  of  their  abihty.  "  The  rapid  increase  of  our 
universities  has  been  our  national  pride;  but  it  will  cease 
to  be  so  if  our  educated  youth  are  not  satisfied."  As  they 
expressed  it,  ''  The  superfluity  of  life  and  activity,  the  am- 
bitious spirit  of  youth,  satisfied  neither  by  work  nor  by  in- 
terest, cry  aloud,  '  Let  us  live  instead  of  dream.'  "  These 
propagandists  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  "  all  the  govern- 
mental, ecclesiastical  and  civil  posts  are  over-crowded ;  and 
this  situation  together  with  the  consequent  enlarged  com- 
petition is  by  far  the  most  pressing  problem.  Markets 
for  production,  fields  foi  labor  and  capital,  are  needed  both 
to  preserve  German's  nationality  in  Europe  and  to  prevent 
its  loss  to  other  countries  through  emigration."  ^  All  sorts 
and  kinds  of  statistics  were  adduced  and  manipulated  to 
prove  over-population,  over-production  of  manufactured 
goods,  insufficient  increase  in  means  of  subsistence  to  keep 
pace  with  the  growth  of  population,  loss  of  man  power  and 
lack  of  efficient  military  service.  And,  it  was  claimed, 
social  disorders  and  industrial  unrest  resulted  therefrom,  in 

'  Hiibbe-Schleiden',  Die  Ethiopien  (Hamburg.  1879). 


c,4        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [94 

which  socialism  had  its  roots.  Hiibbe-Schleiden  in  his 
Uberseeische  Politik,  a  Kultitrzvirtschaftliche  Studie,^  later 
dwelt  upon  this  aspect.  "  More  than  anything  else,  the 
narrow,  economic  horizon  of  our  nation  is  the  cause  of  our 
lack  of  well-being,  and  the  Germans  are  above  everything 
else  good  peasants  and  good  school  masters."  Fabri  be- 
came so  pessimistic  about  Germany's  future  without  the 
adoption  of  a  state-directed  colonialism  and  a  national  direc- 
ion  of  emigration,  that  he  prophesied  dire  social  and  econo- 
mic results,  as  follows :  "  Increasing  imports  of  grain  and 
beef,  because  German  agriculture  cannot  meet  the  need,  a 
resulting  and  ever  increasing  high  cost  of  living,  constantly 
decreasing  wages,  a  lowered  production  of  manufactured 
goods,  ...  a  rapid  growth  of  pauperism  and  social  need."  ^ 
Like  Hiibbe-Schleiden,  he  laid  great  emphasis  upon  the  mis- 
sion of  Germany  and  the  task  assigned  her  by  universal 
history  to  spread  Kultur.  "Where  semi-barbaric  civiliza- 
tions exist,  the  annexation  of  their  lands  by  a  great,  strong 
power  is  an  act  of  humanity,"  ^  he  said. 

Nor  did  all  this  politico-economic  national  propaganda 
lose  itself  in  mere  theory  and  dire  prognostications  of  eviL 
Hiibbe-Schleiden,  Fabri,  AVeber,  all  in  fact,  m'^ke  definite 
recommendations  for  possible  German  colonies.  With  their 
slogan,  "  Los  von  Nord  Amerika,  los  von  Gross  Britanien," 
they  cried  also  a  definite  "Nach," — ^to  agricultural  colonies  in 
South  Africa,  in  Australia,  and  in  South  America,  especially 
in  Brazil  (some  of  them  even  not  hesitating  to  contemplate  a 
a  conflict  with  the  United  States  in  the  quest).  They  urged 
the  foundation  of  trading  colonies  on  the  coast  and  in  the 
interior  of  Africa,   in   Madagascar,   in  the   Indian  Archi- 

^  Hiibbe-Schleiden,  Uberseeische  Politik  (Hamburg,  1881-1883). 
'  Fabri,  op,  cit.,  p.  20. 
*Ibid.,  p.  57. 


95]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  95 

pelago,  and  in  Borneo.  A  group  of  travelers  and  mission- 
aries joined  the  campaign;  they  omitted  the  theory  of  colon- 
ialism but  supported  the  movement  by  recommendations  de- 
rived from  personal  experience.  To  cite  but  a  few,  Karl 
von  Scherzer  ^  urged  Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala ; 
Richard  Dilthey  ^  promoted  the  idea  of  further  colonization 
in  Southern  Brazil.  Uruguay,  Argentina;  Liesenberg  ^  ex- 
tolled Argentina  and  Paraguay;  Wolfing*  and  Blaser,  who 
assumed  that  Germany  would  go  to  war  for  colonies, 
revived  the  question  as  a  Machtfragc  and  advised  activity 
in  Morocco,  Tunis,  and  Tripoli ;  Griinewald  '"  recommended 
Ecuador. 

Naturally,  the  flood  of  literature  just  reviewed,  with  its 
attem.pt  to  make  the  colonial  question  a  national  issue,  did 
not  go  unchallenged  by  the  opponents  of  a  colonial  policy. 
Indeed,  the  warfare  of  pamphlets,  books  and  words  that 
ensued,  served,  at  least  indirectly,  the  object  of  the  colonial 
party  to  make  the  subject  one  of  nation-wide  discussion. 

The  combatants  of  overseas  expansion  consisted,  in  the 
main,  of  the  old  generation  of  cosmopolitans.  They  defined 
the  issue  squarely  as  one  of  nationalism  versus  interna- 
tionalism, and  opposed  the  struggle  of  the  colonial  party  to 
raise  the  debate  to  a  national  plane.  Prominent  among  the 
opponents  was  such  a  man  as  Dr.  Friedrich  Kapp,  the  great 
mediator  between  Germany  and  the  Germans  in  the  United 

'  von  Scherzer,  Die  Deutsche  Arbeit  in  Fremden  Erdtheilen  (Leipzig, 
1880). 

*  Dilthey,  Die  Deutsche  Ansiedlungcn  in   Siidbrasilicn,  etc.    (Berlin, 
1882). 

'  Liesenberg,  Wohin  Auswandem  oder  Deutschland  iiher  dent  Meer 
(Berlin,  1881). 

*  Wolfing,  Der  Erwerb  von  Ackerbau  und  Handclskoionicen   (Koln, 
1881). 

*  Griinewald,     IVie     Kami     Deutschland     Kolonialbcsitz     Enverbenf 
(Mainz,  1879). 


96        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [96 

States,  where  he  had  Hved  for  twenty  years  and  where  he 
had  been  commissioner  for  emigrants  from  1866  to  1871/ 
From  his  experience  he  enjoyed  a  well-earned  reputation  on 
all  colonial  questions,  and  had  also  gained  a  high  position  as 
a  scholar.  His  outlook  was  distinctly  international  and 
cosmopolitan.  He  believed  in  emigration  and  did  his  ut- 
most to  encourage  the  expansion  of  the  German  people. 
His  purpose  in  doing  so,  however,  was  rather  to  extend 
German  Ktdtiir  so  that  it  miight  fuse  with  and  enrich  an 
"  international  race;  "  not  to  perpetuate  nor  to  increase  any 
single  national  or  political  power.  He  represented  the 
thought  of  a  generation  O'f  Germans  against  whom  Hiibbe- 
Schleiden  directed  his  attacks.  Indeed,  Hiibbe-Schleiden's 
book,  Deutsche  Kolonisation  was  a  reply  to  Kapp's  Uber 
Colonisation  und  Answanderiing,'-  in  which  Kapp  argued 
that  the  "  international  protection  of  emigrants  is  the  most 
pressing  question  of  the  day."  He  deplored  the  proposed 
adoption  of  a  state-directed  emigration  as  a  definite  attack 
upon  individual  liberty.  Philippsohn,  an  association  of 
Dr.  Kapp,  a  prosaic  Hamburg  business  man,  without  much 
knowledge  of  the  historic  l^ackground,  presented  the  point 
of  view  of  the  free-trade  merchant.  He  illustrated  the 
radical  difference  between  the  cosmopolitan  and  the  national 
schools  of  thought  when  he  said,  "  The  German  merchant  isi 
not,  as  they  (the  nationalists)  want  to  make  us  think,  a 
pariah  among  foreigners;  just  as  little  is  the  German  emi- 
grant. The  position  of  the  Germans  abroad  is  an  honorable 
one  and  the  word  Volkerdilnger  is  a  senseless  term  which 
aims  at  the  sensational  but  can  only  impress  the  ignorant."  ^ 
Hubbe-Schleiden  answered  Philippsohn  by  saying,  "  No  one 

'  AUgemeine  Deutsche  Biographie,  vol.  li,  pp.  32-36. 
'  Kapp,  F.,  Uber  Colonisation  und  Ausivanderung  (1880). 
3  Philippsohn,    F.,   "  Uber    Colonisation,"    V olkswirtschaftliche   Zeit- 
fragen,  vol.  xii-xiii,  p.  66. 


ll 


gy]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  97 

claims  that  our  merchants  and  emigrants  are  pariahs.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  often  very  influential  persons  and  it 
is  because  of  this  that  they  have  won  the  title,  V'dlkcr- 
dilnger.  It  is  our  people's  honor  that  they  are  calle,d 
Volkerdunger,  but  it  is  our  nation's  shame.  Our  nation 
has  so  far  played  a  pitiful  role  in  the  world.  But  this  dis- 
grace may  rest  upon  our  old  generation;  the  younger  gen- 
eration will  endure  it  no  longer,  in  spite  of  Herr  Philippsohn 
and  his  companions."  ^ 

Other  supporters  of  the  negative  side  of  the  controversy 
were  Peltz,"  Loehnis,^  Fritz,*  and  Zacharias,^  the  last  named 
being  a  member  of  the  Malthusian  League.  Their  principal 
arguments  against  state-directed  colonialism  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows.  They  considered  that  the  Germans  in 
the  United  States  were  far  better  off  than  those  living  in 
South  America  and  that  it  was  to  the  political  interest  of 
Germany  to  form  independent  national  groups  within  the 
United  States.  They  thought  it  unlikely  that  state-directed 
emigration  would  relieve  the  problem  of  over-population. 
They  asserted,  moreover,  that  in  comparison  with  English, 
French  and  Scandinavian  emigration,  Germany's  emigra- 
tion was  much  less.  They  argued  that  German  coloniza- 
tion would  only  be  an  imitation  of  the  English  who  were 
far  better  fitted  for  it  in  every  way,  that  colonization  had 
never  been  the  real  tradition  of  Germany ;  and  that  Germany 
was  furthermore  lacking  in  all  proper  facilities  for  it.  pos- 
sessing neither  a  coast  on  an  open  sea  nor  an  adequate  navy. 
The  Fatherland,  they  asserted,  controlled  an  immense  trade 
already,   international   trade  was  profitable  to  her  at  the 

*  Hubbe-Schleiden,  Deutsche  Kolonisation,  p.  16. 

^  Peltz,  Katechismus  der  Auszvanderuug  (Leipzig,  1881). 
'  Loehnis,  Die  Eitropdische  Kolonieen  (Bonn,  1881). 

*  Fritz,  Zur  Auszvandcrungsfrage  (Wien,  1879). 

'  Zacharias,  Die  Bevolkerungsfrage  etc.  (Hirschberg,  1880). 


c,8        ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM       [qS 

time,  private  trade  interests  should  not  be  fostered,  and 
trade  did  not  always  "  follow  the  flag."  They  feared  that 
agricultural  colonies  would  mean  slavery  for  the  natives, 
tyranny,  wars ;  that  penal  colonies  would  prove  demoraliz- 
ing and  would  prevent  the  proper  treatment  of  crime. 
They  contended  that  Germany's  best  statesmen  realized  that 
her  true  interests  lay  in  Europe;  that  colonies  would  entail 
conflicts  with  other  Powers  and  enormous  expense;  and 
that  expansion  into  eastern  and  southern  Europe  was  much 
more  necessary,  for  Germany's  aim  should  be,  above  all,  to 
become  the  arbiter  of  the  destinies  of  Europe/  Fritz  and 
Loehnis,  especially,  urged  colonization  in  Turkey,  Poland, 
and  Hungary;"  while  Loehnis  specifically  urged  expansion 
in  the  Balkans.  Philippsohn  accused  the  colonial  partisans 
of  exploiting  the  national  principle,  of  using  it  as  a  "  miask 
of  patriotism  "  to  hide  their  desire  for  colonies.  He  care- 
fully dissected  the  arguments  of  Fabri  and  Weber,  one  by  one. 
and  refuted  them.  He  pointed  out  that  all  colonial  enthu- 
siasts had  painted  a  picture  in  many  respects  far  too  black 
and  indeed  glaringly  incorrect.^  For  instance,  he  showed 
that,  during  the  last  twenty  years  German  exports  had  con- 
tinually increased  instead  of  decreased ;  that  criminal  statis- 
tics, used  as  arguments  for  penal  colonies,  were  erroneous ; 
that  the  development  of  the  navy  was  exaggerated  by  Fabri ; 
that  no  such  crisis  due  to  the  tariff  as  Fabri  represented 
existed.  He  proved  by  statistics  that,  according  to  the 
population,  the  percentage  of  emigration  had  decreased, 
and  that  although  the  cost  of  living  had  increased,  wages 
had  increased  also,  as  proved  by  savings  banks  accounts, 

'  Gebauer,  H.,  articles  in  Augsburg  Allg.  Zt.,  Beilage,  1882,  nos.  18, 
20,  22,  25,  28,  30. 

'  Fritz,  op.  cit.,  Loehnis,  op.  cit.,  and  Die  Deut.  Kolonialprojecte  und 
der  Europdische  Siidosten  (Bonn,  1881). 

'  Philippsohn,  op.  cit.,  passim. 


99]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  99 

and  the  prosperity  of  the  working  class.  He  claimed  that 
it  was  incorrect  to  argue  that  wages  would  decrease  because 
of  increasing  population,  since  the  land  of  Germany  was 
capable  of  greater  cultivation  and  development.  He  also 
asserted  that  the  statistics  regarding  the  loss  of  man-power 
and  capital  overseas  were  unreliable,  Moldenhauer  reckon- 
ing them  at  15,000,000  M.  annually^  and  Weber  at 
23,000,000  M.^  In  this  same  connection,  Gebauer  proved 
by  figures  that  Germany  was  not  over-populated '  and 
Philippsohn  argued  that,  since  the  cost  of  state-directed 
emigration  was  very  heavy,  it  would  drive  more  men  away 
to  escape  taxation,  while  only  those  would  remain  in  Ger- 
many who  made  their  living  by  taxes  and  monopolies. 

Thus,  these  anti-expansionists  pleaded  for  greater  de- 
liberation and  a  more  correct  knowledge  of  facts.  "  The 
exaggerations  of  the  colonialists  have  long  been  recognized 
as  the  efforts  of  interested  speculators,"  they  said.  As  in- 
ternationalists they  thought  that  colonies  were  unnecessary, 
indeed,  that  they  would  be  deleterious  to  German  life. 

Turning  from,  the  literary  efforts  and  the  propagandist 
campaign  oi  the  colonial  party,  we  must  observe  its  activity 
in  the  political  field;  for  clever  manipulations  here  consti- 
tuted the  second  phase  of  its  policy  which  was  designed 
to  render  colonialism  a  national  and  political  question. 
"  The  colonial  party  has  no  political  identity  or  in- 
dependence," said  Fabri  in  1879.  But  its  leaders  set  them- 
selves at  once  to  the  task  of  creating  an  "  identity  and  inde- 
pendence." *  No  one  realized  better  than  they  the  neces- 
sity of  achieving  a  definite  party  status;  and  the  existing 

*  Moldenhauer,  op.  cit. 

*  Weber,    Die   Erweiteruug    des   Dent.    Wirtschaftsgebiete    (Leipzig. 
1879). 

'Gebauer,  Augs.  Allg.  Zt.,  Beilage  no.  18. 

*  Fabri,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 


lOO     ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [iqq 

political  situation,  with  its  changing  issues  and  shifting 
groups,  afforded  them  at  once  an  opportunity  which  they 
were  not  slow  to  grasp.  A  brief  review  of  the  domestic 
politics  in  Germany  towards  the  close  of  the  seventies  will 
be  necessary  to  illustrate  the  chances  afforded  to  the  colonial 
partisans  of  entering  the  arena  of  public  life  and  thereby 
achieving  a  "  political  independence." 

The  year  1878  in  Germany  clearly  marked  the  end  of  the 
"  liberal  era  "  and  a  definite  reversion  to  the  principles  of 
conservatism.  In  the  first  place,  the  state  of  national  psy- 
chology indicated  the  return  to  a  reactionary  point  of  view. 
The  period  from  the  years  1867  to  1878  had  been  a  time  of 
great  theorizing,  of  extended  discussion  about  general  laws, 
of  juridical  debates,  of  the  Kiilhirkampf  \  but  after  1878, 
people  no  longer  stressed  theory — they  were  more  concerned 
with  practical  interests.  The  economic  progress  of  Ger- 
many and  universal  suffrage  were  largely  responsible  for 
the  change.  Since  1867,  men  had  learned  something  prac- 
tical in  polity.  "  They  began  to  ask  themselves,  *  What 
do  you  want  of  the  man  whom  you  send  to  Berlin?'^ 
They  wanted  their  business  concerns  attended  to.'  "  Be- 
fore 1878,  economic  interests  did  not  predominate  as  back- 
grounds to  political  parties;  after  1878,  they  did.  After 
1878  the  Kultiirkampf  and  theories  of  government  ceased  to 
occupy  the  center  of  the  stage;  socialism  and  economic  af- 
fairs took  their  place.  As  illustrative  of  this  psychological 
change,  the  term  "  nationalism  "  had  acquired  a  new  mean- 
ing to  the  popular  mind.  From  the  years  1867  to  1878,  the 
word  "  national  "  had  been  the  slogan  in  the  theoretical, 
idealistic,  "liberal"  sense;  it  had  meant  a  purely  political, 
patriotic  enthusiasm;  and  it  had  helped  to  cement  the 
smaller  states  into  a  union  under  the  aegis  of  the  Prussian 
Eagle.     After  1878,  however,  the  cry  "  national  "  was  to 

'  Naumann,  Die  politische  Parteien  (Berlin,  1911). 


lOi]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  jqi 

connote  something  quite  different  and  much  more  material- 
istic; henceforth,  it  was  to  concern  itself  more  with  econo- 
mic life,  it  was  to  be  identified  with  trade  and  commercial 
rivalry. 

In  the  second  place,  the  shift  in  the  relative  strength  of 
the  political  parties  in  1878  illustrated  the  waning  of  liberal- 
ism and  showed  the  way  in  which  the  wind  of  pohtical  con- 
viction blew.  The  National  Liberals  had  attained  the 
height  of  their  power  in  the  year  1874,  with  one  hundred 
and  fifty-two  seats  in  the  Reichstag  and  one  million,  three 
hundred  and  ninety- four  thousand  votes  in  the  country. 
They  began  to  decrease  after  that;  and  in  the  elections  of 
1878,  their  numbers  in  the  Reichstag  fell  to  ninety-eight, 
whereas  the  representation  of  the  Conserv^atives  and  Free 
Conservatives  soared  to  one  hundred  and  sixteen  and  that 
of  the  Catholic  Centrists  to  ninety-three.^ 

Finally,  Bismarck  and  his  political  opportunism  com- 
pleted the  reversion  from  liberalism  to  conservatism.  In 
the  movement  for  unification  of  the  empire,  Bismarck  had 
appealed  to  the  Liberals  and  led  them  full  cry  ahead,  ''  until, 
on  the  wave  of  military  success,  the  vast  apparatus  of  liberal- 
ism fell "  and  unity  was  achieved.  But  Bismarck,  like  the 
consummate  engineer  that  he  was,  "had  taken  care  to 
secure  all  the  ways  of  escape,  so  that  at  a  moment's  notice, 
he  could  stay  the  consequences  of  this  forward  rush  and  re- 
gain that  conserv^ative  ground  for  the  whole  empire,  which 
he  had  deliberately  sacrificed  in  detail  until  the  country- 
should  be  united."  -  In  other  words,  Bismarck  had  pre- 
tended to  espouse  the  cause  of  liberalism,  had  in  fact  made 
significant  concessions  to  the  Liberals  for  the  sake  of  their 
support  in  the  national  movement;  and  in  so  doing  he  had 

*  Grotewold,  Die  Parteien  des  Deutschen  Reichstages  (Leipzig,  1908), 
p.  151. 

*  Annual  Register,  1879,  new  series,  p.  173. 


102      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [102 

bowed  to  their  rather  ideahstic  and  theoretical  interpreta- 
tion of  nationalism.  Politically,  during  the  early  years  of  the 
empire,  he  had  relied  on  the  Cartel,  consisting  of  the  Free 
Conservatives  and  National  Liberals,  against  the  opposition 
parties  of  Progressives,  Centrists,  Socialists,  and  Particular- 
ists.  By  the  year  1878,  however,  the  Liberals  had  served 
his  purpose.  With  their  aid  the  Chancellor  had  achieved 
his  triumph  of  a  unified  and  centralized  nation.  In  short, 
he  had  thoroughly  finished  with  them  and  their  liberal  ideas 
and  he  was  ready  to  return  to  more  familiar  principles  and 
to  more  congenial  friends.  In  the  year  1878,  therefore,  op- 
portunist that  he  was,  he  sensed  not  only  the  changing 
national  temper,  the  waning  of  liberalism;  but  also  the 
growing  antagonism  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  Conservatives, 
due  to  his  continuance  of  the  Kiilturkampf,  and,  on  the  other, 
of  the  National  Liberals,  due  to  his  conduct  of  the  Kultur- 
kampf  as  well  as  to  his  economic  policy.  'A  crisis  had  arisen 
and  the  Chancellor  recognized  that  the  time  had  come  for 
him  to  make  a  choice  between  conservatism  and  liberalism. 
In  that  choice  Bismarck  reverted  to  type,  he  rediscovered 
his  conservative  soul,  he  was  terrified  by  socialist  activities, 
and  he  determined  to  end  the  liberal  era. 

In  order  to  carry  out  his  plan,  the  Chancellor  was  obliged 
to  lean  heavily  upon  the  Conservatives  and  the  Clericals. 
He  made  peace  with  the  Clericals  by  a  cessation  of  the 
Kulturkampf,  and  he  won  strong  support  from  Conserva- 
tives and  from  a  certain  group  of  National  Liberals  by  the 
adoption  of  a  protective  tariff  and  by  indirect  taxation.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  the  Chancellor  seriously  alienated 
from  him  the  left  wing  of  the  National  Liberals  by  his  re- 
pudiation of  free  trade.  The  result  was  a  split  in  the 
National  Liberal  party.  The  left  wing  finally  broke  off 
entirely  on  August  30,  1880,  under  the  leadership  of  Bam- 
berger,  Braumbach,   Forkenbeck,   Rickert;   it   formed  the 


103]  ^  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  IO3 

Liherale  Vereinigung.  endorsed  all  the  traditional  liberal 
ideas  and  joined  the  ranks  of  the  Opposition/  This  left 
the  Chancellor,  therefore,  supported  only  by  the  Conserva- 
tives, Free  Conservatives  and  Clericals  at  a  time  when  he 
needed  all  the  support  he  could  master  for  his  new  economic 
policy,  his  anti-socialist  legislation  and  for  his  social  in- 
surance laws;  he  was  terrified  by  the  growth  of  socialism, 
and  he  was  in  a  position  to  welcome  heartily  any  addition  to 
his  parliamentary  group. 
,  Such  was  the  political  upheaval  which  provided  the  col- 
C,  onial  partisans  with  the  opportunity  they  needed  to  achieve 
(^^^olitical  identity  and  significance.  That  they  immediately 
grasped  the  situation  in  all  of  its  bearings  and  hastened  to 
avail  themselves  of  its  potentialities  will  shortly  appear; 
but  a  brief  review  of  their  former  political  affiliations  will 
place  the  proceeding  in  a  clearer  light. 

Since  1871,  the  colonial  enthusiasts  had  belonged  princi- 
pally to  the  opposition  parties.  The  professors,  scientists, 
and  a  group  of  merchants  came  from  the  Progressives,  a 
party  utterly  ignored  by  Bismarck  until  after  1874;  the  mis- 
sionaries were  for  the  most  part  Clericals,  deadly  enemies  of 
the  Chancellor  until  1878;  the  commercial  colonialists  be- 
longed partly  to  the  Progressives  and  partly  to  the  National 
Liberals,  although  not  to  the  original  National  Liberal 
group  who  adhered  to  the  simon-pure  ideals  of  liberalism, 
but  rather  to  a  newer  group  of  Liberals  who  were  becoming 
more  national  than  liberal.  These  new  Liberals  like  the 
Hamburg  and  Bremen  merchants,  Woermann  and  Godeffroy, 
came  to  represent  the  modern  type  of  National  Liberals  in 
Germany  who  broke  with  the  real  liberalism  that  had  ac- 
cepted the  free-trade  principles  of  the  Hanse  Towns.  The 
new  Liberals  gradually  influenced  the  Government's  pro- 
tection of  overseas  trade  and  its  repudiation  of  the  liberal 

'  Grotewold,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 


104     ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [104 

policy  of  the  empire.  They  cannot  be  classified  as  actual 
allies  of  Bismarck  until  after  1876. 

Whereas,  then,  the  colonial  partisans  in  the  main,  had  sat 
in  the  Opposition  until  1878,  the  opponents  of  colonialism, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  belonged  at  first  to  the  governmental 
parties,  to  the  Conservatives  who  firmly  supported  Bis- 
marck's policy  of  German  hegemony  in  Europe,  or  to  the 
majority  of  National  Liberals,  simon-pure  free  traders. 

A  glance  at  the  party  affiliations  of  both  advocates  and 
opponents  of  colonialism  upon  all  occasions  when  the  sub- 
ject was  discussed  in  the  Reichstag  will  prove  the  foregoing 
statement,  will  show  a  distinct  cleavage  of  party  in  advon 
cates  and  opponents  of  colonialism,  and  will  indicate  the 
shift  of  political  support  after  the  Government  changed  itsi 
attitude  in  1876  and  began  to  adopt  explicit  measures  for 
overseas  trade  protection.  In  1870,  for  example,  when  the 
petition  for  securing  Saigon  from  France  was  discussed  in 
the  Reichstag,  the  political  allegiance  of  those  who  spoke  on 
the  subject  was  as  follows : 

Opponents  of  the  Petition  Party 

Meier  (free-trader)  National  Liberal 

Ross 

Baron  von  Overbeck  Conservative 

Advocates  of  the  Petition  Party 

Mosle  National  Liberal  (new  type) 
Adickes  " 

Rickmers  " 

Professor  Holzendorf  Progressive  i- 

On  April  1 1  and  20,  1877,  when  the  Tongan  Treaty  was  dis- 
cussed, we  find,  as  already  noted,  only  advocates  for  it.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Tongan  Treaty,  as  interpreted 
by  the  Government,  implied  no  colonial  policy  but  only  over- 

'  V erhandlungen  des  Reichstages  des  Norddeutschen  Bundes,  Novem- 
ber 30,  1870. 


105]  ^  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  105 

seas  trade  protection;  and  furthermore,  that  it  marked  a 
distinct  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  administration  itself/ 

Advocates  Party 

Radziwil  Centre 

Kapp  National  Liberal 

(A  free-trader,  who  later  left  the  National  Liberal 
party  and  joined  the  Liberale-V ereinigung) 
Reichensperger  Centre 

Philippsborn  (govemment  official)  Conservative 

Von  Bunsen  (like  Kapp)  National  Liberal 

Von  Billow  (Director  of  Foreign  Office)  Conservative  2 

On  June  13  and  16,  1879,  when  the  Samoan  Treaty  was  dis- 
cussed party  divisions  appeared  clearer. 

Advocates  Party 

Von  Biilow  Conservative 

KiJsserow  " 

Lingens  Centre 

Mosle  National  Liberal  (new  type) 

Opponents  Party 

Bamberger  National  Liberal 

later,  Liberale-V  ereinigung 
Lowe  Progressive 

Dr.  Gareis 
Haerle  "  ^ 

The  change  in  the  Conservative  position,  as  evident  above, 
from  opposition  to  support  of  colonialism  may  be  explained 
by  the  fact  that  Bismarck  thought  it  necessary  to  regain 
the  wavering  loyalty  of  the  Conservatives  towards  1878, 
as  well  as  their  support  for  the  anti-socialist  laws  and  for  his 
other  policies;  that  he  consequently  attached  them  to  him 
by   agrarian   tariff   and    indirect   taxation.     Consequently," 

1  Cf.  supra,  p.  67. 

*  Stenographische  Berichte   iiber  die    Verhandhmgen   des  Deutschen 
Reichstages,  April  11,  20,  1877. 
'  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  June  13,  16,  1879. 


I06     ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [io6 

their  hitherto  antagonistic  attitude  towards  expansion 
changed  and  they  began  to  champion  it  vigorously,  making 
it  a  part  of  their  time-honored  tradition  to  maintain  the 
"  honor  of  the  Fatherland."  The  Conservatives  explained 
their  own  change  of  opinion.  "  After  1876,  new  problems 
confronted  the  Conservative  party;  economic  and  social 
questions  loomed  large.  Colonial  questions  produced  a 
change  in  the  party,  for  the  principles  of  the  Conservatives 
had  always  led  them  to  concentrate  upon  the  internal  de- 
velopment of  Germany.  Colonialism  is  an  entirely  opposite 
policy :  it  is  also  a  problem  of  capitalism.  The  Conser- 
vative party  lias  made  concessions  here  and  altered  its  old 
position.  It  has  sacrified  its  long  adherence  to  internal  de- 
velopment to  the  Idea  of  National  Greatness.  It  has  al- 
lowed greater  scope  to  capitalism  in  the  colonies  than  at 
home.  The  Conservative  party  has  had  to  broaden  its 
base."  ^  The  Conservative  party  changed  with  Bismarck 
before  the  pressure  of  economic  influence;  hence  it  shifted 
its  principles  with  those  of  the  Government  and  it  still  re- 
mained a  governmental  party. 

Comprehending  the  outlines  of  this  political  situation, 
it  is  most  significant  to  observe,  that,  prior  to  1878,  Bis- 
marck never  needed  the  support  of  anyone  advocating 
colonies,  nor  of  the  parties  with  which  they  were  mainly 
affiliated;  but  after  1878,  it  was  very  patent,  as  we  have 
seen,  that  he  was  in  dire  need  of  aid  both  for  the  protective 
tariff  and  his  other  policies.  Conditions  were  now  exactly 
reversed:  before  1878,  the  governmental  parties  had  op- 
posed colonialismi  and  the  opposition  parties  were  in  favor 
of  it;  after  1878,  the  governmental  parties  were  in  favor 
of  colonialisim  and  the  Opposition  opposed  it.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  Chancellor  had  gained  the  hitherto  strongest 

*  Stillich,  Die  PoUtische  Parteieen  in   Deutschland    (Leipzig,    1908), 
vol.  i,  p.  234, 


107]  "^  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  107 

opposing  party,  the  Centre,  and  had  strengthened  the  ad- 
herence of  the  Conservatives  and  the  National  Liberals,  all 
of  whom  now  advocated  a  colonial  policy;  on  the  other 
hand,  he  had  lost  the  old  National  Liberals,  the  Freie 
Traders,  who  had  gone  over  to  the  Opposition  (ultimately 
uniting  with  the  Progressives  in  the  Freisinnige  Volkspartei 
in  1884),  and  who  were  violently  opposed  to  colonialism  and 
bitterly  antagonistic  to  Bismarck.  The  colonial  party  had 
now  only  to  seize  its  opportunity  and  rally  to  Government 
support,  to  make  itself  a  factor  in  party  politics  and  so  to 
establish  its  political  identity.  That  it  did  this,  we  have 
ample  proof. 

In  the  early  eighties,  Bismarck  was  esj>ecially  disposed  to 
welcome  any  adherents  to  his  fiscal  policy  in  order  to  combat 
the  attacks  of  the  Opposition,  as  well  as  to  fill  up  the  ranks 
of  his  allies  depleted  by  the  defection  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
National  Liberals.  The  Hanse  towns, — Bremen,  Ham- 
burg and  Liibeck — were  opposed  to  protection;  they  pre- 
ferred, for  the  most  part,  to  preserve  their  old  tradition  of 
free  trade,  which  they  found  more  profitable,  and  hence  they 
constituted  the  strongest  forces  of  the  Opposition  against 
the  Chancellor.  Now  the  firm  of  Godeffroy,  by  far  the 
most  influential  firm  both  in  Hamburg  and  in  colonial  acti- 
vities of  the  South  Seas,  as  well  as  a  leader  of  the  colonial 
party,  stood  firmly  for  protection,  largely  because  of  its 
overseas  interests  and  its  inevitable  clashes  with  the  com- 
mercial ambitions  of  other  powers.  It  had  indeed  en- 
deavored to  make  Hamburg  enter  the  Zollvcrcin.  The 
same  situation  likewise  prevailed  in  Bremen  where  the  firm 
of  Mosle  and  Company,  equally  influential  in  the  colonial 
party,  strongly  advocated  protectionism,  against  the  major- 
ity opinion  of  the  city.  Naturally,  Bismarck  would  be  over- 
joyed to  receive  the  support  afforded  by  these  two  powerful 
firms,  situated  in  the  two  enemy  camps ;  it  would  prove  in- 


I08      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [io8 

valuable  in  his  determined  effort  to  carry  through  his  new 
protective  tariff.  Senator  Gustav  Godeffroy  rendered  very 
practical  assistance  to  him  by  his  articles  in  the  Hamburger 
Nachrichten  and  by  his  speeches.  One  article,  particularly, 
entitled  Extr enter  Freihandel,^  and  a  speech,  afterwards 
published  under  the  caption,  SchuzzoU  unci  Freihandel 
iinter  hesonderer  Beriicksichtigung  des  Zollpro grammas  des 
Fursten  Bismarcks,  delivered  before  the  Fourth  Congress  of 
the  Tax  and  Economic  Reformers  League,  indicated  the 
strength  of  his  adherence  to  the  cause  of  protectionism. 
The  concluding  words  of  his  speech  were :  "  Let  us  faith- 
fully follow  the  flag  of  our  great  Chancellor  in  his  econ- 
omic policy  for  the  welfare  of  the  empire."  ' 

Again,  Alexander  Mosle  expressed  directly  to  Bismarck 
similar  sentiments  in  the  shape  of  a  telegram  which  con- 
veyed a  resolution  of  confidence  in  his  protectionist  policy, 
passed  at  a  meeting  of  over  three  thousand  Reichstag  electors 
in  Bremen,  on  April  29,  1879.  Certainly,  it  did  not  re- 
quire a  Bismarck  to  recognize  the  colonial  party  as  a  valu- 
able electoral  factor.  In  replying  to  this  telegram  with 
a  letter  of  thanks,  the  Chancellor  said  he  looked  forward  to 
doing  much  for  the  protection  and  encouragement  of  trade 
and  shipping.^ 

Mosle  affords  us  a  true  type  of  the  "  new  "  National 
Liberal,  who  forsook  Liberalism  for  the  sake  of  a  greater 
nationalism.  He  had  entered  the  Reichstag  in  1871  as  a 
free  trader,  like  every  representative  from  that  city,  but 
became  personally  very  much  attached  to  Bismarck,  as  var- 
ious letters  between  them  show.     He  was  fascinated  by  the 

*  "  Volkswirtschaftliche   Aphorismes,"    Vaterst'ddtischen   Bldttern   der 
Hamburger  Nachrichten,  Nov.,  1877. 

^  Handelspolitische  Brochiiren,  1876-1877,  no.  36. 

*  Poschinger,  Fiirst  Bismarck  ah  Volksztnrt  (Berlin,  1899),  vol.  i,  p. 
216. 


I09]  ^  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  109 

Chancellor's  political  skill  and,  as  he  himself  expressed  it, 
was  "  changed  from  a  free  trader  to  a  protectionist  by  the 
pressure  of  Bismarck's  handshake."  ^  When  one  con- 
siders Mosle's  interest  in  colonial  activity,  one  might  assume 
that  a  pressure  greater  than  "  Bismarck's  handshake  "  was 
possibly  responsible  for  his  indorsement  of  protectionism 
in  which  respect  he  represented  a  large  and  politically  in- 
fluential group  of  the  colonial  enthusiasts. 

Thus  the  colonial  party  joined  the  Government's  support- 
ing parties  and  it  had  only  to  add  to  the  platform  of  the 
administration  the  plank  of  a  colonial  policy  with  which 
the  other  governmental  parties, — the  Conservatives,  the 
National  Liberals,  and  the  Centre, — were  already  in 
sympathy. 

The  propaganda  and  political  influence  of  the  colonial 
party  almost  succeeded  in  attaining  the  desired  publicity  and 
national  importance  for  the  question  of  colonialism,  but  one 
other  way  still  remained  It  was  an  effort  to  involve  the 
Government,  both  personally  and  officially,  in  financial  con- 
nections with  overseas  expansion,  and  to  make  a  state-dir- 
ected colonialism  absolutely  indispensable  by  identifying 
commercial  colonization  with  national  interests. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  Bismarck  had  become  increasingly 
interested  and  influenced  by  the  bankers  and  captains  of  in- 
dustry after  the  panic  of  1873,  a  result  largely  of  the  tre- 
mendous economic  and  industrial  progress  which  began  to 
overshadow  all  other  elements  in  German  domestic  affairs. 
Indeed,  the  Conservatives,  jealous  of  an  undue  amount  of 
attention  and  solicitude  which  they  thought  was  accorded 
to  capitalistic  interests,  coined  the  phrase  "  Blcichroder 
era"  to  designate  the  period  from  1876  to  1880.  They 
claimed  that,  during  that  time.  Jewish  bankers,  Bleichroder. 

*  Poschinger,  Fiirst  Bismarck  nnd  die  Pa'-lemcntarier  (Breslau,  1894), 
vol.  ii,  p.  330. 


no      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [no 

especially,  had  bought  Bismarck  and  had  wielded,  in  com- 
pany with  such  state  officials  as  Delbriick  and  Camphausen, 
an  altogether  unwarranted  power  in  the  administration. 
Whatever  exaggeration  existed  in  the  extreme  charges  of 
the  Conservatives  in  1876  and  1877,  it  was  certainly  true 
that  Bismarck  was  hand  in  glove  with  the  two  great  bank- 
ing houses  of  Bleichroder  and  von  Hansemann.  Gerson 
Bleichroder  had  made  his  bank  one  of  the  first  in  Europe 
through  his  connection  with  the  Rothschilds.  He  had  long 
enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Chancellor  and  he  had  often 
come  to  the  rescue  of  the  Government.  Bismarck,  for  in- 
stance, had  summoned  him  to  Versailles  in  1871  to  arrange 
the  French  war  indemnity.  The  other  chief  financial  ad- 
viser of  Bismarck  was  Adolf  von  Hansemann.  Since 
1864,  he  had  been  head  of  the  pcnverful  Diskonto  Com- 
pany ^  of  Berlin  and  was,  moreover,  a  brother-in-law  of 
von  Kiisserow,  who  had  been  manager  of  the  department 
for  overseas  trade  in  the  Foreign  Office  since  1874.^  Kiis- 
serow, it  will  be  remembered,  was  a  keen  colonial  enthusiast, 
mentioned  by  Zimmermann  as  being  "  personally  interested 
in  South  Sea  trade."  It  is  also  not  without  significance, 
perhaps,  that  among  its  officials,  the  DiskontO'  Company 
numbered  Miguel,  one  of  the  vigorous  Reichstag  advocates 
of  the  merchants'  petition  of  November  30,  1870.  He  was 
a  Director  of  the  Diskonto  Company  from  1869  to  1873. 
Woermann,  of  the  great  Woermann  firm  interested  in 
African  ventures,  was  another  official  of  the  company. 

Furthermore,  one  other  link  between  national  finance, 
the  administration  and  colonial  speculation,  was  Senator 
Gustav  Godeffroy,^  a  strong  supporter  of  Bismarck's  pro- 
tection policy  and  head  of  the  Norddeutsche  Bank. 

^  Die  Diskonto  Gesellschaft:  Denkschrift  zum  50  Jdhrige  Zubilatunt, 
1851-1901  (Hamburg,  1901). 
-  Cf.  supra,  p.  62,. 
3  Cf.  supra,  p.  107. 


Ill]  A  NATIONAL  AND  POLITICAL  ISSUE  1 1 1 

Now,  Germany's  political  position  in  Samoa  was  entirely 
the  result  of  her  commercial  interests  which  were  largely  in 
the  control  of  the  House  of  Godeffroy.  By  the  year  1880, 
German  trade  in  the  South  Seas  had  assumed  unprecedented 
proportions,  stimulated  by  the  effects  of  the  Tongan  and 
Samoan  treaties.  The  necessity  of  maintaining  Ger- 
many's political  prestige  had  already,  as  we  have  seen, 
forced  the  Goveniment  to  protect  the  merchants ;  but  there 
were  other  pressing  reasons  demanding  administrative  sup- 
port. The  commercial  colonialists  had  identified  the  finan- 
cial interests  of  the  Government  with  the  South  Sea  trade. 
In  1877,  a  company  had  been  formed  under  the  auspices  of 
Bismarck  in  an  effort  to  enlarge  and  consolidate  the  al- 
ready flourishing  trade  in  Oceania.  The  House  of  Gode- 
ffroy was  the  soul  of  the  company,  but  its  name  was  la 
Compagnie  Oceanique.^  It  included  the  firms  of  ]\Iemel, 
Wilkins  and  Schlubuch,  possessed  a  capital  of  i,  563.500  M., 
established  headquarters  at  Hamburg,  and  aimed  to  mono- 
polize the  commercial  exploitation  in  the  archipelago  of 
northern  Oceania,  especially  in  the  Island  of  Tahiti.  It  ap- 
pears that  Bismarck  was  personally  interested  in  the  company 
and  that  other  state  officials  participated  in  overseas  specu- 
lations. As  Bamberger  asserted  in  his  speeches  in  the 
Reichstag,  the  administration  were  thus  naturally  inclined 
to  further  imperial  trade  protection."  Among  other  ac- 
cusations, Bamberger  sarcastically  explained  the  Govern- 
ment's solicitude  for  South  Seas  trade  by  showing  how 
governmental  connivance  with  commercial  colonialism  be- 
gan under  the  regime  of  the  Foreign  Minister  von  Billow. 
Von  Billow's  diplomatic  duties  as  well  as  his  marriage  had 

'  Annates  de  Vecole  tibre  des  sciences  politiqucs,  18S7,  loc.  cit.,  p.  535. 
^  Ibid.     Vide,    also,   La   Grande   Encyclopedic,   vol.    xi,   p.    11 16,   art. 
"  Colonisation  ". 
*  Verhandlungen  des  DeutscJtcn  Rcichstagcs,  April  2^,  1880,  p.  876. 


1 12      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [112 

brought  him  into  close  connection  with  the  commercial  in- 
terests of  Hamburg  and  he  had  been  especially  active  in 
promoting  the  Tongan  and  Samoan  Treaties,  "  those  first 
steps  in  colonial  policy." '  Unfortunately  von  Biilow  had 
died  in  the  fall  of  1879  and  an  appeal  to  respect  for  the 
dead  enabled  the  colonial  party  in  the  Reichstag  to  prevent 
Bamberger  from  casting  any  further  or  more  definite  asper- 
sions upon  him. 

The  colonial  party  thus  made  colonialism  a  national  and 
political  question.  Its  three  policies  of  literary  propaganda, 
seizure  of  political  advantage  through  the  exigencies  of 
party  revolution,  and  identification  of  the  financial  inter- 
ests, both  personal  and  official,  of  the  administration  with 
overseas  speculations,  had  finally  succeeded.  It  projected 
the  whole  subject  from  a  weak  and  obscure  position  where 
it  was  advocated  by  a  group  with  only  limited  recognition 
and  no  political  power,  to  the  fore-front  of  national  affairs. 
The  colonial  party  focussed  general  attention  upon  state 
directed  colonialism ;  and  in  the  midst  of  its  efforts,  it  pre- 
cipitated a  political  and  national  crisis  which  submitted  the 
entire  movement  to  the  test  of  public  opinion. 

^  Allgemelne  Deutsche  Biographie,  vol.  xlvii,  pp.  352-354- 


CHx\PTER  VI 
The  Test 

Colonialism  suddenly  became  a  concrete  issue  in  national 
and  political  affairs  when  the  Government  introduced  the 
Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  into  the  Reichstag  in  the  year  1880. 
Briefly,  the  bill  proposed  that  the  Government  should  grant 
an  annual  subsidy  to  Godeffroy  &  Son  to  enable  them  to 
promote  their  trade  in  the  South  Seas.  Hence,  the  accept- 
ance or  rejection  of  the  bill  meant  the  acceptance  or  rejection 
of  commercial  colonialism.  In  other  words,  the  Samoan  Sub- 
sidy Bill  became  a  test-case  of  the  whole  colonial  movement. 

The  imttnediate  antecedents  to  the  introduction  of  the  Sub- 
sidy Bill  into  the  Reichstag  can  be  briefly  stated.     In  the  year 

1878,  the  house  of  Godeffroy,  not  satisfied  with  its  com- 
mercial success,  attempted  higher  financial  and  speculative 
flights.  It  formed  a  "  merger "  and  consolidated  all  its 
South  Sea  business  into  a  stock  company,  the  Deutsche 
Handels  und  Plantagengesellschaft  der  Sild  See  Inseln.^ 
In  spite  of  the  extensive  advertisemuent  of  stock  in  the  Ger- 
man papers,  the  majority  of  the  shares  of  the  new  com[)any 
remained  in  the  hands  of  Godeffroy  &  Son.     During  the  year 

1879,  the  House  encountered  serious  financial  difficulties 
owing  to  the  failure  of  mining  speculations  in  Europe."  It 
was  unable  to  secure  aid  in  Hamburg  because  it  already 
controlled  considerable  capital  from  that  city;  and  it  soon 

1  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1880,  Aktenstiick  no.  loi.  p, 
723. 

2  Coppius,.  Hamburgs  Bedeutung  auf  deni  Gebiete  der  Deutschen 
Xolonialpolitik  (Berlin,  1905),  p.  67. 

113]  "3 


1 14      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [114 

exhausted  all  efforts  to  obtain  loans  from  other  commercial 
houses.  Finally,  the  House  of  Godeffroy  &  Son  submitted 
to  extreme  financial  pressure  and  borrowed  money  from 
Baring  Brothers  of  London,  giving  as  security  its  shares  in 
the  Deutsche  Handels  nnd  Plantagengesellschaft  der  Slid 
See  Inseln,  together  with  its  holdings  in  Samoa  amounting 
to  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  Prussian  acres.  The 
loan  only  postponed  disaster ;  the  House  of  Godeffroy  failed 
late  in  1879;  and  its  failure  spelled  ruin  for  the  vast  German 
interests  in  the  South  Seas  which  were  now  in  danger  of 
falling  into  foreign  hands. 

The  resulting  situation  involved  political  and  economic, 
national  and  international,  consequences.  The  comimercial 
interests  in  the  South  Seas  besieged  the  Government  witli 
letters.  These  merchants  represented  the  threatened  ruin  to 
German  trade,  political  position  and  prestige  in  Samoa  if  the 
house  of  Godeffroy  were  not  resuscitated  at  once  and  if  all 
its  influaice  and  holdings  were  not  prevented  from  parsing 
under  the  control  of  England.  Part  of  the  German  press 
urged  the  Govemiment  to  intervene  in  order  to  prevent 
British  appropriation  oif  the  Samoan  lands.  It  proposed, 
specifically,  that  the  Government  or  a  syndicate  of  bankers 
should  buy  up  the  Deutsche  Handels  und  Plantagengesell- 
schaft. The  Kolnische  Zeitung  recalled  Disraeli's  purchase 
of  the  shares  of  the  Suez  Canal  Company. 

Furthermore,  one  must  needs  recall  the  contemporary 
situation  in  Samoa  at  the  end  of  the  year  1879,  in  order  to 
realize  all  the  various  currents  at  work  in  this  political  and 
econoimiic  crisis.  For  it  will  be  remembered  that  Germany, 
in  company  with  England  and  the  United  States,  had  as- 
sumed a  municipal  protectorate  over  Apia  by  negotiations 
during  the  month  of  December ;  ^  and  such  a  protectorate 

*  Aniagcn  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  iS8o,Aktenstuck  no.  loi,  Unter- 
lage  no.  2,  p.  728. 


115]         '  ^^^  ^^^^  115 

necessitated  the  maintenance  of  a  strong  [>olitical  prestige 
which  the  faikn'e  of  Godeffroy  &  Son,  if  unredeemed,  would 
seriously  jeopardize. 

It  was  of  course  to  be  expected  that  the  German  bankers, 
already  imiuch  interested  in  South  Sea  enterprises,  would 
intervene  and  come  to  the  rescue ;  but  that  they  would  do  so 
on  purely  patriotic  and  national  grounds  was  unlikely. 
Here,  however,  was  an  ideal  occasion  for  the  cooperation 
of  colonialists,  financial  interests,  and  the  Government ;  and 
such  was  the  connection  existing  already  between  them,  that 
their  combination  at  this  juncture  was  well  nigh  inevitable. 
Godeffroy  waited  upon  voin  Hansemann,  who  in  turn  in- 
fluenced Bismarck.  The  Chancellor,  although  earlier  in  the 
year  ( 1879)  he  had  refused  to  help  the  house  of  Godeffroy,^ 
now  agreed  to  rescue  its  interests  from  the  grasp  of  Baring 
Brothers  of  London  and  to  promiote  a  government  subsidy 
for  a  stock  company  to  indemnify  and  replace  Godefifroy." 
Accordingly,  a  new  company  was  formed  in  Berlin,  called 
Die  Deutsche  See  Handelsgesellschaft,  ''  auf  Anregung  " 
of  the  administration  and  on  the  condition  that  the  Govern- 
ment underwrite  it."*  It  was  von  Hansemann,  himself,  who 
instructed  the  Secretary  of  the  I-miperial  Treasun,'.  Geheim- 
rat  Burchard,  that  this  plan  "  will  not  only  rescue  German 
trade  but  expand  German  colonial  interests  in  the  South 
Seas."  * 

It  was  not  at  all  unnatural  that  Bismarck  should  thusi 
come  to  the  rescue  of  GodefYroy,  and  his  act  afifords  but  an- 
other proof  of  his  real,  though  unacknowledged,  sympathy  ' 
with  the  aims  O'f  the  colonialists.     The  senior  partner  of  the 
house  of    Gcxleffroy   and   the   Chancellor   had   been    great 

'  Poschinger,  Filrst  Bismarck  als  Volksidrt,  vol.  i,  p.  269. 

*  Annual  Register,  1879,  p.  170. 

'  Poschinger,  Fiirst  Bismarck  als  I'^olkstinrt,  vol.  i,  p.  166. 

*  Die  Diskonto  Gesellschaft,  op.  cit.,  p.  225. 


1 1 6      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  1 16 

friends  in  their  yoiith,  and,  before  1870,  Bismarck  had  sup- 
ported his  scheme  of  peopHng  with  Germlan  immigrants  the 
land  owiied  by  the  Godeffroy  firm  in  Samoa.  This  support 
had  taken  the  form  of  investing  German  consuls  at  Samoa 
with  extraordinary  powers,  of  granting  arms  from  the 
royal  arsenals,  and  of  sending  the  S.  S.  Hertha  to  Samoa. 
A  program  of  future  colonization  drawn  up  and  laid  before 
the  Berlin  Government  had  elicited  the  promise  of  further 
aid  to  Godeffroy ;  ^  but  the  intervention  of  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  in  1870  and  the  consequent  change  in  Bis- 
marck's policies  occasioned  by  the  founding  o-f  the  empire, 
had  prevented  its  realization.  Now,  ten  years  later,  came 
an  opportunity  to  fulfill  the  promise. 

Toward  the  end  of  December,  1879,  therefore,  the  official 
press  announced  that  in  order  to  prevent  the  ruin  of  trade 
in  the  South  Pacific  by  foreign  creditors  of  Godeffroy  &  Son, 
the  Government  had  decided  to  demand  a  subsidy  from  the 
Reichstag  for  a  new  company."  On  January  i,  1880,  Bis- 
marck in  a  letter  to  Scholz,  Under  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, unfolded  the  completed  plan : 

You  are  aware  of  the  solicitude  with  which  the  empire  has  always 
regarded  German  activities  in  Oceania.  A  celebrated  Hamburg 
firm,  for  reasons  not  connected  with  its  South  Sea  trade,  has  en- 
countered financial  difficulties  which  threaten  the  loss  of  all  its 
possessions  and  establishments.  ...  In  the  interests  of  overseas 
trade,  therefore,  I  think  the  Imperial  Government  should  ask  the 
cooperation  of  the  legislative  bodies  in  order  to  supply  the  means 
necessary  to  avert  this  danger.  I  am  all  the  more  persuaded 
thereto,  since  lately  captains  of  finance  have  declared  themselves 
ready  and  willing  in  the  national  interests  to  undertake  the  estab- 
lishment of  such  a  company,  if  the  Government  will  support 
them.^ 

'Lowe,  Prince  Bismarck  (London,  1885),  vol.  ii,  p.  210. 

*  Annates  de  I'ecole  libre  des  sciences  politiques,  loc.  cit.,  p.  535. 

^  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1880,  Aktenstiick  no.  loi,  An- 
lage  no.  5. 


117]  THE  TEST  117 

The  proposed  plan  was  that  the  Government  should  guar- 
antee to  the  compaiiy  an  annual  subsidy  of  four  percent  of  its 
total  capitalization  for  twenty  years,  or  not  more  than 
300,000  M.,  which  was  to  be  entirely  repaid  as  soon  as  its 
dividends  should  exceed  a  specified  percent/  The  new  com- 
pany was  to  purchase  all  the  assets  and  possessions  of  the 
Deutsche  Handcls  iind  Plantagengesellschaf.t,  in  accordance 
with  the  latter's  own  offer  of  December  26.  1879.-  which 
would  seem  to  indicate  a  thorough  and  pre-arranged  under- 
standing with  Godeffroy  &  Son.  The  Chancellor  w^as  to  ap- 
point a  commissioner,  representing  the  Government,  on  the 
board  of  directors.  Everything  appeared  to  have  been  com- 
pletely planned  and  the  Deutsche  See  Handelsgescllschaft 
was  duly  constituted  on  January  21,  1880,  consisting  of 
fourteen  share  holders  and  having  von  Hansemann  and 
Bleichroder  as  directors-in-chief. ^ 

On  April  15,  1880,  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  passed  the 
Bundesrat  against  the  votes  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen,  and 
on  April  22,  it  came  up  for  its  first  reading  in  the  Reichstag.* 
Throughout  the  entire  course  of  the  debates,  the  supporters 
of  the  scheme  masked  the  whole  question  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion, which  the  proposed  subsidy  raised,  behind  an  in- 
flamed appeal  to  national  patriotism  to  protect  German  trade 
and  political  prestige  in  the  South  Seas.  Never  once  did 
they  meet  squarely  the  issue  of  colonial  policy  as  such,  al- 
though their  oppK>nents  flung  down  the  gauntlet  many  times. 
And  in  reading  the  debates,  it  is  miost  evident,  as  indeed  it 

1  Anlagen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  1880,  Akteustiick  no.  loi,  p. 
720;  Hahn-Wippermanni,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  6. 

*  Ibid.,  Aktenstiick  no.  loi,  no.  4. 

3  Ibid.,  Aktenstiick  no.  loi,  Unterlage  no.  6 ;  Poschinger,  Bisnuirck 
als  Volkswirt,  vol.  i,  p.  166;  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  5-6. 

*  Europdische  Geschichtskalender,  April  15,  1880. 


1 18      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  i  ig 

was  to  the  Opposition,  that  all  the  cards  were  not  on  the 
table;  that  something  lay  beneath  this  bill  which,  if  indorsed, 
would  comimit  the  nation  to  a  thoroughgoing  policy  of  over- 
seas expansion. 

An  analysis  of  Bismarck's  announcements  concerning  the 
newly  formed  company,  of  the  speech  from^  the  throne  at 
the  opening  of  the  Reichstag  session,  of  the  explanatory 
documents  with  winch  the  bill  was  accompanied,  and  of  the 
speeches  of  the  administrative  officials  in  the  debates,  reveals 
the  Goveniment's  argument  and  appeal  to  the  nation  for  an 
indorsement  of  the  Subsidy  Bill.  The  Government  seemed 
to  rest  its  case  simply  upon  the  plea  that  the  Samoan  Subsidy 
was  in  line  with  the  overseas  trade  protection  policy  as  in- 
augurated by  the  Tongan  Treaty  i'n  1877.  and  was  in  fact 
but  a  continuation  thereof.  For  instance,  the  preamble  to 
the  bill  declared :  "  Ever  since  the  news  about  the  failure  of 
the  house  of  Godeffroy,  consular  reports  and  other  com- 
munications have  represented  to>  the  Government  that  the 
loss  of  territory  in  Samoa,  now  in  German  hands,  will  result 
in  a  loss  of  German  prestige  and  commercial  position  in 
Oceania  hardly  to  be  recovered.  The  Imperial  Cabinet,  , 
convinced  of  the  national  significance  of  the  imatter 
could  not  permit  itself  to  neglect  an  attempt  to  avert  this  \ 
disaster."  ^ 

The  same  note  was  struck  by  the  speech  from  the  throne  > 
of  February  10,  1880:  "  The  empire  is  deeply  concerned  to 
provide  protection  and  encouragement  for  trade  and  ship- 
phig.  For  this  purpose,  it  presents  for  ratification  a  treaty 
of  trade  and  amity  with  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  the 
Samoan  Bill."  - 

Again,  the  N orddeutschc  Allgetneine  Zeitmig,  officially 

^  Anlagen  des  Deiitschen  Reichstagcs,  18S0,  A ktenstiick  no.  lOi,  p.  721. 
"  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  2. 


1 


■119]  THE  TEST  119 

advocating  the  subsidy,  in  a  special  article  on  April  17,  1880, 
contradicted  flatly  that  the  bill  meant  a  colonial  policy,  or 
•even  the  support  of  the  House  of  Godeffroy.^ 

In  the  debates,  every  speaker  who  officially  represented 
the  Government,  was  most  particular  to  emphasize  the  posi- 
tion which  the  administration  had  adopted.  In  fact,  Under- 
Secretary  Scholz.  introducing  the  proposition  on  April  22, 
1880,  began  by  denying  what  he  termed  "  the  misrepresenta- 
tion of  the  subject  as  colonialism  by  the  press  of  the  Opposi- 
tion." ..."  The  Government  is  merely  following  a  course 
similar  to  that  followed  in  subsidizing  the  Saint  Gotthard 
Tunnel."  ' 

Von  Kiisserow's  masterly  summary  of  the  whole  admin- 
istrative policy  concerning  overseas  trade  protection  closed 
by  stating  that  the  Samoan  Subsidy  was  merely  a  continua- 
tion thereof.  "  It  is  not  a  question  of  party,  of  free  trade 
or  protection,  but  one  of  the  honor  and  glor}-  of  Germany."  ' 
He  exaggerated  the  menace  of  England  and  expatiated  at 
length  upon  the  threatened  calamity  which  Germany's  failure 
to  act  would  bring  about  in  Samoa.  These  two  national 
dangers  provided  a  convenient  flagstaff,  upon  which  to  un- 
furl and  wave  against  the  winds  of  the  Opposition,  the  red, 
white  and  black  flag  of  the  German  Empire. 
\  "  Nations  only  respect  a  nation  that  can  exert  might  and 
power,"  said  Hohenlohe'-Schillingfiirst,  the  provisional 
State  Secretary  in  the  Foreign  Office.*  This  point  of  view 
was  epitomized  by  Staudy,  who  spoke  for  the  Conservative 
party,  which,  while  opposed  to  the  subsidy  as  helping  in- 

^  Norddeutsche  AUgemeinc  Zcitung,   April  17,   1880,  no.   179,   quoted 
by  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  vol.  i,  p.  275. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  April  22,  1880,  p.  857. 
» Ibid.,  April  23,  1880,  pp.  888  et  seq. 
*Ibid.,  April  27,  1880,  pp.  945  et  seq. 


120      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [120 

dustrial  capital,  emphasized  the  importance  of  upholding  the 
honor  of  the  Fatherland.  "  How  would  she  apj^ear  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world,  if  she  did  not  take  a  definite  position?  .  .  . 
It  is  superfluous  to  speak  of  a  colonial  policy,  as  the  pro- 
position before  us  does  not  mention  it."  ^ 

Significantly  enough,  Bismarck  did  not  appear  personally 
in  the  Reichstag  during  the  Samoan  debate.  At  the  time 
he  was  living  within  the  shadow  oi  one  of  his  periodical 
"  requests  for  leave  to  resign." 

On  the  other  hand  the  colonial  enthusiasts,  just  as  previ- 
ously in  the  debates  on  the  Samoan  treaty,  did  not  hesitate  to 
call  the  pi'oposed  subsidy  another  step  in  the  direction  of 
colonial  policy  and  to  welcome  it  heartily  as  such. 

Prince  Hohenlohe-Langenberg  came  out  openly  in  favor 
of  expansion.  "  I  have  noted  with  joy  the  movement  of  the 
last  year  towards  it.  Colonial  policy  is  a  great  necessity; 
immigration  makes  it  so.  .  .  .  Today,  for  the  first  time,  we 
officially  confront  the  question  of  its  adoption.  .  .  .  Great 
political  interests  are  at  stake."  " 

Mosle,  in  his  turn,  rejoiced  that  "the  Prince  Hohenlohe- 
Langenberg  has  so  spoken.  I  am  convinced  that  the  Gov- 
ernment will  soon  adoj>t  a  colonial  policy.  It  will  become 
a  necessity.  It  is  a  pity  that  influences  have  hitherto  re- 
strained the  Chancellor.  .  .  .  The  treaty  with  Samoa  will 
only  last  so  long  as  we  can  dominate  the  island.  .  .  .  This 
has  been  the  history  of  all  colonial  powers.  England  is 
our  model."  ^ 

The  claims  of  these  enthusiasts,  however,  did  not  alarm 
the  opponents  of  colonialism  so  much  as  the  facts,  which 
they  later  pointed  out,  that  the  Samoan  Subsidy  as  advo- 

^  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,   April  23,   1880,  pp.  89c 
et  seq. 
'  Ibid.,  April  22,  1880,  pp.  858  et  seq. 
^ Ibid.,  April  23,  1880,  pp.  879  ^f  seq. 


121]  THE  TEST  121 

cated  by  the  Government,  was  but  the  beginning  of  a  colonial 
fyolicy,  that  it  would  lead  to  more  expansion,  and  that  it 
represented  the  real  attitude  of  the  Government,  which  its 
advocates  merely  "  try  to  cover  up  with  their  cry  of  na- 
tional glory." 

Tearing  off  this  disguise  and  at  once  proclaiming  the  issue 
to  be  one  of  state  colonialism,  the  Opposition  centered  its 
attack  in  two  main  arguments;  first,  that  the  Samoan 
Subsidy,  as  a  step  in  the  direction  of  colonialism,  would  "not 
be  for  the  ultimate  national  interests;  and,  second,  that  it 
merely  represented  governmiental  support  of  a  private  firm, 
which  would  prove  very  bad  business  for  Germany,  another 
South  Sea  Bubble. 

In  dispelling  "  the  national  glory  "  illusion,  Bamberger, 
the  leader  of  the  Oppositio'n,  claimed  that  the  affair  was 
represented  in  one  way  by  the  governmental  press  and  in 
quite  a  different  manner  by  that  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen. 
"  They  (the  Government)  say  it  is  national  interest.  It  is 
really  speculation.  .  .  .  Bismarck  has  issued  a  circular  which 
accompanies  the  stock  subscription  list  of  the  Deutsche  See 
Hmidels  Gesellschaft,  claiming  it  to  be  a  national,  patriotic 
duty  to  subscribe.^  ...  In  intellectual  circles,  in  clubs,  in 
newspapers,  and  in  pamphlets,  an  active  propaganda  has  been 
carried  on  in  order  to  make  the  German  people  believe  that 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  whole  German  nation  are 
involved  in  the  affairs  of  this  single  firm.  This  is  really 
nothing  but  the  beginning  of  a  colonial  policy  and  I  am 
opposed  to  it."  - 

The  misrepresentation  was  occasioned,  Bamberger 
thought,  because  of  "  the  ecstasy  of  colonialism  which  is  in 

^  Verhandlungen  des  Dcutschen  Reichstages,  April  22,  1880,  pp.  S62 
et  seq. 
'  Ihid.,  April  27,  1880,  pp.  945  et  seq. 


122      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [122 

the  air,  and  also  because  of  the  waving  of  the  national  flag 
and  the  blaring  of  trumpets."  And,  instead  of  the  entire 
world  waiting,  as  the  colonialists  would  have  everyone  be- 
lieve, to  watch  what  Germany  does  in  Samoa,  no  one  is  at 
all  concerned  about  it.  "  hi  England  und  France,  kein 
Hund  und  keine  Katze  fragt  danach." 

Arguing  along  the  same  line,  Lowe,  a  Progressive,  showed 
that  the  Government  was  involved  in  an  economic  colonial 
enterprise,  which  "  the  Conservatives  attempt  to  disguise  by 
the  cry  of  national  glory.  .  .  .  They  will  only  demand  more 
subsidies  in  order  to  hoist  the  German  flag  higher.  .  .  ,  The 
purpose  clearly  is  to  inaugurate  a  colonial  policy.  .  .  .  And 
I  consider  it  wrong  to  conceal  the  real  issue  in  this  matter,  by 
continually  asserting  that  the  subsidy  is  to  insure  national 
interests  when,  in  reality,  it  is  merely  to  promote  trade."  ^ 

Having  fearlessly  called  the  Samoan  proposition  state- 
directed  colonialism,  the  Opposition  proceeded  to  demon- 
strate how  it  was  contrary  to  the  real  commercial  and  finan- 
cial interests  of  Germany.  Thus,  Meier,  who,  a.3  he 
claimed,  expressed  the  opinion  of  the  whole  Hamburg  Ex- 
change, and  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  House  of 
Godeffroy  and  in  possession  of  many  facts  concerning  the 
situation,  vigorously  opposed  the  project.  He  said  that  Ger- 
man merchants  did  not  need  tO'  be  subsidized.  "  I  am  op- 
posed to  state  help  and  am  convinced  that  if  we  wish  our 
nation  strong,  we  must  reject  it;  we  must  allow  people  to 
depend  on  themselves.  .  .  .  If  we  reject  this  proposed  sub- 
sidy, we  will  be  doing  a  service  to  the  nation  as  well  as  to 
the  stockholders."  ' 

Bamberger  elaborated  Meier's  argument  with  many  de- 
tailed figures,  designed  to  show  the  relative  insignificance 

^  Verhandlungen  des  Dentschen  Reichstages,   April  27,   1880,  pp.  945 
et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  April  22,,  1880,  pp.  881  et  seq. 


123]  ™^  TEST  123 

of  the  Samoan  trade.  He  asked  why  the  German  people 
should  take  300,000  M.  out  of  its  pocket  every  year  and 
make  "  poor  Michael  "  pay  to  assist  a  bankrupt  business,  es- 
pecially when  there  exist  many  successful  firms  in  the  South 
Seas.  "  It  is  unjust  to  injure  other  interests  in  Samoa  which 
have  been  and  are  doing  well."  ^ 

The  House  of  Godeffroy,  in  business  since  1860,  has  had  many 
financial  embarrassments  .  .  .  and  has  finally  gone  on  the  rocks. 
.  .  .  This  is  not  a  sound  business  ;  should  we  support  it  ?  .  .  .  The 
House  of  Godeffroy  differs  from  all  other  firms  in  its  large  landed 
possessions  overseas ;  this  means  colonialism,  which  has  been  sown 
with  blood  for  the  past  three  hundred  years."  .  .  .  There  is  little 
import  trade,  since  the  natives  are  too  primitive.  The  Leipzig 
Chamber  of  Commerce  has  telegraphed  a  resolution  in  favor  of 
the  Subsidy  Bill.  Why?  Leipzig  can  export  only  woven  under- 
wear and  for  this  the  natives  have  no  use.  It  is  only  an  illusion, 
this  idea  that  trade  will  be  improved  by  subsidies.  The  import 
trade  in  Samoa  is  mainly  English — seventy-eight  percent  of  it — 
while  only  twenty-two  percent  is  German.  The  Samoan  trade 
really  amounts  to  little.^ 

Bamberger  as  well  as  Lowe  considered  the  whole  project 
a  repetition  of  the  South  Sea  Bubble.  "  The  Government 
is  miisled,  does  not  understand  business  and  sees  visicftis. 
.  .  ,  Enthusiasts  for  colomies  always  go  into  ecstasies  over 
visions  of  commercial  advantage,  and  others,  whom  I  .call 

*  Oceaniden,'    whenever    the    sea    is    mentioned    cry    out. 

*  Thalatta,'  like  the  ten  thousand  Greeks."  * 

Resorting  to  personal  attacks,  Bamberger  accused  God- 
efifroy  &  Son  of  unscrupulous  monopolistic  methods.    "  Con- 

^Verhandlungen  des  Dcnischen  Reichstages.   April  23.   1880,  pp.  893 
et  seq. 
'  Ibid.,  April  22,  1880,  pp.  862  et  seq. 
"  Ibid.,  .April  22,  1880,  pp.  893  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  April  27,  1880,  pp.  954  et  seq. 


124      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [124 

sul  Weber,  Agent  of  the  House  of  Godeffroy,  has  misused 
his  powers.  ...  In  1876,  the  firm  of  Ruge,  Heedermami  & 
Company,  wrote  to  Bismarck  complaining  that  the  German 
Consul  Weber,  who  is  also  agent  of  Godeffroy  &  Son,  was 
threateniing  the  inhabitants  of  Samoa  that  if  they  did  not 
sell  exclusively  to  Godeffroy,  they  would  have  to  pay  a  fine 
of  250  M.,  every  month."  ^  And  we  already  know  how 
Bamberger  exposed  the  connection  between  the  financial 
interests  of  Godeffroy  &  Son,  the  great  German  bankers, 
ond  the  Government."  He  also  said,  "  I  believe  with  Meier 
that  the  '  financial  experts  '  like  Bleichroder  and  Hardt  have 
started  and  managed  the  whole  affair  and  have  issued  the 
new  company's  stock,  '  under  a  strong  moral  pressure.' 
These  are  the  gentlemen  who  composed  the  company  and 
everyone  knows  what  good  business  they  have  already  done 
in  Prussia  and  the  empire."  ^ 

The  fate  of  the  proposed  subsiidy  proved  without  doubt 
that  the  opposition  in  the  Reichstag  reflected  correctly  the 
prevailing  public  opinion;  for  the  bill  failed  to  pass  the 
Reichstag  by  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  to  one  hundred 
and  twelve  votes,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  colonial  party 
and  Bismarck.*  The  concentrated  and  bitter  opposition  of 
the  left  wing  of  the  National  Liberals,  numbering  twenty- 
one,  of  the  Progressives,  the  Centrists,  the  Poles,  the  Parti- 
cularists  and  the  Socialists  had  triumphed  over  the  strong 
union  of  the  Conservatives  and  the  right  wing  of  the  Na- 
tional Liberals,  the  latter  numbering  thirty-six.  The  Centre 
was  here  among  the  opponents  and  was  conspicuously  absent 

1  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  April  22,  1880,  pp.  863 
et  seq. 

-  Cf.  supra,  p.  III. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  April  27,  1880,  pp.  894 
et  seq. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  960,  list  of  votes. 


125]  ^^^  ^^-^^  125 

ill  the  debates,  because,  while  strongly  in  favor  of  over- 
seas expansion,  the  Catholic  party  always  blocked  a  colonial- 
ism which  provided  solely  for  the  commercial  and  political, 
to  the  total  exclusion  of  any  cultural  or  religious  objects. 
The  emphatic  "  No  "of  this  party,  together  with  the  absence 
of  many  Conservative  representatives,  proved  decisive.  One 
hundred  and  forty  members  abstained  from  voting,  indicat- 
ing that  a  considerable  group  still  reserved  judgment  or  were 
unwilling  to  commit  themselves  upon  the  vital  issue  of  a 
national  colonial  policy. 

The  press  further  reflected  the  temper  of  the  countr\^  as 
it  was  revealed  by  the  discussion  of  the  Samoan  affair;  it 
confirmed  the  attitude  and  reiterated  the  arguments  adopted 
by  both  sides  which  the  debates  had  already  indicated.  The 
government  organs,  notably  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  partly  owned  by  members  of  the  House  of  God- 
effroy,  fought  for  the  subsidy  with  great  fervor.^  At  first, 
it  took  every  occasion  to  deny  that  the  Samoan  proposition 
meant  a  colonial  policy  or  a  means  of  support  for  the  House 
of  Godeffroy.  It  criticised  bitterly  the  imethod  employed 
by  the  Opposition,  particularly  its  personal  attacks,  and  tried 
to  dispel  all  suspicion  and  yet,  when  an  adverse  outcome 
seemed  likely,  it  adopted  an  attitude  of  naive  indifference, 
attaching  apparently  no  great  significance  to  either  failure  or 
success."  "  We  hear  that  only  a  very  acute  neuralgic  at- 
tack with  which  Bismarck  has  been  afflicted  for  the  past  three 
weeks,  prevented  him  from  personally  taking  part  in  the 
debates."  ^ 

When  the  subsidy  was  irreparably  defeated,  however,  the 
paper  in  its  disappointment  and  anger,  discarded  all  diplo- 

'  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  72>- 

*Norddeut.  Allge.  Zt.,   1880,  April  17,   18,  21.  22.  nos.  179,  181,   185, 
186,  quoted  by  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  vol.  i,  p.  275. 
^  Ibid.,  April  25,  1880,  no.  191. 


126      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [126 

macy  and  revealed  its  true  position  :  "  It  is  probable  that  had 
the  country  been  consulted,  the  verdict  would  have  been  very 
different.  The  Samoan  Subsidy  was  a  prelude  to  a  German 
colonial  policy  and  the  first  practical  expression  of  it. 
Neither  the  enemies  of  our  greatness,  nor  the  doctrinaires 
of  the  Manchester  School,  will  succeed  in  preventing  Ger- 
many from  embarking  upon  that  course  which  other  nations 
have  followed  with  advantage."  ^ 

Indeed  the  German  Government  seemed  more  dissatisfied 
than  discouraged,  since  another  official  paper,  Die  Post,  ad- 
vised the  administration  to  take  possession  of  the  Samoan 
Islands  and  merely  to  announce  the  fact  to  the  Reichstag. 
"  If  a  people  suitable  for  the  work  of  colonization  exists,  it 
is  the  German  people.  A  large  part  of  the  world's  commerce 
is  in  their  hands.     German  colonies  are  necessar}^"  ~ 

The  Kolnische  Zeitiing,  a  semi-official  organ,  represent- 
ing the  opinions  of  inland  Germany,  where  paradoxically 
there  has  always  existed  a  romantic  sentiment  and  enthus- 
iasm for  overseas  exploits  and  for  the  navy,  said,  in  com- 
menting upon  the  result :  "  It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  the 
need  of  colonies  for  economic  reasons  has  already  attained  a 
strong  hold  on  the  official  mind.  .  .  .  The  victor}'  of  the 
Opposition  will  bring  disappointment  to  imany  circles  and  is 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  a  large  majority  of  our  people. 
.  .  .  The  national  interest  was  foremost  here.  .  .  .  The 
parliament  of  no  other  great  state  would  sacrifice  political 
prestige  for  so  small  a  financial  consideration  or  on  account 
of  the  risk  of  the  venture."  ^ 

Naturally,  the  organs  of  the  colonial  party  united  with  the 

1  Norddeut.  Allg.  Zt.,  April  28,  1880,  quoted  by  Annates  de  I'ecole 
libre  des  sciences  politiques,  loc.  cit.,  1887,  p.  537,  and'  Giordani,  The 
German  Colonial  Empire  (London,  1916),  p.  15. 

'  Die  Post,  April  23,  1880,  quoted  by  Giordani,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 

'  Die  Kolnische  Zeitung,  April  30,  1880. 


127]  ^^-^  ^^-^^  127 

governmental  press  in  deploring  the  failure  of  the  subsidy. 
"  Our  political  position  in  Samoa  depends  upoti  our  economic 
status.  Whoever  has  lived  in  the  colonies  will  know  with 
what  hearty  laughter  our  withdrawal  fromi  Samoa  will  be 
greeted."  ^ 

The  press  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen  was  most  significant ; 
it  might  have  been  expected  energetically  to  have  vociferated 
the  strong  support  of  the  subsidy  on  the  part  of  these  com- 
mercial cities,  since  the  Government  claimed  that  the  bill 
was  to  foster  shipping  and  trade;  but  it  failed  to  fulfill  such 
expectations. 

The  Hamburg  press  showed  that  city  as  maintaining  a 
somewhat  reserved  attitude,  in  spite  of  the  attacks  upon  its 
local  patriotism  by  Der  Export.  Hamburg,  generally,  had 
always  been  in  favor  of  colonial  expansion,  but  unlike  the 
theorists  of  the  inland,  did  not  talk  so  much  about  it,  l^ecause 
it  was  better  informed  regarding  the  dangers  and  difficulties, 
and  was  not  so  hot-headed,  nor  so  ready  to  inaugurate  state- 
directed  colonialism  at  a  stroke.  Furthermore,  the  free- 
trade  party  still  prevailed  there  in  large  measure  and  the 
Hambiirge?-  Borscnhallc  took  the  point  of  view  that  other 
German  firms  were  active  in  the  South  Seas  and  GodefTroy 
&  Son  ought  to  help  itself." 

The  Bremen  press  opposed  the  Subsidy  Bill  more  com- 
pletely and  exhibited  greater  jealousy.  The  Brevier  Han- 
delshlatt  anticipated  "  grave  political  results  "  of  such  a  de- 
parture and  entirely  discredited  the  "  national  argument."  ■ 

Perhaps  the  whole  Samoan  affair  was  most  correctly  in- 
terpreted by  the  Augshiirger  Allgcmeinc  Zeifimg,  when  it 
asserted,  despite  the  claims  of  the  Norddeiifsche  Allgei'ieiiie 
Zcitung,  that  the  proposed  subsidy  was  only  in  the  inter- 
ests of  German  trade  and  the  protection  of  its  South  Sea 

*  Der  Export,  April  27,  1880. 

*  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  pp.  68-69, 


128      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [128 

property.  "All  the  commercial  interests,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Leipsic  Chamber  of  CcwTumerce,  denied  that  they  would 
be  helped  by  it.  .  .  .  The  Samoan  Subsidy  was  refused  by 
the  Reichstag  because  something  lay  underneath  it,  and  it 
was  made  to  cover  up  political  motives.  .  .  .  Above  every- 
thing else,  the  Samoan  Subsidy  appeared  to  anyone  who 
voted  for  it  as  a  new  departure.  Many  a  representative 
would  willingly  have  supported  one  such  innovation,  but  the 
question  arose  whether  this  would  not  inaugurate  a  nezv 
policy."  ^ 

The  results  of  the  Samoan  project  and  its  failure  were 
far-reaching  in  their  effects  upon  the  colonial  movement. 
While  temporarily  appearing  to  check  it  they  were  ulti- 
mately most  favorable  tO'  its  progress.  In  the  first  place, 
we  note  the  effect  upon  the  Government's  attitude  towards 
colonialism.  The  Subsidy  Bill  had  forced  the  admlinistra- 
tion  to  abandon  the  reserve  hitherto  displayed  towards  the 
whole  matter  and  to  take  a  definite  stand.  Modern  German 
colonialism,  that  is  state-directed  colonialism,  would  doubt- 
less have  begun  in  1880,  had  it  not  received  this  set-back. 
There  was,  as  we  have  seen,  every  indication  that  the 
inauguration  of  a  state-directed  colonialism  through  the 
Samoan  Subsidy  had  been  the  intention  of  the  administra- 
tion. "  Bismarck,  thereby,  had  hoped  to  launch  his  Lieb- 
lingsplan,  namely,  a  colonial  policy."  ^  The  rejection  of  the 
project  by  the  Reichstag,  however,  influenced  Bismarck  to 
drop  temporarily  all  support  of  the  colonial  movement  and 
all  official  cooperation  with  it ;  he  fell  back  upon  his  maxim 
that,  "  It  is  impossible  to  enter  upon  a  colonial  policy  with- 
out a  national  impulse."  He  saw  that  the  majority  of  the 
country  was  against  him  and  he  was  too  clever  a  statesman 
to  make  the  mistake  of  openly  pressing  an  already  defeated 

*  Augshurger  Allgemeine  Zeitun-g,  April  30,  1880. 

*  Coppius,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 


129]  T^HE  TEST  129 

issue  in  the  face  of  a  powerful  Opposition.  The  Chan- 
cellor was  also  politician  enough  to  realize  that  a  policy 
which  he  had  strongly  advocated  had  been  repudiated  by  a 
too  independent  Reichstag.  And  he  appreciated  only  too 
well  the  iimportance  of  not  letting  such  a  Reichstag  get  out 
of  hand,  especially  at  this  crisis  in  political  affairs.  He  felt 
that,  "  by  this  decision,  his  authority  was  compromised,  his 
duty  and  policy  injured  by  party  strife."  and  that  caution 
was  necessar}^^  Hence,  after  May,  1880,  we  find  the  Chan- 
cellor playing  a  double  game,  for  how  otherwise  explain  his 
very  contradictory  conduct?  He  seemed  at  one  time,  in- 
directly and  secretly,  to  support  the  colonial  movement :  and 
at  another  timie.  to  repudiate  it  officially  and  openly,  by  re- 
fusing to  accede  to  any  demands  for  assistance  and  pro- 
tection. 

As  evidence,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  Chancellor's  support 
of  colonialism,  is  a  letter  written  on  May  7,  1880.  to  the 
Board  of  Directors  of  the  Deutsche  Sec  Handels  Gesell- 
schaft.  This  Board  had  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  company 
upon  the  failure  of  the  subsidy,  and  had  personally  assumed 
the  debts  of  Godeffroy  &  Son.  thereby  preventing  their 
property  in  Samoa  from  falling  into  English  hands.  In  the 
letter,  Bismarck  expressed  the  greatest  approval  and  appre- 
ciation of  their  action.  "  The  conviction  that  you  have  ren- 
dered a  worthy  service  to  the  Fatherland  by  supporting  exist- 
ing enterprises  in  the  South  Seas  will  not  only  be  gratefully 
appreciated  by  His  Majesty  and  the  governments  of  the 
states  unibed  with  his,  but  also  by  wide  circles  of  the  German 
population."  - 

*  Account  of  Bismarck's  conversation'  with  prominent  diplomat,  in 
Nord.  Dent.  AUg.  Zt.,  May  i,  1880.  quoted  by  Poschinger  in  Bismarck 
als  Volkswirt,  vol.  i,  p.  276. 

'  Poschinger,  Aktenstiicke  cur  W irtschaftspoUtxk  des  Fiirsten  Bis- 
marcks  (Berlin.  1890),  vol.  i,  p.  3^2. 


130      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [130 

Again  on  July  6,  1880,  he  expressed  the  following  senti- 
ments in  the  government  press: 

The  Conipagnie  Oceanique  has  established  at  great  expense  a  fac- 
tory in  the  island  of  Raiatea,  whose  independence  is  considered 
incontrovertible  by  international  law.  ...  It  can  be  readily  un- 
derstood that  the  desire  of  the  authorities  in  Tahiti  to  extend  the 
French  protectorate  there,  causes  disquiet  among  the  German  in- 
habitants. This  is  a  serious  matter  and  something  should  be  done. 
.  ,  .  We  doubt  whether  the  German  Imperial  Government  will 
intervene  for  the  protection  of  German  commerce  in  Raiatea,  in 
case  France  interferes,  ...  or  that  it  will  take  any  commercial 
initiative  in  Polynesia,  if  negotiations  with  England  or  America 
become  necessary.  For  the  German  National  Assembly  by  reject- 
ing the  Samoan  Subsidy  has  solemnly  discredited  in  the  eyes  of 
Germany  and  the  Powers  the  Government's  solicitude  for  German 
interests  in  the  South  Seas.  The  Government  should  determine 
to  assist  overseas  trade  in  opposition  to  the  sentiment  of  the 
Reichstag?- 

On  the  other  hand,  there  exists  abundant  evidence  that  the 
Chancellor  officially  repudiated  any  movement  towards 
colonialism.  In  the  year  1880,  he  ignored  Mosle's  petition 
for  a  state  subsidy  for  a  company  established  to  buy  up  and 
develop  land  in  North  Borneo,  owned  by  von  Overbeck ; " 
likewise  on  November  11,  he  rejected  Hansemann's  request 
for  a  state  guarantee  of  a  steamship  line  between  Mioko,  the 
German  admiralty  port  in  the  Duke  of  York  Islands,  and 
other  South  Sea  Islands,  as  well  as  a  plan  for  the  coloniza- 
tion of  New  Guinea."     Again,  in  the  year  1881,  we  find  the 

'^Nord.  Deut.  Allg.,  July  6,  1880,  quoted  by  Annales  de  I'ecole  libre 
des  sciences  politiques,  loc.  cit.,  p.  538.  Also,  cf.  supra,  p.  iii.  The 
Compagnie  Oceanique  was  a  company  founded  to  extend  Germany's 
commercial  settlements  in  the  South  Seas  with  which  Bismarck  was 
closely  connected. 

*  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  72. 


I3l]  THE  TEST  131 

Chancellor  saying  to  a  member  of  the  Reichstag,  in  relation 
to  the  failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy,  "As  long  as  I  am 
Chancellor,  we  will  carry  on  no  colonial  policy.  We  have  a 
navy  incapable  of  going  far  and  we  cannot  afford  to  own 
waste  places  in  other  parts  of  the  earth  which  will  only 
revert  to  the  French,"  ^ 

At  the  same  timie  (1880)  Bismarck  created  the  Economic 
Council  of  Prussia,-  to  support  his  political  and  commercial 
policy;  and  the  Council  forthwith  passed  a  resolution  that 
the  empire  appropriate  100.000,000  M.  to  purchase  territory 
outside  of  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  colonies. 
i  The  only  interpretation  of  this  paradoxical  policy  would 
seem  to  be  that  Bismarck,  fearful  of  political  opposition, 
was  "  feeling  his  way,"  was  advancing  as  best  he  could  to- 
wards a  colonial  policy,  and  at  the  same  time  was  avoiding 
any  possible  opportunity  for  another  vote  in  the  Reichstag 
indicating  "  no  confidence." 

The  failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  thus  seriously 
affected  the  Government's  relation  to  the  colonial  question. 
It  drove  the  Chancellor  into  an  equivocal  j>osition  after  first 
forcing  him  to  show  his  hand  in  favor  of  colonies.  It  pre- 
vented the  movement  from  achieving  its  goal  of  state- 
directed  colonialism  in  the  year  1880,  and  compelled  it  to 
develop  through  one  or  more  phases,  during  which  the  ad- 
ministration remained  in  the  position  of  a  silent  and  secret 
partner  of  the  colonial  party. 

In  the  second  place,  we  have  to  consider  the  result  of 
the  failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  upon  the  colonial 
party  itself.  Stung  by  defeat  into  greater  effort,  it  re- 
doubled its  exertions  both  in  individual  attempts  at  economic 
colonialism  and  in  propaganda  to  convert  public  opinion.     A 

^  Poschinger,  Fiirst  Bismarck  und  Die  Parlcmentaricr,  vol.  iii.  p.  54. 
"^  Ibid.,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  vol.  ii,  p,  11, 


132      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [132 

multktide  of  independent  overseas  enterprises  as  well  as  a 
tremendous  outburst  of  literature  were  the  result  of  the 
party's  defeat  in  the  Reichstag.  Imimeasurably  strength- 
ened by  the  open  and  avowed  support  of  the  Government, 
disclosed  by  the  whole  Samoan  affair,  it  felt  all  the  more 
keenly  the  public  withdrawal  of  administrative  cooperation, 
and  was  therefore  absolutely  determined  to  regain  govern- 
mental support.  Mo'iTeover,  the  manner  in  which  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill,  especially  Bam/berger,  had 
handled  their  case  and  had  attacked  imperial  officials,  re- 
sulted in  winning  many  supporters  who  had  been  otherwise 
indifferent  to  the  cause.  Even  the  enemies  of  a  colonial 
policy  resented  the  bitter  insinuations  uttered  against  state 
officials  by  the  Opposition  and  sympathized  with  the  colonial- 
ists on  that  account. 

Indirectly  also,  the  failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill 
streiigthened  the  position  of  the  colonial  party:  the  loss  of 
German  prestige,  incident  upon  the  defeat  of  the  proposed 
Samoan  policy,  encouraged  the  rival  efforts  of  England  and 
France;  it  imiade  the  "  foreign  menace  over  seas  "  loom  larger 
upon  the  horizon ;  and  it  supplied  the  colonial  enthusiasts  and 
patriots  with  abundant  material  for  specific  appeals  for  pro- 
tection. For  instance,  the  English  firm  of  McArthur  in 
New  Zealand,  which  had  possessed  trade  and  plantation  set- 
tlements in  Samoa  since  1870,  secured  the  buildings  and 
leases  of  the  German  firm,  Ruge,  Heedemann,  on  the  Tonga 
Islands,  after  the  subsidy's  failure;  it  sent  ships  and  pro- 
jected a  steamship  line  between  Tonga  and  New  Zealand, 
thus  causing  the  Gerimlans  to  fear  English  annexation/ 
Also  England  annexed  to  the  Fiji  Islands  the  Island  of 
Rotuman,  where  Germany  had  hitherto  controlled  trade. 
England  then  forbade  German  ships  to  proceed  thither  di- 

*  Poschinger,  Aktenstiicke,  vol.  i,  p.  332. 


133]  ^^^  ^^^^  133 

rectly,  obliging  them  to  stop  first  at  an  English  customs 
port  in  Fiji.^ 

France's  desire  to  extend  her  Protectorate  from  Tahiti  to 
the  island  of  Raiatea,  has  already  been  mentioned;  and  this 
she  finally  accomplished  when  she  raised  her  flag  in  Raiatea 
on  May  25,  1881.- 

The  most  important  result,  however,  which  the  Samoaii 
Subsidy  accomplished  for  the  colonial  party  and  the  entire 
movement  was  that,  in  common  with  most  test  cases,  it  clari- 
fied the  issue  and  defined  more  precisely  the  friendly  and 
hostile  elements.  It  forced  groups  and  individuals  into 
taking  sides.  By  imeans  of  the  publicity  and  discussion 
which  the  affair  occasioned,  the  colonial  party  could  now 
distinguish  between  its  supporters  and  its  opponents.  For 
instance,  the  colonialists  realized  after  April,  1880.  that 
colonialism  has  become  a  political  issue,  that  it  was  party 
politics  for  their  enemies  to  fight  colonialism  in  any  shape 
whatsoever  in  the  Reichstag;  that  indeed  these  enemies 
fought  it  more  because  of  mere  political  tactics  and  a  desire 
for  revenge  against  Bismarck,  and  his  protective  tariff,  than 
because  of  any  actual  disagreement  with  the  colonial  move- 
ment. In  fact  the  non-governmental  parties,  the  left  wing 
of  the  National  Liberalists,  the  Progressives,  the  Poles,  and 
the  Socialists,  indirectly  influenced  aft'airs  abroad  to  the 
detriment  of  German  colonial  plans.  In  England,  especially, 
they  contributed  indirectly  to  stirring  up  a  movement  to 
block  Germany,  which  in  1880  eventuated  in  the  formation 
of  a  comtpany  that  bought  and  developed  the  land  shares 
owned  by  von  Overbeck  in  North  Borneo  and  checkmated 
Mosle's  plan.^     Indeed  the  English  papers  made  no  secret  of 

'  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  30. 

-  Cf.  supra,  p.  130. 

3  Herrfurth,  Bism-arck  uiid  die  Kohnialpolitik,  p.  20, 


134      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [134 

saying  that  the  company  was  organized  m.  order  to  fore- 
stall Germany. 

Nowhere  was  the  cleavage  which  the  Samoan  affair 
wrought  in  public  opinion,  more  apparent  than  at  the  first 
annual  Congress  of  the  Centralverein  filr  Handels  Geogra- 
phic and  the  Nineteenth  Annual  Congress  of  the  Deutsche 
Volkszvirte.  The  two  organizations  chanced  to  meet  simul- 
taneously in  Berlin  during  October,  1880,  and  officially  dis- 
cussed the  colonial  isssue;  in  fact  their  debates  echoed  those 
of  the  Reichstag  over  the  Samoan  affair/  While  the  Con- 
gress of  the  Centralverein  was  wholly  in  favor  of  state- 
directed  colonialism  and  state-directed  emigration  (although 
all  the  speakers  did  not  go  so  far  as  the  colonialist  leaders, 
such  as  Dr.  Jannarsch,  Weber  and  Fabri,  in  advocating 
governmental  acquisition  of  territory)  the  Congress  of 
Deutsche  Volkswirte,  led  by  Dr.  Kapp,  supported  by  Loehnis 
and  Philippsohn,  passed  a  resolution  of  opposite  tenor. 
"  While  the  Government  feels  obliged,  under  the  present  law, 
to  allow  emigration  to  proceed  unchecked,  yet  protects  it 
from  exploitation  and  interference,  the  Congress  of  Deutsche 
Volkszvirte  declines  to  indorse  any  attempt  to  establish 
colonies  at  the  cost  of  the  state  in  order  merely  to  benefit 
certain  rich  groups.'" 

The  two  congresses  thus  expressed  a  divisio  1  of  public 
sentiment  which  typified  the  situation  throughout  the  nation. 
It  was  the  old.  internationally-minded  generation  pitted 
futilely,  as  time  was  to  prove,  against  the  representatives 
of  the  new  age,  fresh  in  their  industrial,  economic  and  na- 
tional strength.     Which  had  the  greater  chance? 

The  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill,  the  test-case,  had  failed  imme- 

*  Verhandlungen  des  Erstens  Kongresses  des  Centralverein s.  Ver- 
handlungen  des  N eunzehnten  Kongresses  Deutschen  Volkswirte,  quoted 
by  Hubbe-Schleiden,  Deutsche  Kolonisation.  Vide,  also,  Schtnoller's 
Jahrbuch,  1881,  pp.  325  et  seq. 


135]  ^"^  ^^^^  135 

diately  in  furthering  a  colonial  policy.  Nevertheless,  it  ad- 
vanced the  colonial  imiovement  a  long  way  on  the  road  to 
success,  by  clearly  defining  the  issue,  by  disclosing  the  avowed 
support  of  the  Government,  by  giving  wide  publicity  to  the 
subject,  by  definitely  lining  up  the  supporters  and  opponents 
and,  finally,  by  indicating  the  work  still  to  be  accomplished. 
We  shall  next  follow  the  colonial  party  and  the  Government, 
working  side  by  side  as  partners,  to  promote  the  movement 
through  its  final  stage  which  ended  in  the  ultimate  triumph 
of  a  state-directed  colonialism. 


CHAPTER  VII 
The  Triumph 

Between  the  years  1881  and  1884  the  colonial  party  and 
the  Government  endeavored  each  in  its  way  to  achieve  the 
triumph  of  a  state-directed  colonialism.  Their  task  was 
to  create  a  powerful  public  opinion  in  favor  of  expansion 
sufficient  to  enable  the  administration  to  emerge  from  the 
position  of  hesitancy  and  political  precaution  into  which 
it  had  been  driven  by  the  failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy. 
Throughout  these  four  years  the  colonial  party  cooperated 
with  and  supplemented  the  policy  and  tactics  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Indeed,  the  inter-action  of  these  two  forces  supplies 
the  keynote  to  the  period  and  the  explanation  of  the  final 
triumph  of  colonialism  in  1884.  For  the  colonialist  leaders 
and  the  administration  finally  succeeded  in  initiating  a 
state-directed  colonial  policy  by  a  bold  stroke,  although  they 
discovered,  at  the  same  time,  that  they  had  to  reckon  still 
with  a  formidable  opposition  in  the  country  and  that  they 
had  on  their  hands  another  year's  fight  to  secure  parliamen- 
tary ratification. 

We  will  trace  first  the  work  of  the  colonial  party,  as  it 
was  the  leader  in  the  campaign  until  the  year  1883.  After 
the  defeat  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill,  the  party  lined  up 
its  cohorts  of  every  kind  and  united  all  the  scattered  en- 
thusiasts for  colonialism  in  a  definite  organization — the 
Kolonialverein.  Indeed  the  history  of  the  Kolonialverein 
presents  an  excellent  picture  of  the  convergence  into  one 
main  and  deep  channel  of  all  the  streams,  currents  and 
136  [136 


137]  '^^^  TRIUMPH  137 

eddies,  which  went  to  make  up  the  entire  colonial  movement, 
and  in  its  final  organization  it  exhibits  the  union  of  the  the- 
orists and  the  practical  colonialists  under  the  leadership  of 
the  latter. 

/  Several  societies  had  already  appeared  in  Germany  as 
Iforerunners  of  the  Kolonialverein.  The  first  of  these,  the 
West  Deutsch  P^erein  filr  Colonisation  und  Export,  founded 
by  Fabri  at  Dusseldorf  in  1880,  was  an  offshoot  from  the 
Central  Association  for  Commercial  Geography  and  Ger- 
man Interests  Abroad.  The  Society's  avowed  purpose  was 
to  devote  all  its  activity  solely  to  the  establishment  of  colon- 
ies; its  special  aim,  as  announced  in  1880,  "  to  influence  the 
Government  in  acquiring  German  trade  and  plantation  set- 
tlements." It  directed  its  attention  to  trade  and  business 
projects,  endeavoring  particularly  to  prepare  a  place  for 
Germans  in  South  America.  This  active  society  later 
joined  the  Kolonialverein  in  1883. 

Next  in  importance  as  a  forerunner  was  the  Leipzig 
Verein  filr  Handels  Geographie  which  boasted  objects  similar 
to  those  of  the  West  Deutsch  Verein.  In  1882  both  these 
societies  sent  a  commission  to  Argentina  and  Paraguay  to 
study  the  possibilities  and  opportunities  in  those  lands. 
Also  they  were  both  instrumental  in  founding  in  Leipzig 
in  1884  the  South  American  Colonial  Company.  -And  to- 
gether with  the  Central  Association  they  contributed  to 
the  establishment  of  rich  trade  museums,  which  the  Prus- 
sion  Government  welcomed  with  the  warmest  sympathy. 

The  Central  Association  for  Commercial  Geography  also 
formed  many  branches  which  emphasized  colonial  interests. 
The  year  1882,  alone,  witnessed  the  founding  of  Geogra- 
phical Societies  at  Jena,  at  Konigsberg  and  at  Lubeck.^ 

Together  with  these  societies  there  existed  various  others 
for  exploration  and  travel,  groups  of  Rhenish  Industrials 

*  Globus,  1882,  pp.  126,  239. 


138      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [138 

like  Friederichs,  Hasenklever,  and  Heindahl,  who  were  very 
much  in  favor  of  economic  expansion  over-seas,  and  asso- 
ciations of  Hanse  merchants  such  as  Woermann  and  Mosle, 
Godeffroy's  successors.^ 

Thus  there  were  many  movements,  all  unrelated,  un- 
coordinated. But  there  was  no  one  concerted  effort  for 
colonization,  and,  moreover,  the  existing  societies  and  groups 
were  small  in  themselves.  A  central  organization  which 
would  unite  all  these  various  efforts  was  conspicuously  lack- 
ing.    The  preparation  for  it  was  complete. 

The  idea  of  a  plan  for  one  large,  all-inclusive  colonial 
society  may  be  credited  to  three  men,  who  gave  it  expression 
almost  simultaneously — Frieherr  von  Maltzan,  von  der 
Briiggen  and  Prince  Hohenlohe-Langenburg.  Von  Malt- 
zan as  a  naturalist  had  just  returned  in  1882  from  a  journey 
in  Senegambia,  where  he  had  stayed  for  some  time  with 
Friedrich  Colin,  a  Gennan  merchant  from  the  Rhine  dis- 
trict. Colin,  representing  a  French  house,  had  been  in 
Senegambia  twelve  years  and  regretted  exceedingly  to  see 
France,  England,  Portugal  and  not  Germany,  acquiring  land 
there  for  commercial  advantage.  Von  Maltzan,  influenced 
by  Colin,  and  likewise  impressed  himself  by  Germany's  in- 
action, wrote  two  stirring  articles  on  the  subject  which  ap- 
peared in  the  Augsburg  Allgemcine  Zeitung,  in  May,  1882, 
and  which  were  subsequently  published  in  a  brochure,  en- 
titled Handels  Kolonieen,  E'ln  Lebensfrage  fiir  Deutsch- 
land.  Likewise,  with  Colin's  aid,  von  Maltzan  had  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  only  way  to  secure  an  opening  for 
Germany  in  Senegambia  or  anywhere  in  Africa  was  to 
form  a  national  society  of  all  those  interested  in  colonial 
enterprise,  to  finance  a  commercial  occupation  by  a  private 

•  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  1882-1907  (Berlin,  1908),  p.  5- 
"  Augsburg  Allg.  Zeitung,  May,  1882. 


139]  -^^^  TRIUMPH  139 

company,  and  then  to  apply  for  imperial  support  and  pro- 
tection. He  therefore  wrote  invitations  to  all  persons 
known  to  be  in  favor  of  colonialism  and  also  inserted  a 
notice  to  the  same  effect  in  the  newspapers.  Hiibbe- 
Schleiden  replied  to  von  Maltzan's  invitation  on  June  8, 
1882,  and  promised  support.  He  wrote  as  follows:  *' I 
came  to  Berlin  a  short  time  ago  in  order  to  organize  just 
such  a  central  focus  for  colonial  efforts  as  you  plan  for 
your  Kolonialverein.  But,  in  the  meantime,  I  have  become 
persuaded  that  the  time  is  not  ripe  to  aim  at  such  a  practical 
goal.  Practical  ends  [in  colonization]  are  not  achieved  by 
such  organizations.  They  serve  rather  for  political  and  cul- 
tural agitation."  ^ 

Von  Maltzan  received  this  reply,  together  with  a  similar 
one  from  Freytag,  and  grew  very  much  discouraged  by  the 
general  lack  of  response  to  his  appeal.  Soon,  however, 
Prince  Hohenlohe-Langenburg,  attracted  by  the  newspaper 
notice,  wrote  him  that  he  had  realized  for  a  long  time  the 
political  need  of  colonies;  that  he,  in  fact,  had  been  in 
correspondence  about  the  project  with  von  der  Briiggen.  a 
traveller  and  man  of  means,  the  author  of  several  articles 
on  expansion  which  had  appeared  during  the  year  1882  in 
the  Preussiches  Jahrbiich.^  One  of  these  articles  had  ex- 
pressed the  sentiment  that,  "  It  would  be  an  incalculable 
tragedy  for  Germany  if  finally  colonization  was  not  car- 
ried on  by  a  great  company."  Prince  Hohenlohe  was  in- 
spired by  study  and  travel  with  colonial  ideas ;  he  had  been 
Vice  President  of  the  Reichstag  when  the  Samoan  project 
failed ;  and  he  had  evidently  gained  an  appreciation  of  the 
political  need  of  colonies.  He  had  experienced,  further- 
more, the  advantage  of  national  organization  in  the  Yacht 
Club  of  which  he  was  president.     Hohenlohe  invited  von 

*  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgeschaft,  pp.  6,  7. 
'  Preussisches  Jahrbuch,  March,  1882. 


I40      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [140 

Maltzan  to  cooperate  with  von  der  Briiggen  and  himself  in  a 
national  society.  Thus  he  formed  the  connecting  link  which 
was  needed  between  von  Maltzan  and  von  der  Briiggen. 
Hohenlowe  united  the  economic  and  political  colonial  in- 
terests and  the  motives  of  trade,  travel,  exploration,  science, 
and  national  necessity,  although  it  is  significant  to  note  that 
von  Maltzan,  who  had  taken  the  first  real  initiative  in  the 
affair,  primarily  represented  the  economic  motive. 

The  result  of  the  cooperation  of  these  three  men  was  a 
summons  to  all  those  interested  in  colonialism  in  any  way — 
the  great  industrials,  representatives  from  societies,  and  the 
Boards  of  Trade  of  Frankfort  and  Offenbach — to  meet  in 
Frankfort  (since  Miguel,  the  Biirgermeister  of  Frankfort 
was  an  ardent  colonialist),  to  discuss  the  question  of  placing 
the  colonial  ambition  of  Germans  upon  a  broader  base. 
The  preparatory  meeting  was  held  on  August  26,  1882;  it 
appointed  a  committee  which  issued,  on  September  12,  a 
circular  embodying  the  objects  of  the  proposed  society  and 
an  appeal  for  members.  The  objects  were  stated  as  fol- 
lows :  "  To  extend  to  a  larger  circle  the  realization  of  the 
necessity  of  applying  national  energy  tO'  the  field  of  colon- 
ization. 

"  To  form  a  central  organization  for  all  the  hitherto  scat- 
tered efforts  for  expansion. 

"  To  create  some  method  for  the  practical  solution  of  the 
question."  '^ 

The  circular  and  invitation  was  signed  by  representative 
colonial  leaders  and  protagonists.  We  quote  some  of  the 
names  of  the  signers,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  cooperation 
of  all  phases  of  colonial  theory  and  practice  in  the  founda- 
tion of  the  Kolonialverein :  Dr.  Emile  Jung,  firm  of  Jant- 
zen  and  Thormalhen  of  Hamburg ;  Lammers,  Editor  of  the 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  8. 


141  ]  THE  TRIUMPH  141 

Bremen  Handelshlatt;  Dr.  Oscar  Lenz;  Meier  of  Bremen, 
Head  of  the  North  German  Lloyd;  Dr.  A.  B.  Meyer, 
Director  of  the  Royal  Zoological  and  Anthropological 
Museum  of  Dresden;  Moldenhauer,  an  engineer  and  writer 
for  colonialism;  Dr.  Kirchhoff,  Head  of  the  Geographical 
Society  in  Halle;  F.  Loesen,  a  ship  owner  of  Hamburg; 
Rohlfs,  an  African  explorer;  Professor  Schmoller,  of 
Berlin;  Schloeman,  a  shipper  of  Hamburg;  Clemens  Den- 
hardt,  a  merchant  of  Berlin;  Dr.  Fischer,  Professor  of 
Geography  in  the  University  of  Kiel;  Dr.  Gustav  Fre)i:ag; 
Fabri ;  and  Hiibl^e-Schleiden.^ 

The  circular  was  then  published  in  the  papers  together 
with  a  manifesto  addressed  to  the  country.  The  latter 
showed  the  need  of  increasing  commercial  outlets,  in  order 
to  establish  and  maintain  close  touch  with  Germans  over 
seas,  and  called  attention  in  quite  an  alarming  way  to  Ger- 
many's position  as  growing  more  and  more  restricted  abroad. 
Most  of  the  German  press  gave  it  space,  but  the  only 
acknowledgment  of  the  Bayerische  Vaterland  was  the  com- 
ment, "  It  is  very  kind  of  the  Kolonialverein  to  send  us 
their  long  announcement,  but  I  and  most  of  my  readers  are 
not  interested  in  colonies,  unless  a  colony  should  be  estab- 
lished within  a  couple  of  dozen  miles  where  Prussians  might 
be  exported.  In  that  case  then,  we  would  be  much  in 
favor  of  them !  " 

Many  leading  men.  however,  responded  to  the  call,  par- 
ticularly the  industrial  magnates  of  the  West  and  South  and 
members  of  societies  already  organized.  Some  difficulty 
was  encountered  at  first  with  the  citizens  of  the  Hanse 
Towns,  the  leading  circles  of  Bremen  and  Liibeck,  i'.i  spite 
of  the  great  efforts  made  to  win  them  by  literature  and 
lectures.     Hiibbe-Schleiden    constituted    himself    a    special 

^  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgcsellschaft,  p.  12. 


142      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [142 

emissary  to  them  and  wrote  that  they  held  aloof  because 
of  suspicion  and  that  their  attitude  seemed  tO'  be,  "  We  know 
those  Frankforters,  their  ideas  sound  well,  but  at  bottom  they 
only  want  our  money  and  wish  to  supplement  their  capital 
with  ours."  ^  The  criticism  was  also  made  that  the  Kolon- 
ialverein  represented  no  definite  enterprise,  that  it  appeared 
to  business  men  entirely  too  theoretical.  Lammers  of  Bre- 
men wrote  that  not  a  voice  in  its  favor  was  to  be  heard  there. 
Senator  Klugman  wrote  from  Liibeck  that  he  foresaw  no 
increase  of  industrial  opportunity  in  the  Kolonialverevn. 
Professor  Rein  of  Marburg  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
Verein  was  all  theory  and  lacked  money  and  power."  All 
these  men  represented  the  point  of  view  of  the  extreme  type 
of  practical  colonialists,  men  who  were  too'  impatient  to 
adopt  the  slow  method  of  educating  public  opinion.  Gradu- 
ally, nevertheless,  they  were  won  over  in  sufficient  numbers 
to  warrant  the  establishment  of  an  organization.  The  Kol- 
onialverein  was  accordingly  founded  and  its  constitution 
drawn  up  on  December  6,  1882,  at  Frankfort.  The  presi- 
dent, Prince  Hohenlohe-Langenburg,  announced  on  that 
occasion  that,  "  The  Verein  was  founded  by  men  of  all  par- 
ties and  positions  in  life  and  had  met  with  an  entirely  unex- 
pected response."  ^ 

The  "  parties  and  positions  "  were  indeed  most  evident  in 
the  discussions  over  the  constitution.  Here  again  appeared 
the  clash  and  final  compromise  among  the  various  motives 
and  aims  of  colonialism.  For  instance,  Rohlfs  wished  the 
Society  to  engage  merely  in  scientific  study  and  to  determine 
what  areas  were  of  greatest  economic  value  for  the  Father- 
land.    Fabri  spoke  in  favor  of  the  guidance  of  emigration 

"^  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  13. 

'  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  38. 

'  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  18. 


143]  ^^^  TRIUMPH  143 

and  the  establishment  of  colonies  as  the  primary  object, 
Fabri  emphasized  also  the  great  necessity  of  avoiding  anta- 
gonism with  the  Government ;  he  stipulated  as  a  condition  of 
the  union  of  his  West  Deutsch  Verein  with  the  Kolonial- 
verein,  that  "  no  sentence  appear  in  the  constitution  which 
might  offend  the  Governmet.".  ..."  We  cannot  afford  to 
hit  our  heads  against  a  stone  wall  or  to  deal  with  an  anta- 
gonistic Government."  Meier,  on  the  other  hand,  thought 
it  impossible  and  inexpedient  to  found  colonies  and  urged 
that  the  object  of  the  Society  should  be  the  furtherance  of 
imperial  protection  of  trade  and  commerce.  Miguel  agreed 
with  Meier  that  the  purpose  of  the  Verein  should  be  not  to 
establish  colonies  or  financial  enterprises,  but  to  work  for 
the  governmental  protection  of  already  existing  establish- 
ments and  to  make  the  colonial  issue  something  upon  which 
the  entire  nation  and  not  a  small  group  might  unite. 

The  result  of  the  discussion  was  the  usual  result — a 
compromise,  and  hence  we  find  the  aims  of  the  Kolonial- 
verein,  as  expressed  by  its  constitution,  very  general  and 
elastic,  in  order  to  suit  the  minds  of  all  those  present.  "  Its 
principal  work  is  to  educate  public  opinion ;  ....  to  form 
a  central  organization  for  colonial  ambitions ;  .  .  .  .  not  to 
found  colonies  which  would  involve  the  Govemmeent  in 
serious  political  difficulties ;  but  to  confine  its  eft"orts  to  the 
establishment  of  small  trading  stations  and  to  strive  for  the 
official  protection  of  the  administration."  ^ 

The  method  pursued  by  the  Kolonialrercin  consisted 
chiefly  of  organizing  branches,  publishing  propaganda,  send- 
ing out  lecturers,  and  stri\nng  to  establish  friendly 
and  cooperative  relationships  with  other  societies.  Its  suc- 
cess was  shown  when  the  West  Deutsch  Verein  with  its  five 
hundred  meml^ers  joined  the  Kolonialvercin  in  1883.  The 
only  practical  work  of  the  Society,  although  many  such 

*  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  pp.  9.  10. 


144      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [144 

schemes  were  projected,  consisted  in  a  settlement  in  Para- 
guay, whither  a  commission  was  despatched  on  Ootoiber  23, 
1882,  and  where  the  German  flag  was  raised  (without  of- 
ficial authority)  in  1883/  Thus,  in  spite  of  tremendous 
opposition,  von  Maltzan  even  going  so  far  as  to  resign  from 
the  Kolonialvercin,  the  Society  achieved  in  its  second  year  a 
real  settlement  under  the  red,  black  and  white  flag. 

The  growth  and  success  of  the  Kolonialvercin  in  win- 
ning adherence  to  the  cause  was  remarkable,  for  by  De- 
cember 31,  1883,  after  one  year's  work,  it  numbered  three 
thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty  members  and  had  foot- 
holds in  four  hundred  and  ninety-two  places  in  Germany 
and  in  forty-three  abroad  including  nineteen  outside  of 
Europe."  Furthermore,  it  was  strong  enough  to  launch  an 
official  organ,  the  Koloniaheitung,^  whose  first  issue,  appear- 
ing in  January,  1884,  stated  in  its  introductory  article  that 
the  Kolonialverein  had  been  founded  by  men  from  all  parts 
of  Germany  in  response  to  a  general  expression  of  a  national 
desire.  The  journal  called  upon  all  patriotic  men  to  further 
the  work  of  the  colonial  party.  Its  appeal  was  not  political 
or  partisan,  but  rather  universal  and  national.  Two  years 
of  active  propaganda  achieved  wonders  in  shaping  public 
opinion.  "  Men  of  all  parties  now  belong  to  the  Kolonial- 
verein. The  Koloniak'crin  stands  far  removed  from  the 
strife  of  parties  and  represents  only  a  national  purpose," 
said  President  Hchenlohe-Langenburg  at  the  first  general 
convention  held  in  Eisenach,  on  September  4,  1884.*  In 
one  year,  1884- 1885,  the  membership  increased  over  three 
hundred  percent,  rising  to  ten  thousand,  two  hundred  and 
seventy-five. 

*  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  26. 

*  Ibid.)  p.  25. 

'Die  Kolonialseitung.  1884. 

*^Der  Europaischer  Geschichtskalendar,  December  31,  1883. 


145]  ^^^  TRIUMPH  145 

Anotlier  organization — Die  Gesellschaft  fiir  Deutsche 
Kolonisation — was,  in  addition  to  the  Kolonialvercin,  a 
moulder  of  public  opinion  and  an  influence  for  the  growth 
of  colonialism.  It  was  founded  by  Karl  Peters  in  Berlin 
on  April  3,  1884,  for  the  ver\'  practical  object  of  raising 
capital  to  finance  colonies  in  East  Africa/  When  Dr.  Peters 
attempted  to  win  official  interest  for  the  Society,  he  en- 
countered the  lively  opposition  of  the  Koloniaherein,  whose 
members  thought  that  any  scattering  of  effort  would  weaken 
the  whole  movement.  An  amalgamation  of  the  two  socie- 
ties was  proposed  but  great  difficulties  lay  in  the  way :  Peters 
stood  for  an  active  policy  of  immediate  annexation :  while 
the  Kolonialvercin  was  more  cultural,  more  educational, 
more  interested  in  supporting  enterprises  already  started. 
A  long  debate  ensued  and  resulted  in  a  decision  against 
amalgamation.  It  had  the  advantage,  however,  of  eliciting 
protracted  discussion  in  the  press,  which  drew  public  at- 
tention to  the  colonial  question  and  inflamed  party  spirit. 
Final  amalgamation  with  the  Kolonialvcrein  ultimately  came 
about,  however,  on  November  19,  1887.  The  result  was 
the  foundation  of  a  single  great  society.  Die  Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschuft.  which  became  a  powerful  and  influen- 
tial factor  in  the  later  history  of  German  colonialism." 

The  colonial  party  accompanied  its  work  of  organizing 
and  consolidating  its  scattered  forces  by  a  renewal  of  vigor- 
ous public  propaganda.  We  have  seen  what  a  firm  founda- 
tion the  colonialists  had  already  laid  in  this  respect  during 
the  years  from  1879  to  1881.  Now,  the  defeat  of  the 
Samoan  project  serv^ed  to  enlist  scores  of  new  apologi'^ts 
for  the  cause.  The  new  literature  emlxxlied  for  the  most 
part  the  same  arguments  as  that  j>receding  it.  which  has  all 

'  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgeseltschaft,  pp.  36,  37- 
•  Herrfiirth,  op.  cit.,  pp.  24-25. 


146      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [146 

been  described  in  Chapter  IV  and  needs  no  further  exposi- 
tion here..  But  the  new  propaganda  possessed  several  char- 
acteristics novel  in  kind  or  tone. 

(  First,  the  prevalence  of  articles  dealing  with  colonialism 
""became  conspicuous  in  German  periodicals  after  1881. 
This  was  not  evident  formerly,  when  the  propaganda  con- 
sisted principally  of  brochures,  pamphlets,  and  books  pri- 
vately published.  The  change  indicated,  perhaps,  that  col- 
onialism now  occupied  a  more  prominent  place  in  general 
discussion  and  had  been  promoted  to  a  position  of  more 
or  less  national  interest.  Efforts  of  the  colonial  party 
were  l>earing  fruit.  The  Preussiches  Jahrbuch,  especially, 
abounded  in  articles  on  colonization,  a  fact  which,  if  we 
bear  in  mind  its  semi-official  character,  serves  to  confirm 
the  idea  that  the  Government  was,  if  not  actually  sympa- 
thetic, at  least  not  antagonistic  to  the  movement.^ 

Another  characteristic  of  the  literature  of  the  period  was 
the  publication  of  new  editions  of  former  works  which  had 
supported  the  expansion  movement  directly  or  indirectly. 
For  instance,  Roscher's  book.  Kolonial  Politik,  Kolonicen 
und  Ausimnderung  was  re-edited  for  the  third  time  in  1885 
and  was  followed  shortly  by  a  flood  of  literature  which  ex- 
alted and  advertised  the  colonial  exploits  of  Brandenburg- 
Prussia  and  the  Great  Elector."  The  best  of  these  new 
editions,  however,  belong  rather  beyond  our  period. 

■  Von  der  Briiggen,  "  Auswanderung,  Kolonisation,"  "  Der  Deutsche 
Kolonialverein,"  "  Einige  Worte  zur  Kolonisation,"  "  Der  Kanzler  und 
Kolonialpol,"  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  March,  1882,  p.  290;  January, 
1883,  p.  64;  July,  1884,  p.  34;  February,  1885,  p.  171.  Treitschke,  "Die 
Ersten  Versuchen  Deutscher  Kolonialpolitik,"  Preussisches  Jahrbuch, 
December,  1884,  p.  555.  Among  other  articles  were :  Geffcken,  "  Deut- 
sche Kolonialpolitik,"  Der  Deutsche  Rundschau,  April,  May,  1882,  pp. 
2,2,,  206,  and  October,  1884,  p.  120;  Gelbauer,  "  Zur  Deutschen  Kolonial- 
fragen,"  Augsburg  Allg.  Zt.,  1882,  Beilage,  nos.  18,  20,  22,  25,  28,  30,  32. 

'Hoffmcister,  Die  Maritimen  und  Kolonialen  Bestrebungen  des 
Grossen  Kurfurstens  (Emden,  1886) ;  Hyack,  Brandenburgische- 
Deutsche  Kolonialpldne  (1887). 


147]  ^^^  TRIUMPH  i^j 

Prominent  among  new  works  on  colonialism  appearing 
during  these  years,  were  further  works  by  Hiibbe-Schlei- 
den,'  Emil  Deckert's  two  hundred  and  fifty  page  volume 
containing  every  known  argument  for  colonies,^  and  a  des- 

',  criptive  book  on  Africa  by  Oberlander.^ 

(T  It  must  be  observed,  moreover,  that  the  opposition  litera- 
ture, the  attacks  and  protests  of  the  enemies  of  colonial- 
ism, decreased  in  number.  The  one  important  work  of 
this  character,  during  these  years  was  Stegemann's  Deutscli- 
lands  Kolonialpolitik.*  The  book  summarized  the  argu- 
ments of  expense,  political  difficulties,  and  the  disadvantage 
of  a  colonial  policy  which  was  always  striving  to  promote 
the  economic  welfare  of  a  nation  at  the  expense  of  the  poli- 
tical. Stegemann  was  forced  to  admit  that  "  the  colonial 
literature  has  grown  very  much,"  but  claimed  that  "  the 
German  press,  with  the  exception  of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung 
(also  semi-official),  has  not  shown  any  definite  support,*' 
and  hence,  he  argued,  "  must  not  be  in  favor  of  colonial- 
ism."^ It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Stegemaim  did  not 
say  that  the  German  press  showed  any  signs  of  hostility  as 
he  doubtless  would  have  said  had  he  been  able  to  prove  it, 
E.  Hasse  reviewed  the  book,  unfavorably,  in  the  Kolonial 
Zeitung;'^  he  set  it  down  as  the  view  of  the  "old  genera- 
tion of  internationalists,"  who  believed  not  in  the  expres- 
sion of  an  individual  culture  and  nationalism  through  colon- 
ies, but  in  "a  mixing  of  German  culture  with  others — an 

'  Hufbbe-iSchleiden,  Kolonisations  Politik  und  Technik  (Hamburg, 
1883);  Uberseeische  Politik  (Hamburg,  1881). 

^Deckert,  E.,  Die  Kolonialreiclie,  pt.  ii  (1883);  Deckert,  E.,  imd 
Kolonisationsobjecte  (Leipzig,  1885). 

3  Oberlander,  Deutsch-Afrika  (Leipzig,  1885). 

*  Stegemann,  Deutschlands  Kolonialpolitik  (Berlin,  1884). 

*  Stegemann,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 

*  Die  Kolonialzeitung,  1884,  vol.  iii,  p.  6, 


148      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [143 

internationalism."  Indeed  this  "  old  generation,"  so  termed 
by  the  colonialists,  were  becoming  literally  old ;  their  voices 
in  opposition  to  a  national  colonialism  were  growing  weaker 
aiid  weaker.  Minor  objections,  however,  began  to  be 
voiced  by  another  group,  the  Socialists,  as  illustrated  by 
Max  Schippel  in  his  book,  Das  Moderne  Elend,^  and  by 
Karl  Kautsky,'  who  attempted  to  show  that  the  economic 
unrest  of  Germany  was  due  to  social  mal-adjustment  and 
not  to  over-population.  These  Socialists  claimed  that  col- 
onies would  not  relieve  all  social  ills,  and,  also,  that  money 
expended  on  colonization  would  be  better  spent  upon  the 
improvement  of  conditions  at  home.  It  must  be  noted,  how- 
ever that  the  Socialists'  hostility  did  not  spring  from  an 
undivided  opposition  to  colonialism,  but  rather  from  an  an- 
tagonism towards  the  entire  "  bourgeois  system,"  and  from 
a  primarv'  desire  to  propagate  the  gospel  of  Karl  Marx. 

Finally,  we  have  to  consider  as  part  of  the  colonial  party's 
work,  during  the  years  from  1881  to  1884,  its  further  ef- 
forts in  behalf  of  direct  colonial  action  in  overseas  expan- 
sion. It  continued  to  encourage  industrial  initiative  in 
founding  trade  settlements  and  to  solicit  governmental  sup- 
port for  these  ventures.  In  this  way  it  indirectly  influenced 
public  opinion  and  served  to  keep  before  the  nation  thriving 
examples  of  colonial  undertakings  and  the  need  of  admin- 
istrative protection.  The  merchants,  traders  and  specula- 
tors, all  the  commercial  colonialists,  were  apparently  not  in 
the  least  discouraged  by  the  defeat  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy 
and  were  enormously  encouraged  by  the  Government's 
sympathy  and  cooperation  on  that  occasion.  They  re- 
doubled  their  efforts  to   increase  the  sphere  of   overseas 

*  Schippel,  Das  Moderne  Elend  und  die  Moderne  Ubervolkung :  Ein 
Wort  gegen  Kolonieen  (Leipzig,  1883). 

'  Kautsky,  "Auswandening  und  Kolonisation,"  Die  Neue  Zeit.,  1883, 
PP-  365-393- 


149]  ^^^  TRIUMPH  T49 

mercantile  opportunity  and  endeavored  simultaneously  to 
win  back  the  administrative  support  so  simimarily  with- 
drawn after  the  defeat  of  the  Subsidy  Bill. 

We  have  already  seen  how  both  Mosle  and  von  Hanse- 
mann  applied  to  the  Chancellor  for  a  state  subsidy  the  very 
year  of  the  Samoan  failure/  Old  and  new  colonial  adven- 
turers and  promoters  followed  them.  For  instance,  the 
Barmen  Mission  petitioned  in  1881  for  commercial  pro- 
tection for  its  settlement  in  Africa;"  in  September,  1882, 
Gustav  and  Clemens  Denhardt  petitioned  the  Government 
for  support  of  a  proposed  establishment  in  Tana.*  The 
Denhardt  brothers  had  made  considerable  progress  in 
■Africa :  they  had  continued  the  friendly  relations  established 
by  the  explorers  Brenner  and  von  Decken  with  the  chiefs) 
of  Witu,  and  had  drawn  up  a  plan  for  a  colony.  In  order 
to  finance  the  venture  they  influenced  the  formation  of  a 
"  quiet  compan)?-  "  in  Berlin  in  1883,  after  they  had  appli(:^l 
to  the  Kolonialvrrcin  in  vain."*  More<^ver,  Colin  of  Stutt- 
gart, long  in  the  serv'-ice  of  a  French  house  in  Senegambia, 
decided,  towards  the  end  of  the  year  1883,  to  settle  there 
for  himself.  The  Kolonialvercin  refused  him  aid,  for  it 
adhered  to  its  announced  policy  of  avoiding  direct  action 
in  colonialism  which  might  involve  Germany  in  difficulties 
with  foreign  Powers.  However,  Colin  secured  suppt)rt 
from  his  brother,  from  the  director  of  the  IViirtemburcj 
V ereinshank ,  and  from  several  others.  He  chose  Denbiah 
for  his  establishment,  persuaded  the  chiefs  to  ask  for  Ger- 
man protection,  and  carried  their  request  for  the  same  to 
Berlin,  early  in  the  year  1884.''     So  great  indeed  was  the 

^  Cf.  supra,  p.  130. 

■  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  46. 

'  Ibid. 

*  Koschitzky,  vol.  i,  p.  243. 

'  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  190. 


1 50      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  1 50 

growth  of  trade  settlements  in  West  Africa  along  the  Gold 
Coast,  that  the  following  firms,  in  addition  to  those  already 
there,  either  entered  for  the  first  time,  or  enlarged  their 
former  holdings  between  the  years  1880  and  1884 :  Woelber 
and  Brothers  of  Hamburg,  settling  at  Lome,  Bageida  and 
Klein  Popo;  Goldelt  of  Hamburg,  at  Lome  and  Wydah; 
Vietor  and  Sons  of  Bremen,  at  Lome,  Bageida  and  Klein 
Popo:  Witt  and  Biisch;  Gaiser  Voight  and  Company,  at 
Porto  Novo;  Muller,  Rosenbusch,  and  Liideritz/  Several 
firms  established  German  factories  in  Togoland.  preferring 
to  make  their  own  settlements  largely  because  England  im- 
posed on  all  trade  in  that  district  her  burdensome  customs 
duties.  So  considerable  had  become  the  trade,  moreover, 
that  the  firm  of  Woerman,  of  long  standing  in  Africa, 
founded  in  1882  a  steamship  line  running  from  Hamburg  to 
West  Africa,  thus  forming  a  direct  connection  between 
Germany  and  the  commercial  colonial  posts." 

The  South  Seas  exhibited  no  less  an  increase  of  commer- 
cial and  colonial  activity  than  did  West  Africa,  after  the 
failure  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy,  although  von  Hansemann 
had  represented  the  situation  in  his  memorial  as  quite 
the  contrary.''  The  Deutsche  Handels  und  Plantagengesell- 
schaft,  successors  to  Godeffroy,  had  proceeded,  as  will  be 
recalled,  without  the  Samoan  Subsidy.  In  1883,  the  com- 
pany was  controlling  eighteen  trading  stations  in  New 
Britain,  the  Hermit  and  Duke  of  York  Islands.^  Indeed  it 
seemed  to  l:>e  prospering  without  administrative  aid.  On 
Fd)ruar3r  23,  1884,  the  German  North  Borneo  Company 
sprang  into  existence  at  Hamburg  and  bought  ten  thousand 
acres  from  the  English  North  Borneo  Company.     Consul 

*  Weissbuch,  1885,  p.  24.    Vide,  also,  Cheradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  172. 

*  Zimmertnann,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 

*  Hahn-Wippermann.  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  72. 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  232. 


Igl]  THE  TRIUMPH  151 

Struebel  summed  up  the  prosperous  condition  of  the  South 
Sea  trade,  as  well  as  the  great  opportunities  still  open  to 
German  merchants,  in  his  report  to  the  Chancellor  on  De- 
cember 18,  1883/  He  stated  therein  that  Germany's  copra 
import  amounted  in  one  year  to  from  two  to  three  thousand 
tons,  whereas  the  need  of  supplies,  food,  clothes,  and  all 
sorts  of  manufactured  goods,  was  so  great  as  to  afford  a  tre- 
mendous market  for  export.  Furthermore,  the  consuls 
and  merchants  were  continually  urging  upon  the  Govern- 
ment, and  hence  indirectly  upon  the  nation,  the  pressing  need 
for  imperial  protection  of  all  trade  and  commercial  effort 
in  the  South  Pacific.  They  asked  for  the  extension  of 
consular  and  naval  service,  as  well  as  for  the  appointment  of 
sp>ecial  officials  whose  duty  it  would  be  to  supervise  overseas 
trade. 

The  Government  was  far  more  subtle  in  its  attempt  to 
sway  public  opinion  for  colonialism  than  was  the  colonial 
party;  it  employed  the  finesse  of  diplomacy  rather  than  a 
direct  attack.  Unlike  the  colonial  party,  whose  leaders 
could  openly  strike  at  ignorance,  indifference,  opposition 
and  every  obstacle  to  expansion,  the  Govennent  felt  con- 
strained to  proceed  with  greater  caution.  Bismarck,  as  we 
have  already  noted,  found  himself  in  a  difficult  position  after 
the  defeat  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy.  Heartily  in  sympathy 
with  expansion,  as  he  had  then  revealed  himself  in  1880, 
he  seemed,  during  the  years  1880- 1885.  to  become  finnly 
determined  to  establish  a  colonial  policy  for  the  empire. 
The  pressure  of  external  circumstances,  such  as  the  imperial- 
istic acquisitions  of  France  in  Tonkin  and  Tunis,  of  Italy  in 
the  Red  Sea,  and  of  England  in  Egypt  and  India,  evidently 
strengthened  his  decisiof.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  he 
dared  not  alienate  the  supporters  of  his  policy  in  the  Rckh- 

ll^Z    *  ^^'eissbuch,  1885.  pp.  131-1SO. 


1 52      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  1  52 

Stag  who  were  none  too  strong  or  numerous.  For,  during 
the  early  eighties,  he  was  struggling  against  the  opposition 
to  his  new  tariff  policy,  his  social  insurance  legislation  and 
his  increasingly  sympathetic  support  of  commercial  and 
economic  interests.  Illustrative  of  the  antagonism  which 
he  met,  was  his  attempt  throughout  the  entire  year  1881 
to  form  an  Economic  Council  for  the  empire  similar  tc* 
the  one  already  successfully  established  for  Prussia,  ^  but 
the  proposal  twice  suffered  defeat  in  the  Reichstag^ 
Again,  his  assumption  of  the  ofifice  of  Minister  of  Trade 
and  Commerce  at  the  end  of  the  year  1880,  another  proof 
of  his  sympathy  with  the  business  interests,  created  grave 
suspicion  in  the  minds  of  his  political  opponents.^  Ham- 
pered by  this  decided  antagonism  and  mindful  of  political 
considerations,  Bismarck  employed  two  means  of  arousing 
a  public  sentiment  in  favor  of  colonialism.  The  first  was  a 
secret  encouragement  of  the  colonial  party,  accompanied  by 
a  continual  testing  of  the  temper  of  the  nation  to  deteTmine 
how  far  his  support  might  go;  the  other  was  a  revival  of 
his  characteristic  policy  of  creating  a  chauvinistic  attitude 
in  Germany,  especially  towards  England,  with  the  ulterior 
purpose  of  arousing  an  enthusiasm  for  colonial  expansion. 
In  regard  to  the  first  means,  Bismarck,  as  it  were,  kept 
one  hand  on  the  pulse  of  public  opinion,  while  with  the 
otlier  he  cautiously  aided  and  abetted  the  colonial  movement, 
quickly  withdrawing  his  aid.  however,  the  minute  that 
national  antagonism  approached  the  danger  point.  Is  this 
not  his  j>osition,  in  the  first  place,  in  relation  to  the  Kolonial- 
verein?  Would  an  organization  of  so  universal  and  power- 
ful a  character  have  been  permitted  to  form  or  proceed  at 

*  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkswirt,  vol.  ii,  p.  9. 
'  Ibid.,  pp.  71,  96. 
'  Ibid.,  pp.  9-10. 


•y. 


153]  ^^^  TRIUMPH  1:^3 

all,  in  a  country  like  Germany,  had  the  administration  not 
been  somewhat  in  sympathy  with  its  aims  ?  Let  us  examine 
the  relations  between  Bismarck  and  the  Society  and  observe 
how  the  Chancellor,  on  the  one  hand,  withheld  any  definite 
and  outspoken  support,  and,  on  the  other,  refrained  frcmi 
exerting  the  slightest  opposition. 

From  the  outset,  its  leaders  strictly  defmed  the  attitude  of 
the  Kolonialverein  toward  the  administration  as  one  of  keen 
solicitude  to  avoid  any  friction  or  any  interference  with  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  empire.  Hiibbe-Schleiden  and  Frey- 
tag  clearly  enunciated  this  attitude  in  their  letters  to  von 
Maltzan.^  Fabri  expressed  it  by  stipulating  non-interfer- 
ence with  the  administration  as  the  one  condition  of  the 
union  of  his  society  with  the  Koloniaherein;  while  Hohen- 
lohe-Langenburg  officially  proclaimed  it  in  his  speech  at  the 
first  general  meeting  of  the  Vcrein  at  Frankfort,  where  he 
related  how  he  had  made  an  especial  effort  to  win  the 
sympathy  and  support  of  the  Gcvvemment.  lie  said,  "  At 
first  the  Foreign  Office  held  rather  aloof,  because  it  had  the 
idea  that  the  Verein  aimed  to  encourage  emigration,  but  as 
a  result  of  further  explanation  of  the  Verein' s  real  '^bject, 
it  displayed  a  friendly  attitude.  .  .  .  We  must  endeavor  to 
stand  in  as  much  accord  with  the  Government  as  possible.''  * 

Toward  the  end  of  December,  1882,  von  Maltzan  had  an 
interview  with  the  Crown  Prince  in  which  the  latter  mani- 
fested great  interest  in  the  work  of  the  Society  but  showed  a 
decided  disinclination  to  take  any  direct  part  in  its  work. 
The  political  situation,  as  an  article  in  the  official  press  an- 
nounced, precluded  any  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  Gc^^'- 
emment  at  this  unsettled  time.^ 

'  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  pp.  27-28. 

'  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  24. 

•Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 


154      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [154 

Furthermore,  the  constitution  of  the  Verein  emphasized 
its  position  as  ''  not  wishing  to  involve  the  Government  in 
any  [x>Htical  difficuhies,"  while  the  "  aim  of  the  Verein  was 
not  to  work  against  the  Government  but  with  it;  to^  pre- 
pare its  way  to  educating  pubhc  opinion."  It  is  also  of 
importance  to  note  that  the  Verein  first  applied  to  von  Kiis- 
serow,  the  colonial  enthusiast  in  the  Foreign  Office,  for  sup- 
port, sending  him  one  of  the  original  prospectuses,  but  ob- 
taining no  answer.^  Knowing  von  Kiisserow's  sympathy 
with  colonialism,  did  a  cautious  silence  imply  consent?  In- 
deed there  exists  no  evidence  whatsoever  of  the  slightest 
friction  or  antagonism  between  the  Government  and  the 
Kolonialverein ,  a  fact  which  would  appear  to  substantiate 
the  theory  that  they  were,  in  reality,  thoroughly  in  sympathy 
with  one  another  as  to  aims;  and  were  only  biding  their 
time  when  public  opinion  and  the  political  condition  in  Ger- 
many could  warrant  their  open  and  acknowledged  coopera- 
tion. 

In  the  next  place,  Bismarck's  attitude  towards  the  activi- 
ties and  petitions  of  the  commercial  colonialists  affords  us 
more  evidence  of  his  scheme  of  direct  and  indirect  support. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  both  Mosle  and  von  Hansemann  did 
not  hesitate  to  besiege  the  Chancellor  in  1880  for  coopera- 
tion with  their  colonial  plans,  six  months  after  the  defeat  of 
the  Samoan  Subsidy.  They  were  both  very  close  to  him 
and  could  not  fail  to  be  aware  of  his  attitude.  To  be  sure 
their  requests  met  with  a  refusal,  which  at  that  time  agreed 
with  the  temper  oi  the  nation.  It  must  be  noted,  however, 
that  it  was  at  the  Chancellor's  request  that  von  Hanse- 
mann drew  up  and  presented  the  memorial  on  the  condi- 
tion of  South  Sea  trade  and  had  it  published  in  February, 
i88r."     Bismarck  evidently  wished   the  coimtry  to  know 

•  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  39. 

'  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  202. 


155]  -^^^  TRIUMPH  155 

that,  "  after  the  rejection  of  the  Samoan  Subsidy,  it  is  im- 
possible to  take  any  strong  initiative  in  the  South  Seas;  a 
great  set-back  to  trade  must  be  expected  unless  Germany 
energetically  supports  it."  ^ 

Meanwhile,  von  Hansemann  received  a  reply  from  the 
Chancellor  to  the  effect  that,  "  The  Chancellor  considers 
that  after  the  defeat  of  the  Samoan  project,  it  is  imprac- 
ticable for  him  to  take  any  initiative  in  this  direction.  The 
countr\''s  inclination  is  not  strong  enough  to  warrant  sup- 
port of  this  plan  now.  As  affairs  are  at  present,  it  would 
have  to  be  left  to  the  action  of  private  initiative,  to  which 
the  Government  can  only  afford  consular  protection."  - 

The  Government,  however,  followed  with  great  care  all 
the  activities  of  the  company  formed  as  successors  to  Gode- 
ffroy  in  the  South  Seas  and  kept  its  consuls  there  informed 
of  administrative  plans.  Thus  the  Chancellor  allayed  any 
suspicion  of  governmental  action  in  Oceania  which  had  l)een 
a  particularly  tender  subject  with  the  Opposition  since  the 
Samoan  Subsidy  Bill. 

Bismarck  was  not  idle  in  other  directions,  and  in  contra- 
diction to  the  sentiments  expressed  by  him  on  February  i8, 
1881,  to  von  Hansemann.  he  began  as  early  as  March  i. 
1 88 1,  to  broach  cautiously,  in  the  official  press,  the  subject  of 
state  support  for  a  steamship  line  to  the  East."  He  fol- 
low^ up  this  scheme  with  a  memorial  presented  to  the 
Reichstag,  on  May  27.  1881,  on  the  necessity  of  a  state  sub- 
sidy for  the  proposed  line.*  with  more  articles  in  the  press, 
during  the  summer,  entitled.  Zur  Hchung  dcs  Dcutschcn 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  72. 

*  Hahn-Wipperniann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  73. 

'  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als  Volkszfirt,  vol.  ii,  p.  32.  quotings  the  hfor«l. 
Dent.  Allg.  Zt.,  March  i,  r88i. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  74.  Vide,  also.  Aniageii  des  Deut.  Reichstages,  1881.  Akten- 
stUck  no.  200. 


156      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [156 

AusfuhrJiandels ,^  and  with  an  assurance  to  the  Conserva- 
tive Verein  of  Schoneberg  that,  "  He  clung  to  his  economic 
policy  with  the  firm  hope  that  it  would  result  in  freeing  the 
economic  interest  of  Germany  from  oppression  of  ser- 
vitude in  which  they  had,  until  the  present,  been  held  by 
political  parties  for  a  political  purpose." 

Bismarck's  memorial,  however,  was  never  even  placed 
upon  the  order  of  the  day  and  was  utterly  disregarded.  The 
implied  rebuff  from  the  Reichstag  warned  him  to  take  care 
and  consequently  he  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  petition  of 
the  Barmen  Mission  for  protection  in  188 1  and  to  the  peti- 
tion of  the  brothers  Denhardt  on  September  15,  1882.^ 
Indeed,  his  mood  revealed  itself,  we  take  it,  in  the  somewliat 
peevish  tone  of  his  reply  to  the  Counsellor  for  Commerce, 
Baare,  in  Bochum,  who  at  the  beginning  of  1883,  recom- 
mended the  annexation  of  Formosa.  "  Colonies  only  be- 
long to  a  mother  country  in  which  national  feeling  is: 
stronger  than  party  spirit.  The  attitude  of  this  Reichstag 
is  such,  that  it  is  difficult  enough  to  maintain  what  we  al- 
ready have,  even  to  support  an  army  for  home  defense. 
So  long  as  the  empire  is  so  financially  disabled,  we  dare  not 
embark  on  such  expensive  undertakings.  The  responsibil- 
ity of  colonies  would  only  increase  the  (exercise  ground) 
of  the  Reichstag.  We  cannot  bear  the  burden  of  colonies, 
we  can  only  support  trading  companies:  but  even  for  that 
it  would  be  necessary  to  have  a  national  Reichstag  which 
would  have  other  and  higher  objects  than  constant  discus- 
sion and  the  creation  of  difficulties  for  the  administration."  * 

Meanwhile,  however,  Bismarck  was  beginning  to  aid  the 
colonial  movement  secretly  in  a  very  material  manner,  al- 
though his  many  refusals  of  support  indicated  that  he  did 

'  Poschinger,  op.  cit.,  p.  75. 

-  Cf.  supra,  p.  149. 

^  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  46. 


157]  THE  TRIUMPH  157 

not  dare  as  yet  openly  to  encourage  it.  For  instance,  on 
Novemiber  16,  1882,  Liideritz,  the  Bremen  merchant  long 
active  in  African  trade  at  Lagos,  appUed  to  the  Foreign 
Office  t\)r  imperial  protection  of  the  contracts  he  was 
about  to  consummate  with  native  chiefs  for  trade  and  for  the 
establishment  of  a  factor}-  on  the  Southwest  Coast  of 
Africa/  Bismarck,  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1883, 
secretly  promised  him  that  protection  would  be  afforded  if 
he  could  acquire  a  harbor  to  which  no  other  nation  tnight 
rightfully  asserted  a  claim."  Liideritz,  fortified  by  this  pr-v 
mise,  went  ahead  with  his  plans  and  took  possession  of  the 
harbor  of  Angra  Pequena  in  April,  1883.  He  further  ex- 
tended his  operations  by  sending  his  agent  Vogelsang  into 
the  interior  in  the  following  summer  for  the  purprvse  of 
making  treaties  and  settlements.  The  latter  concluded  a 
treaty  with  the  native  chiefs  on  May  i,  1883,  acquiring  a 
territory  of  considerable  area  with  all  sovereign  rights.'* 
Luderitz  would  hardl>'  have  embarked  upon  such  an  ex- 
pedition had  he  not  had  definite  assurances  of  imperial  pro- 
tection from  Bismarck — and  that  he  did  possess  assurances 
is  proved  by  the  governmental  instructions  of  Aug^ist  18, 
1883,  to  the  German  Consul  in  Capetown  to  accord  pro- 
tection and  aid  to  Luderitz :  ''  Herr  Luderitz  can  cotmt  on 
the  protection  of  the  Imperial  Government,  so  long  as  his 
actions  are  based  upon  justly  won  rights  and  do  not  clash 
with  the  legitimate  claims  of  others,  be  they  native  or 
English."  " 

Furthermore,  the  Chancellor  sent  the  gun-boat  Nautilus 

*  Weissbuch,  1885,  pt.  i,  p.  77. 

*  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  32. 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  pp.  148-150.     Vide,  also.  Cheradame.  op. 
cit.,  p.  72. 

«  IVeissbiuh,  1885,  pt.  i,  p.  79. 


1 58      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  1 58 

to  Angra  Pequena  and  another  warship  to  Little  Popo  in. 
the  month  of  January,  1884. 

Likewise,  Bismarck  accorded  direct  support  and  protec- 
tion to  the  South  Sea  traders :  in  response  to  their  petitions, 
especially  to  the  memorial  of  Consul  Struebel  in  Apia  of 
December  18,  1883,  the  Chancellor  replied  that  he  was  ap- 
pointing special  commissioners  to  whom  he  would  entrust 
all  German  interests  in  the  Islands  of  New  Britain  and 
New  Ireland  and  whose  authority  he  would  further  rein- 
force by  German  warships/ 

Bismarck  not  only  met  the  individual  colonialists  half 
way,  so  far  as  it  was  possible  without  exciting  suspicion,  but 
he  took  a  most  decided  initiative  in  1883  in  advancing  a 
colonial  policy.'  Indeed,  after  Luderitz  applied  to  him  for 
protection  and  after  the  German  people  received  Liideritz's 
exploits  w^ith  approval,  he  seems  to  have  decided  that  the 
time  was  ripe  for  colonial  activity,  and  that  public  opinion 
was  more  favorable."  He  still  realized,  however,  that 
necessity  for  caution  was  great  and  he  therefore  drew  closer 
to  the  merchants,  the  commercial  colonialists,  for  advice 
and  guidance  in  his  more  definite  policy. 

The  apparently  unfriendly  action  of  England  and  France 
in  concluding  a  Colonial  Convention  on  June  28,  1882,* 
strengthened  the  Chancellor  in  his  decision  to  launch  a 
colonial  policy  of  his  own.  The  Convention  negotiated  a 
demarcation  line  for  the  extension  of  English  and  French 
territory  northward  from  Sierra  Leone,  and  it  also  estab- 
lished high  custom  duties  which  were  resented  by  German 
firms,  especially  by  Woermann.  Bismarck  seized  the  op- 
portunity afforded  by  the  Convention  to  ask  the  Senates 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  75. 
^  Herrfurth,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 
'  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  150. 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p,  32.     Vide,  also,  Cheradixnc, 
op.  cit.,  p.  72. 


1^9]  THE  TRIUMPH  1 59 

of  the  Hanse  towns  on  April  14,  1883,  to  submit  sugges- 
tions to  the  Government  for  the  protection  of  German  trade 
m  Africa;  and  in  so  doing  he  both  tested  public  opinion  and 
promoted  colonial  interests.  The  suggestions,  embodied  in 
Denkschrifts  from  the  German  firms,  were  accordingly  sub- 
mitted in  July,  1883.  We  summarize  their  principal  ideas 
in  order  to  show  the  strength  of  public  opinion  in  the  Hanse 
towns  in  favor  of  imperialism  and  to  indicate  how  far  the 
commercial  colonialists  thought  that  the  government  should 
embark  at  that  time  upon  a  state-directed  colonialism. 

Liibeck  expressed  the  need  of  direct  communication  with 
the  African  Coast. 

Bremen  desired  the  protection  of  warships  and  treaties 
with  the  local  chiefs  to  offset  the  burdens  laid  upon  German 
trade  by  England  and  France.^ 

Hamburg  gave  the  most  valuable  advice  of  all,  as  fol- 
lows :  ( I )  German  Consul  on  the  Gold  Coast ;  ( 2  )  more  ex- 
tended consular  treaties;  (3)  commercial  treaties  with  inde- 
pendent negro  princes  on  the  Coast,  supported  by  warships ; 
(4)  stationing  of  warships  near,  and  establishment  of  naval 
base  on,  the  Spanish  Island  of  Fernando  Po;  (5)  neutraliz- 
ing the  mouth  of  the  Congo  River;  and  (6)  founding  of  a 
trade  colony  at  Biaf  ra  Bay." 

On  December  22,  1883,  the  Foreign  Office  notified  the 
petitioners  that  their  demands  were  being  considered,  that 
it  would  be  grateful  for  even  more  information,  and,  finally, 
that  it  had  already  made  provision  for,  ( i )  The  appointment 
of  a  consul;  (2)  the  creation  of  a  commission  to  supervise 
German  interests  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa;  (3)  the  sta- 
tioning of  warships  on  the  Coast;  and  (4)  the  dispatching 
of  the  S.S.  Sophie  to  North  Africa.^ 

'  IVeissbuch,  July  9.  1883,  p.  5. 

'^  IVeissbuch,  July  6,  1883,  no.  3. 

•  Hahn-Wippcrmann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  22. 


l6o      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i6o 

llie  Chancellor  thus  applied  his  first  scheme  of  dealing 
with  public  opinion:  he  afforded  a  discreet  encouragement 
to  the  colonial  movement  and  a  cautious  direct  suppcjrt,  l*ut 
he  never  once  allowed  himself  to  go  too  far  and  arouse 
hostility  or  antagonism,  for  he  cleverly  remained  constantly 
in  touch  witli  the  fluctuations  of  colonial  sentiment  in  Ger- 
many. The  closer  he  drew  to  the  commercial  colonialists, 
the  more  he  sympathized  with  their  point  of  view,  and  the 
stronger  became  his  resolution  and  con\nction  that  colonial- 
ism was  essential  to  the  empire.  Nevertheless  as  late  as  July, 
1883,  after  he  had  definitely  promised  support  to  Liideritz 
and  invoked  petitions  from  the  Hanse  towns,  he  publicly 
amiounced  in  the  press  tliat,  "  The  purchase  and  support 
of  colonies  would  entail  financial  sacrifices  for  which  the 
German  states  had  not  now  the  money.  .  .  .  The  German 
Empire  would  place  about  its  neck  a  tremendous  burden  of 
responsibility  if  it  should  acquire  colonies  at  present."  ' 

Circumstances,  however,  were  becoming  propitious  for 
die  Chancellor  to  set  in  motion  his  second  scheme  of  mani- 
pulating public  opinion  in  favor  of  a  colonial  policy.  In- 
deed, the  opportunity  lay  ready  at  hand  to  enable  him  to 
use  his  remarkable  diplomatic  skill  to  arouse  a  chauvinistic 
patriotism  in  Germany  towards  the  threatening  colonial  en- 
croachments of  England.  He  first  employed  such  tactics 
in  May,  1882,  in  relation  to  the  South  Sea  affairs.  He  then 
deliberately  rcA-ived  the  unsettled  question  of  England's  in- 
demnities to  the  dispossessed  Fijian  settlers.  The  Chan- 
cellor sent  a  note  to  the  English  Government  recalling  the 
fact  that  the  claims  had  been  urged  for  eight  years,  ever 
since  1875,  ^.nd  he  enclosed  a  petition,  lately  received  from 
one  of  the  injured  German  interests  in  Fiji,  the  firm  of 
Rabone,  Feez  and  Company.-     The  note  elicited  from  Eng- 

'  Herrfurth,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 

*  Hahxi-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  187-188. 


l6l]  THE  TRIUMPH  ifSj 

land  only  another  promise;  and  Bismarck  heard,  on  N<:i- 
vemt>er  7,  1882.  from  his  representative,  Count  Miinster  in 
London,  that  the  "  English  Government,  as  a  result  of  the 
findings  of  the  land  commision  in  Fiji,  seemed  little  inclined 
to  examine  their  claims  as  they  were  made  from  a  very 
biased  point  of  view."  ^  It  had  become  only  too  evident 
that  England  meant  to  postpone  the  entire  Fijian  settlement 
indefinitely.  The  Chancellor  then  decided  to  take  v'igorous 
action  in  the  matter.  He  asked  England  on  April  i6.  1883. 
to  submit  the  claims  to  a  joint  commission  composed  of 
Englishmen  and  Germans."  England  seemed  not  at  all 
disposed  to  consent  to  this  proposal  and  the  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence dragged  on  with  increasingly  peremptory  notes 
from  Bismarck  on  Octolj>er  t8.  and  December  27,  1883,  and 
April  8,  i884.''  Not  until  June  19.  1884,  did  England  agree 
to  the  establishment  of  a  joint  commission.*  The  ciTrres- 
pondence  and  the  attitude  of  the  Chancellor,  however,  had 
had  their  effect,  for  they  served  to  create  the  impression  in 
Germany  that  not  only  were  England's  commercial  and 
colonial  methcKls  a  menace  to  the  Fatherland,  hut  that  any 
coimtry  might  in  tlie  same  manner  infringe  upon  the  pro- 
perty rights  of  Gennans  anywhere  overseas  without  re- 
paration. The  affairs  stirred  up  the  |>eople  to  a  keen  realiza- 
tion of  the  need  of  actual  annexation  in  order  to  secure  ade- 
quate protection ;  even  "  the  enemies  of  colonialism  began 
to  debate  the  question  favorably."  '" 

Fiji,  however,  was  not  the  only  spot  in  the  South  Seas 
which  could  cause  German  feeling  to  nui  high  and  iiati«  >iia! 

'  Hahn-Wippermann.  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  188. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  188-189. 
'Ibid.,  p.  189. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  190.     Vide.  also.  Herrfurth.  op.  cit.,  pp.  20-:*.:. 

*  Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  145. 


1 62      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [162 

and  patriotic  passions  to  become  inflamed  under  the  careful 
guidance  of  the  Chancellor.  On  November  27,  1882,  the 
Augsburg  AUgemeine  Zeitung  published  an  article  by  Emil 
Deckert,  advising  the  Government  to  annex  and  colonize 
New  Guinea.^  The  Sydney  Morning  Herald  copied  the 
article  and  succeeded  in  arousing  a  strong  anti-German 
feeling  in  Australia."  The  Australian  press  demanded  that 
England  annex  New  Guinea.  The  excitement  became  so 
intense  that  the  Governor  of  Queensland  overstepped  his 
authority  in  his  zeal  and  took  it  upon  himself  to  occupy  a 
section  of  New  Guinea  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  on 
April  4,  1883.  The  British  Colonial  Office  speedily  repu- 
diated the  act  and  intimated  that  it  could  not  be  respon- 
sible financially  for  such  an  occupation  and  that  the  Aus- 
tralian colonies  would  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  expense. 
The  Australian  colonies  consequently  adopted  a  sort  of 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  the  South  Seas,  which  was  contained 
in  the  resolutions  passed  at  the  Inter-Colonial  Convention 
held  in  Sydney,  December  3.  1883.  One  resolution  pro- 
posed the  formation  of  an  Australian  League;  another 
favored  the  annexation  of  New  Guinea  and  the  neighboring 
islands  not  held  by  the  Dutch ;  and  finally,  a  third  opposed 
the  annexation  by  a  foreign  Power  of  any  land  in  the  South 
Seas  below  the  equator.^  Consul  Krauel  of  Sydney  and 
Consul  Struebel  of  Apia,  as  well  as  interested  business  firms, 
duly  reported  to  Bismarck  the  news  of  Australia's  aggres- 
sive imperialism.  Consul  Struebel  also  prepared  a  long  re- 
port urging  the  official  protection  of  labor  transporta- 
tion to  the  German  plantations  in  Samoa  by  specially  ap- 
pointed officers  supported  by  warships.  He  said :  "  It  is  a 
question  not  only  of  providing  labor  for  the  German  plan- 

^  Augsburg  Allg.  Zt.,  Nov.  27,  1882. 
'  Qieradame,  op.  cit.,  p.  109. 
^Koschitzky,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  236. 


163]  THE  TRIUMPH  163 

tations  but  of  winning  almost  half  of  the  South  Sea  Islands' 
trade,  as  yet  imtouched,  for  Germany.  We  must  either  do 
it  at  once  and  take  the  wind  out  of  England's  sails  (fv  else 
lose  it  entirely."  ^ 

Furthermore,  Consul  Hemsheim  of  Jaluit  reported  the  sit- 
uation in  the  South  Seas  to  be  more  serious.  He  complained 
to  the  Chancellor  of  the  trespassing  and  interference  of  the 
English  labor  ships,  of  the  disturbance  of  German  freedom 
of  trade  with  the  natives,  and  of  the  destruction  of  a  Ger- 
man trade  station  on  the  Laughlan  Islands  by  the  English 
steamer  Stanley.^  Petitions  and  complaints  from  private 
business  firms  increased  the  urgent  need  of  official  action. 

In  response  to  all  these  repvorts,  Bismarck  assumed  a  firm 
stand  towards  England.  On  January  5,  1884,  he  demanded 
reparation  for  the  damage  wrought  by  the  S.  S.  Stanley, 
and  on  April  5,  1884,  he  claimed  compensation  for  other 
injuries  inflicted  by  the  destruction  of  a  German  trading 
post  at  Nufa  and  of  a  Hamburg  schooner.  He  further  em- 
phasized these  claims  by  sending  the  warship  Hyane  to  the 
scene  of  trouble.^  Altogether,  his  immediate,  active  re- 
sponse to  the  consular  reports  dealing  with  Germany's 
threatened  commercial  interests,  as  well  as  his  imyielding 
and  aggressive  attitude  towards  England,  could  not  fail  to 
have  an  effect  in  winning  approval  throughout  the  country 
and  in  thus  creating  a  far  more  sympathetic  mood  for  the 
launching  of  an  official  colonial  policy. 

It  was  in  relation  to  African  affairs,  however,  that  the 
Chancellor  pushed  his  policy  to  a  climax;  a  climax,  which 
in  conjunction  with  the  conditions  in  the  S><iuth  Seas,  created 
an  international  crisis  and  caused  an  outburst  of  patriotic 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  o/>.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  75-76. 

2  Weissbuch,  1885,  pt.  i,  pp.  131-150. 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  76. 


1 64      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [164 

and  nationaJ  enthusiasm  powerful  enough  to  launch  a  state- 
directed  colonialism.  Fortunately  for  the  success  of  Bis- 
marck's plans,  Ejigland's  policy  could  easily  be  made  to  ap- 
pear as  monopolistic  and  selfish  in  Africa  as  in  the  South 
Seas,  a  fact  which  was  most  effective  in  influencing  the 
Cjerman  mind,  for  during  the  early  eighties  explorers  were 
directing  the  eyes  of  all  nations  towards  Africa  as  the 
continent  which  alc>ne  afforded  great  stretches  of  territory 
still  unclaimed. 

We  have  already  noted  one  instance  of  England's  ex- 
clusive tendency  in  Africa,  her  Convention  with  France  of 
June  1882,  which  aroused  such  resentment  in  German  trad- 
ing circles  and  afforded  Bismarck  an  opportunity'  to  assist 
directly  the  Hanse  merchants.^  In  line  with  the  Anglo- 
Frendi  Convention,  England  concluded  on  February  26. 
1884.  the  Anglo- Portuguese  Treaty,^  which  established  a 
monopolistic  control  of  the  Congo  River.  This  treaty  met 
with  bitter  and  outspoken  antagonism  from  German  busi- 
ness interests.  The  Boards  of  Trade  of  Hamburg,  Sol- 
lingen.  Bremen  and  Mannheim  sent  protests  to  the  Govern- 
ment, and  the  firms  in  Loanda  dispatched  representatives  to 
Berlin  in  order  to  plead  their  cause.^  The  Society  for  Ger- 
man Colonization  and  the  German-African  Society  pro- 
tested vehemently  against  the  proposed  customs  duties  in 
favor  of  Portugal  and  England  and  against  the  Anglo- 
Portuguese  Commission  on  Navigation.*  Patriotic  excite- 
ment spread  throughout  Germany  and  an  enraged  public 
.sentiment  arose  against  England.  To  the  popular  mind. 
England  apjX'ared  to  wish  to  monopolize  the  control  of  all 

'  Cf.  supra,  p.  158. 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  432. 

*  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  60. 

*  Kolonialgesellschaft.  pp.  36-37. 


165]  THE  TRIUMPH  j^^ 

affairs  in  Africa.  The  Chancellor  cleverly  nurse<l  the 
national  resentment  and  turned  it  to  his  own  account.  He 
sent  a  protest  against  the  Anglo- Ponuguese  Treat)-  to 
Portugal,  April  18,  1884-/  he  repudiated  any  intenticm  of 
accepting  its  terms ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  he  instructed  his 
ambassador  in  Paris  to  approach  France  with  a  pr(>pf)sal  to 
unite  the  commercial  interests  of  France  and  Germany  in 
the  Congo  against  England.^  On  April  24,  1S84,  he  re- 
ceived a  response  wherein  France  promised  her  full  sup- 
port.^ France's  cooperation  in  maintaining  the  principle 
of  equality  of  trade  in  the  Congo  finally  led  to  the  calling 
of  the  Congo  Conference  on  November  15.  1884.  Thus 
Bismarck  attempted  to  isolate  England  so  far  as  her  coK)n- 
ial  aims  in  Africa  were  concerned;  and  he  thereby  en- 
couraged and  increased  the  growing  anti-English  sentiment 
already  very  prevalent  in  Crermany. 

Finally,  to  cap  the  climax,  England's  procrastination  and 
pusillanimity  in  regard  to  her  Southwest  African  clainT^ 
supplied  the  Chancellor  with  an  opjxjrtimity  to  crown  his 
work  with  success.  The  story  of  England's  and  Germany's 
counter  claims  to  Southwest  Africa  will  bear  repetition  here 
in  order  to  demonstrate  P>ismarck's  subtlety,  precaution  and 
skill  in  cultivating  anti-English  sentiment  and  securing  a_ 
public  opinion  in  Germany  favorable  to  a  colonial  policy. 
Shortly  after  Liideritz  had  applied  for  imperial  protection 
in  November.  1882.  Bismarck  had  addressed  a  note  to  Eng- 
land on  the  subject  (February  4,  1883).  He  couched  it  in 
very  courteous  terms  and  asked  if  England  exercised  any 
authority  over  the  Angra-Pequena  region.  "If  not.  Ger- 
many intends  to  afford  to  her  subjects  in  that  regi*  n  the 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  473-474. 
'^  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft,  p.  32-33. 
■■'  HahB-Wippermann.  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  474. 


1 66      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i66 

protection  which  they  need."  ^  The  note  conveyed  the  im- 
pression, however,  confirmed  later  by  Secretary  Paunce- 
fote's  minute  of  his  conversation  with  Coimt  Herbert  Bis- 
marck on  the  subject,  that  Germany  "  had  not  the  least  de- 
sign of  establishing  a  foothold  in  Southwest  Africa,"  and 
would  prefer  to  leave  the  responsibility  of  protection  to 
England.^ 

England  replied  to  the  note  on  February  23,  1883,  that, 
"  the  Cape  Colony  Government  has  certain  establishments 
along  the  coast,  but  without  more  precise  information  as  to 
the  exact  location  of  Liideritz's  factor>%  it  is  impossible  for 
the  British  Government  to  say  whether  it  could  afford  this 
protection  in  case  of  need."  ^ 

The  reply  was  extremely  evasive ;  and  it  appeared  all  the 
more  so,  since  England  had  already  declared  that  this  part 
of  the  coast  was  outside  her  jurisdiction.  Indeed,  when 
Bismarck  had  asked  the  British  Government,  on  Novem1>er 
4,  1880,  to  extend  its  protection  to  German  missionaries  in 
this  region  on  an  occasion  of  a  native  war,  England  had 
replied  (November  29,  1880).  "The  British  Government 
cannot  accept  responsibility  for  anything  occurring  outside 
of  British  territory,  which  includes  only  Whale  Bay  and  its 
immediate  region."  * 

England  had  further  confirmed  her  attitude,  in  regard  to 
the  district,  by  instructions  to  the  Governor  of  Cape  Colony 
to  consider  the  Orange  River  as  the  boundary  to  England's 
territory ;  and  he,  in  consequence,  had  refused  to  afford  any 
protection  to  the  missionaries  settled  beyond  the  river. 

All  this  former  correspondence,  which  had  definitely  de- 

*  JVeissbuch,  pt.  i,  p.  78. 

^  British  Sessional  Papers,  1884-1885,  vol.  Ivi,  p.  100. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

*  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  10.  •      ; 


i67J  THE  TRIUMPH  167 

limited  England's  claims,  had  really  made  Bismarck's  in- 
quiries of  1883  superfluous,  as  he  himself  admitted;  and  it 
also  indicated  that  the  Chancellor  had  made  such  polite 
inquiries  merely  from  the  motive  of  wishing  to  maintain 
Germany  scrupulously  in  the  right,  should  a  complication 
with  England  arise,  and  of  desiring  to  quiet  any  sus]>icion 
in  England  of  Germany's  actual  plans.  The  Chancellor 
also  clearly  realized  that  his  note  might  incite  England  to 
take  active  measures  to  block  Germany;  indeed  it  cause<J 
him  no  regret  when  she  did  so  almost  immediately. 

England  proceeded  to  employ  the  time  gained  by  her 
vague  reply  to  Germany  of  February  23.  1883,  by  attempt- 
ing to  make  the  Cape  Government  assert  its  claim  to  the 
territory  beyond  the  Orange  River.  ^  Bismarck  also  im- 
proved the  time,  as  we  have  already  seen,  by  granting  to 
Liideritz  so  definite  a  promise  of  imperial  protection  that  he 
felt  warranted  in  seizing  the  harbor  of  Angra-Pequena  and 
the  surrounding  districts  in  April,  1883. 

Fortified  by  the  news  of  Liideritz's  definite  settlements  in 
Africa,  the  Chancellor  realized  that,  because  of  his  precau- 
tion and  diplomacy,  he  had  the  best  of  England,  whatever 
she  did.  He,  tlierefore,  sent  the  perempton,^  note  of  No- 
vember 12,  1883,  asking  once  more  if  England  claimed 
sovereignty  over  the  bay  of  Angra-Pequena."  England 
vouchsafed  no  immediate  reply;  and  Liideritz.  certain  of 
imperial  support,  was  accordingly  emboldened  to  announce 
publicy  his  acquisition  (November  20,  1883)  of  a  strip  of 
coast  extending  from  the  Orange  River  to  26°  south  hititude 
and  twenty  miles  inland.^     England,  aroused  by  Gennany's 

^British  Sessional  Papers,  Correspondence,  vol.  Iv.  no-.  16,  17.  :ii,  24 
et  seq. 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  11. 

*  Ibid.  Vide,  also.  Butish  Sessional  Papers.  1884-1885.  vol.  Ivi,  pp. 
91-95. 


1 68      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i68 

action,  immediately  sent  a  note  (November  22,  1883) 
stating,  "  that,  although  Her  Majesty's  Government  has  not 
proclaimed  the  Queen's  sovereignty  along  the  whole  coast, 
but  only  at  certain  points,  such  as  Whale  Bay  and  Angra- 
Pequena  Island,  it  considers  that  any  claim  for  sovereignty 
or  iurisdiction  by  a  foreign  Power  between  the  southern 
point  of  Portuguese  jurisdiction,  18°  south  latitude,  and  the 
frontier  of  Cape  Colony  would  infringe  upon  its  legitimate 
rights."  ' 

England  was  now  in  exactly  the  position  where  Bismarck 
wished  her  to  be.  with  respect  to  public  opinion  in  Germany. 
To  patriotic  Germans  she  was  the  dog-in-the-manger.  Bis- 
marck's reply  of  December  31,  1883,  demanded  by  what 
right  or  title  England  could  claim  sovereignty  over  a  ter- 
ritory formerly  considered  independent;  and  his  note  re- 
vealed a  tone  hitherto  lacking  in  his  communications.^  He 
was  sure  of  his  ground  and  could  afford  to  be  defiant. 
Moreover,  the  German  people  now  w^anted  him  to  be  de- 
fiant, was  Germany  not  the  injured  nation,  in  more  respects 
than  one?  We  need  only  to  remember,  in  order  to  ap- 
preciate the  full  force  of  the  Chancellor's  diplomacy  at  this 
j)oint,  that  its  harsh  tone  synchronized  with  his  ultimatum 
upon  the  Fijian  claims  and  with  his  promise  of  vigorous 
action  in  the  South  Seas."  The  cumulative  effect  of  these 
clashes  with  England  was  tremendous  in  Germany. 

Indeed,  from  December,  1883,  the  thermometer  of  popu- 
lar indignation  and  national  chauvinism  steadily  and  rapidly 
rose  until  in  April,  1884,  it  finally  indicated  a  state  of  fever- 
ish excitement.  For  England  sent  no  reply  to  the  note  of 
December  31,  1883,  and  her  procrastination  aroused  in  Ger- 
many a  resentful  hatred — a  hatred  augmented  by  articles 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit..  vol.  v.  p.  10. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

3  Cf.  supra,  pp.  161,  163. 


169]  ^«£  TRIUMPH  169 

in  ihe  official  press/  by  the  Chancellor's  attitude  towards 
Great  Britain's  aggressive  interference  with  German  trade 
in  the  South  Seas,  and  by  the  Anglo- Portuguese  Treaty  ai 
February,  1884.  Bismarck  realized  that  the  crisis  had  ar- 
rived. He  at  once  took  advantage  of  the  state  of  the  popu- 
lar mind  and  by  the  telegram  of  April  24,  1884,^  officially 
proclaimed  Liideritz's  settlements  in  Southwest  Africa 
under  the  direct  protection  of  the  empire.  With  a  bold 
stroke,  the  Chancellor  had  thus  inaugurated  a  state-directed 
colonialism  for  Germany. 

The  telegram  of  April  24,  1884.  carried  no  national  sanc- 
tion, except  by  implication.  However,  it  would  seem  that, 
had  Bismarck  not  been  convinced  his  action  wovild  receive 
ratification  and  already  possessed  die  hearty  approval  of  a 
large  majority  of  the  German  people,  he  would  never  have 
dared  to  take  it,  any  more  than  he  would  have  dared  to 
carry  through  the  Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  in  1880  without  sup- 
port. The  consciousness  of  an  entire  change  in  the  national 
mind,  with  which  he  had  kq>t  himself  so  closely  in  touch, 
would  seem  to  have  sustained  him  in  his  bold  and  independ- 
ent policy.  Nevertheless,  state-directed  colonialism  could 
not  be  termed  an  official  imperial  policy  until  it  had  received 
national  ratification.  To  that  final  stage  of  the  development 
of  the  colonial  movement,  during  its  period,  of  origin,  the 
last  chapter  is  devoted. 

'  Annates  de  I'ecole  libre  etc.,  Jainiary,  1888,  loc.  cit..  p.  2 :   Kdhtijche 
Zt.,  Sept.  1883,  nos.  9,  10,  11,  12  (Fabri). 
'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  13. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
National  Inauguration  of  Colonialism 

The  effort  to  secure  national  ratification  of  state-directed 
colonialism  covered  the  entire  year  from  April,  1884,  to 
March,  1885.  It  was  primarily  a  political  struggle  carried 
on  in  the  Reichstag  and  in  the  country  by  the  forces  of  the 
Government  and  the  colonialists,  now  openly  united.  Un- 
like the  preceding  phase  of  the  movement,  the  Government 
this  time  took  the  lead.  The  battle  was  bitterly  contested ; 
and  the  distinctly  limited  colonial  program  adopted  in  1885 
reflected  the  incompleteness  of  the  victory. 

The  central  issue  of  the  parliam-eiitary  struggle  was  the 
Steamship  Subsidy  Bill.  This  bill  had  had  a  long  history. 
The  plan  for  a  steamship  line  to  the  East  first  came  to 
Bismarck's  attention  as  early  as  1876.^  He  had  not  pro- 
moted it,  however,  until  188 1,"  when  he  aired  it  in  the  official 
press,  requested  the  imperial  representative  in  Hamburg  to 
test  opinion  there  about  it,  and  made  it  a  subject  oi  cor- 
respondence with  Mosle.^  Thwarted  by  the  Reichstag's  re- 
jection of  his  memorial  on  the  subject  in  May.  188 1,  he  had 
temporarily  abandoned  the  whole  scheme,  but  he  revived  it 
in  1884,  encouraged  by  the  same  stimulus  of  popular  support 
wiiich  had  impelled  him  to  send  the  telegram  to  Liideritz. 
On  March  2^,  1884,  Bismarck  asked  the  Kaiser's  permission 
to  present  the  project.*  He  introduced  it  into  the  Bundesi'at 
on  April  23,  and  into  the  Reichstag  on  May  23. 

*  Poschinger,  Bisnujrck  ah  Volksimrt,  vol.  iii,  p.  xxix. 
3  Cf.  supra,  p.  155. 

*  Poschinger,  V olkswirtschaftliclte  Aktenstucke,  p.  42. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  154. 

170  [170 


171  ]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      171 

The  Steaaniship  Subsidy  Bill  provided  for  :  ( i )  steamship 
connectioiiis  with  eastern  Asia  through  a  main  line  to  Hong 
Kong  by  way  of  Rotterdam,  Antwerp,  Naples,  Port  Said, 
Suez,  Aden,  Coloambo  and  Singapore  and  through  a  branch 
line  between  Hong  Koing  and  Yokohama  by  way  of  Shanghai 
and  Korea;  and  (2)  connections  with  Australia  through  a 
main  line  to  Sydney,  by  way  of  Naples,  Port  Said.  Suez, 
Aden,  Adelaide,  and  Melbourne,  and  through  a  branch  line 
from  Sydney  to  Tonga  and  Samoa.  The  Government  was 
to  subsidize  these  lines  for  fifteen  years  with  the  sum  of 
4,000,000  M.  annually.^ 

It  was  pointed  out  by  the  Government  that  Germany 
possessed  at  the  time  only  ten  steamship  lines  to  America,  a 
freight  line  to  East  Africa,  the  Sloman  line  to  East  Africa, 
and  the  Woermann  line  to  West  Africa,  all  supported  entirely 
by  private  means,  except  that  the  Government  paid  300.000 
M.  annually  for  mail  service  and  that  the  eastern  trade  was 
not  great  enough  to  support  steamship  lines  without  state  aid. 

The  struggle  o\'er  the  bill  began  on  June  23,  1884,  in  the 
session  of  the  Budget  Commission  to  which  the  whole  matter 
had  been  referred  after  its  first  reading  in  the  Reichstag  on 
June  14.  So  important  did  the  Chancellor  consider  the 
issue  that  he  personally  appeared  in  a  Reichstag  committee 
for  the  first  time  since  187 1.  In  answer  to  Hammacher's 
question  whether  the  bill  was  connected  with  foreign  policy, 
he  replied  that  it  stood  in  direct  relation  to  it.  He  said, 
"  The  verdict  which  the  Reichstag  pronounces  on  the  Steams- 
ship  Subsidy  Bill  will  be  decisive  for  the  colonial  policy  of 
the  Government.  The  Reichstag's  decision  was  against  the 
Samoan  Subsidy  Bill  and  opposed  to  the  wishes  of  tlie  ad- 
ministration. Hence  the  Government  has  for  a  long  time 
been  thwarted."^ 

^  Anlagen  des  Deut.  Reichstages,  1884.  Aktenstuck  no.  in. 
*  Poschinger,  Bismarck  als   Volkswirt.  vol.   ii.   p.   183.     Account  of 
session  of  Budget  Commission,  June  23.  1884. 


J  72      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  1 72 

Thus  the  Chancellor  himself  threw  down  the  gauntlet; 
he  clearly  defined  the  issue.  The  bill  was  to  constitute  a 
test-case,  just  as  the  Samoa  Subsidy  Bill  had  done;  but,  this 
time,  the  national  vote  would  signify  either  the  rejection  ar 
the  confirmation  of  an  imperial  state  colonialism  already 
adopted,  instead  of  one  merely  proposed. 

From  the  outset,  Bismarck  appeared  to  be  justified  in  his 
statement  that,  "  It  seems  very  likely  that  this  first  attempt 
since  the  Samoan  affair  to  promote  the  overseas  interests 
of  the  empire  will  meet  with  the  favor  of  the  Reichstag. 
The  notes  and  telegrams  expressing  approval  which  are  re- 
ceived alimost  daily  from  circles  which  I  had  no  idea  pos- 
sessed such  a  lively  interest  in  the  matter,  bear  witness  to 
the  fact."  ' 

The  first  organization  to  rush  publicly  to  the  Chancellor's 
aid  was,  of  course,  the  Kolonialverein.  On  April  26,  1884, 
it  passed  a  resolution  approving  the  change  of  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  Government  which  the  Steamship  Subsidy  Bill 
indicated.  Bismarck  thanked  the  Society  in  a  letter  of  May 
4,  1884,  saying,  "  Even  though  I  can  hardly  count  on  an 
immediate  success  for  this  present  bill  when  I  remember 
the  Samoan  affair  and  consider  the  prevailing  tendencies  in 
the  Reichstag,  still  I  consider  it  the  duty  of  my  administra- 
tion to  endeavor  to  promote  the  national  welfare  in  spite 
of  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  present  Reichstag.'"  ' 

Thus  the  hitherto  silent  partners,  the  administration  and 
the  Kolonialverein,  openly  acknowledged  their  close  co- 
op>eration.  Bismarck  showed  by  the  tone  of  the  above  letter 
what  a  tower  of  strength  and  support  he  expected  the 
Kolonialverein  to  be  to  him  in  his  fight  with  the  refractory 
assembly.  And  indeed  it  [)roved  so  to  be.  It  adopted 
further  resolutions  on  June  28.   1884,  thanking  the  Chan- 

'  Poschinger,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  183. 

'  Die  Koloniaheitung,  1884,  vol.  XJ,  p.  213. 


J73]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      773 

cellor  for  his  famous  colonial  speeches  of  June  26.  and  uro- 
ing  all  to  work  for  the  success  of  the  bill.  The  Society  held 
a  monster  General  Convention  at  Eisenacli,  on  September 
21,  1884,  whicli  overwhelmingly  indorsed  the  new  policy  of 
the  Government  and  attempted  to  raise  the  whole  issue  above 
party  politics  to  the  national  and  patriotic  sphere.  The  more 
the  Reichstag  blocked  the  Subsidy  Bill,  the  longer  grew  the 
membership  roll  of  the  Kolonialvercin. 

Other  organizations,  likewise,  rallied  strongly  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  Government,  among  them  the  powerful  Central 
Association  for  Commercial  Geography.  Bahse,  speaking 
at  its  meeting  on  May  8,  1884.  said,  "  Trade  has  failed  to 
keep  pace  with  industry.  .  .  .  The  hesitation  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  the  Samoan  affair  played  into  the  hands  01 
England.   ..." 

Politically,  the  Chancellor  received  expressions  of  sup- 
port not  only  f  ronn  his  allies  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Conserva- 
tives and  National  Liberals,  but  also  from  groups  through- 
out the  country.  Special  committees  of  Conservatives  and 
National  Liberals  formed  to  discuss  the  colonial  issue;  the 
second  Chamber  of  Baden  passed  a  resolution  on  April  28, 
1884,  urging  the  Government  to  adopt  a  definite  colonial 
policy ;  ^  special  petitions  and  resolutions  came  from  the 
National  Liberal  Committee  in  Wiesbaden,  from  tlie  Hessian 
Progressive  Committee  in  Darmstadt,  and  from  the  Deutsch- 
Freisinnige  Committee  in  Wurzburg;  while  Dr.  Stephan.  the 
Imperial  Postmaster  General,  produced  any  number  of  peti- 
tions in  the  Reichstag  on  June  14.  when  he  hitroduced  the 
Subsidy  Bill  and  stated,  "  The  press  of  almost  all  parties 
greets  the  project  with  favor,  even  the  Dcinocratische  Cor- 
respondenc.''' " 

'  Die  Deutsche  Kolonialseitung,  1884,  p.  I94- 

*  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  June  14,  1884.  pp.  720 
et  seq. 


1 74      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [  j  74 

Most  of  the  promises  of  support  came  naturally  from 
the  industrial  and  commercial  world.  The  Society  of  Ger- 
man Jute  Makers  sent  a  letter  to  Bismarck  on  his  birthday 
thanking  him  for  his  economic  policies  since  1879;^  the 
citizens  of  Dortmund,  the  helmet  makers  of  Dusseldorff ,  the 
ship-builders  of  Hamiburg,  and  many  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce, all  committed  themselves  to  the  new  policy  in  writ- 
ing.^ In  a  telegram  thanking  the  Dresden  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  Bismarck  said  on  June  28,  1884,  "  Other  in- 
formation from  all  parts  of  Germany  confirms  my  opinion 
that  out  people  follow  the  lead  of  their  own  hearts  and 
minds  when  it  is  a  question  of  the  esmipire's  political  and 
economic  strength."  ^ 

The  Government  could  count  on  the  support  of  all  the 
Coinservatives.  of  most  of  the  National  Liberals,  and  of 
g7"oups  of  Progressives  and  Deutsch-Freisinnige — all  who 
were  interested  from  a  business  standpoint — commercial 
colonialists,  many  industrials  and  .merchants.  It  is  not 
strange,  then,  that  Bismarck  assumed  the  tone  revealed  in 
his  replies  to  the  Kolonialverein  and  the  Dresden  Chamber 
of  Commerce. 

The  other  factor  in  the  contest,  the  Opposition,  remains  to 
be  estimated.  Bamberger  and  Richter  of  the  Deutsch- 
Freisinnige  Partei  appeared  as  the  leaders  of  the  doctrinaire 
group.  They  based  their  objections  upon  the  same  ground 
as  that  taken  in  the  Samoan  affair,  namely,  that  the  proposed 
steamship  lines  represented  mercantile  interests  which  in 
turn  concealed  colonial  aims.  Bamberger  cited  the  fact  that 
Postmaster  General  Stephan  definitely  stated  in  presenting 
the  bill  that  it  had  no  connection  whatever  with  the  colonial 

*  Poschinger,    Bismarck   als   Volks7virt,   vol.   ii,    p.    184,   quoting   Die 
Post,  1884,  nos.  178,  184,  186. 
'  Jbid.,  1884,  nos.  172,  343,  347. 
'  Poschinger,  Aktenstuckc,  p.  154. 


175]    NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      17- 

policy,  whereas,  Bismarck,  when  cornered  in  the  Budget 
Commission,  admitted  the  close  relation  of  the  two  and  out- 
lined a  program  of  expansion.^  They  accused  the  Chan- 
cellor of  misrepresenting  his  plans  and  his  foreign  policy  and 
of  failing  to  admit  earlier  the  connection  of  subsidy  bills  with 
overseas  expansion.  They  harped  upon  the  danger  of  fric- 
tion with  foreign  Powers  and  illustrated  the  foolishness  and 
futiKty  of  overseas  possessions  by  references  to  the  experi- 
ences of  other  countries.  In  all  these  arg^mients  they  were 
supported  by  the  Socialists  who,  of  course,  held  similar  doc- 
trinaire, party  convictions. 

A  far  more  serious  aspect  of  the  Opposition,  lio-weveT. 
was  its  partisan  character.  A  party  spirit  apparently  actu- 
ated the  Radicals  as  much  if  not  more  than  their  liberal  doc- 
trines— a  spirit  of  revenge  and  hatred  of  Bismarck  and  all 
his  new  policies,  as  well  as  of  determination  to  contest  his 
absolute  control  of  foreign  affairs.  The  same  feeling  of 
animosity  attracted  to  the  Radical  Opposition  all  dissident 
elements,  who  mierely  seized  the  Subsidy  Bill  as  something 
tangible  upon  which  to  fasten  their  antagonism  to  the  Gov- 
ernment. Prominent  among  them  was  the  Centre  party,  led 
by  Windthorst,  Bismarck's  bitter  enemy.  Although  the 
Centre  party  theoretically  and  practically  believed  in  a  mcxl- 
erate  colonialism,  it  was  still  smarting  from  the  Kultur- 
kampf;  always  posing  as  the  party  of  economy,  it  resented 
the  great  expenditure  required  by  the  bill ;  it  was  becomang 
aroused  by  the  proposed  anti-Polish  policy ;  and  finally,  under 
Windthorst's  influence,  it  could  not  afford  to  lose  this  un- 
paralleled opportunity  to  combat  the  Chancellor.  Hence,  the 
Catholic  party  sacrificed  conviction  to  partisanship  and 
joined  forces  with  the  Radicals.  As  the  Centre  held  the 
balance  in  the  Reichstag  in  1884- 1885  and  could  determine 
any  issue  by  combining  with  the  Right  or  the  Left,  it  created 
a  serious  problem  for  the  Government. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Detitschen  Reichstagcs,  June  26,  1884,  p.  1064. 


176      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [176 

The  Clerical-Radical  Opposition  employed  two  methods 

against  the  Government.  First,  it  revived  the  practice,  in 
which  the  Radicals  had  acquired  considerable  technique  in 
the  Samoan  affair,  of  "  throwing  mud  "  at  their  opponents. 
Richter  condemned  all  who  favored  the  bill  as  being  finan- 
cially interested  in  it.  Bamberger  accused  von  Kiisserow 
of  a  direct  business  connection  between  tlie  proposed  sub- 
sidy and  the  recent  purchase  by  a  Berlin  banking  house  of 
the  shares  of  the  Samoa-Handels  und  Plantageii  Gescll- 
schaft  in  the  hands  of  Baring  Brothers  of  London.  He  also 
pointed  out  that  the  recent  formation  of  a  Consortium  to 
buy  land  in  New  Guinea  was  coincident  with  the  proposal  of 
the  government  subsidy  for  a  South  Pacific  Steamship  Line 
and  that  von  Hansemann.  director  of  the  Diskonto  Covi- 
pany,  and  Ohlendorf,  owner  of  the  Norddeutsche  Allege- 
tneine  Zeitung,  were  its  promoters.  "  If  these  connections 
between  the  business  interests  and  the  Government  really 
exist."  said  Bamberger,  "  the  Subsidy  Bill  will  appear  in  a 
clearer  light,  for  then  it  will  merely  mean  an  additional 
sup[>ort  for  the  Samoan  Company."  Bamberger  called  upon 
von  Kusserow  to  explain  the  situation  if  he  could.  A  per- 
sonal quarrel  arose  and  a  duel  became  imminent,  but  the 
principals  settled  the  matter  without  recourse  to  such  violent 
means.' 

In  the  second  place,  the  Radical-Clerical  Opposition  used 
"  obstruction  tactics  "  and  carried  them  likewise  to  great  ex- 
tremes. It  prevented  the  second  reading  of  the  Steamship 
Subsidy  Bill  on  June  14,  1884.  and  had  the  bill  referred  to 
the  Budget  Commission.  Whereupon  Windthorst,  the  chair- 
man, on  June  23,  postponed  the  next  sitting  of  the  Budget 
Commission  to  June  27.  The  postponement  precluded  any 
further  di.scussion  of  the  bill,  since  the  Reichstag  session 

^  EV)sdiinger,  "  Der  Konflict  Kusserow- Bamberger,"  Zeitschrift  fiir 
KoloniaipoHtik,  etc.,  May.  1908,  p.  363. 


177]     ^^'T^ONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      ijy 

terminated  on  June  28,  and  thus  afforded  an  opportunitv  ti> 
the  hostile  forces  to  strengthen  themselves  for  the  combat  at 
the  next  session  of  the  Reichstag  in  the  autumn.  The  new 
Reichstag,  elected  on  October  28,  1884,  exhibited  little  ap- 
preciable change  in  the  balance  of  the  parties;  although 
whatever  variation  did  occur  was  favorable  to  the  Govern- 
ment in  relation  to  the  colonial  issue. 

Comerv.       D.  Conterv.       Centre       Nat.  Libs.     Dent.  Freiiinnige     Soctslitt 

1881 50  28  99  45  114  12 

1884 78  30  100  50  74  24 1 

The  figures  show  that  the  Radicals  suffered  a  heavy  loss, 
in  spite  of  the  one  hundred  i^er  cent  gain  of  the  Socialists. 
The  election  gave  Bismarck  two  more  colonialists  as  sup- 
porters, one  of  whom  was  Woermann,  the  powerful  National 
Liberal  merchant.  The  Centre,  however,  maintained  its 
■commanding  position  and  hence  the  political  situation  re- 
mained unchanged.  When  the  new^  Reichstag  met.  there- 
fore, its  disposition,  as  determined  by  the  same  Clerical- 
Radical  majority,  was  for  w^ar  against  the  Chancellor.  Bis- 
marck was  further  handicapped  by  the  necessity  of  pre- 
senting a  huge  budget  which  showed  a  large  deficit  and 
-which  naturally  provided  the  Opposition  with  a  weapon 
against  him.  Again  the  Radical-Clericals  succeeded,  upon 
the  first  reading  of  the  new  Subsidy  Bill,  in  having  it  re- 
ferred to  the  Budget  Commission.  The  Commission  con- 
sisted of  six  Centrists,  four  Freisinnige.  two  Socialists,  three 
National  Liberals,  four  Conservatives,  and  two  Dcutsch 
Conservatives,  a  .majority  of  twelve  to  nine  against  the  bill, 
which  meant  its  certain  death.  ^  Moreover,  the  opponents 
decided  upon  a  general  obstruction  policy  further  to  em- 
barrass the  Chancellor.     They  blocked  every  measure  pro- 

^  Rehm,  Deutschhnds  PoUtische  Partcieu   (Jena,  1912),  p.  85. 
'  Europdische  Geschichtskalendar,  1884.  p.  130. 


178      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [178 

posed  by  him  and  created,  in  the  autumn  of  1884,  an  abso- 
kite  parhamentary  deadlock. 

Such  was  the  character  of  the  Opposition  which  Bismarck 
had  to  face :  the  doctrinaire  Liberal-Radicals,  plus  all  cautious 
citizens  who'  traditionally  opposed  expense,  risk  and  any  de- 
parture from  the  beaten  path,  and  the  far  more  dangerous 
parliamentary  and  partisan  enemies  represented  by  the 
Clerical-Radical  majority,  supplemented  by  discontented  and 
dissident  nationalist  groups  who  were  traditional  foes  of  the 
Chancellor.  Indeed,  the  situation  presented  a  splendid  op- 
portunity for  the  Chancellor  to  display  his  best  powers ;  and 
he  rose  to  the  occasion  with  his  characteristic  cleverness. 

We  can  distinguish  three  definite  stratagems  in  Bismarck's 
campaign,  diligently  and  untiringly  waged  against  the  parlia- 
mientary  Opposition,  from  April,  1884,  to  March,  1885.  In 
the  first  place,  the  Chancellor  and  the  colonial  party  pro- 
ceeded with  startling  rapidity  to  execute  plans  of  colonial 
settlement.  They  wished  to  be  able  to  point  to  a  colonial 
empire  already  in  the  making.  On  May  19.  1884,  Bismarck 
sent  official  orders  to  Dr.  Nachtigal,  whom  he  had  already 
appointed  Consul  to  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  (April  17, 
1884),  to  place  certain  districts  under  imperial  protection, 
namely,  Angra-Pequena  with  an  extension  of  its  original 
boundaries,  the  strip  between  the  Niger  Delta  and  Gabun,  es- 
pecially that  part  opposite  the  Island  of  Fernando  Po  in 
Biafra  Bay,  and  Little  Popo  in  Togoland.^  Dr.  Nachtigal 
obeyed  the  orders  wnth  the  utmost  speed  and  Bismarck  an- 
nounced on  October  13,  1884,  that  the  districts  named  were 
under  German  protection.-  On  October  i,  the  Chancellor 
appointed  Dr.  Rohlfs,  Consul  for  East  Africa,  and  extended 
imperial  protection,  on  February  7,  1885,  to  all  lands  ac- 
quired by  the  Society  for  German  Colonization.^     The  Gov- 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  24. 

^ Ibid.,  pp.  36-37.  'Ibid.,  pp.  163-165. 


179]     ^^TIONAL  INAUGURATION  OP  COLONIALISM      ijg 

ernment  alsoi  made  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  secure  through 
diplomacy  the  Island  of  Fernando'  Po  from  Spain.  In  the 
South  Seas,  activity  was  even  more  strenuous.  On  May  13, 
a  German  Consortiiun,  founded  in  Hamburg,  bought  the 
shares  of  the  Samoa  Handels  und  Plantagcn  Gcscllschafi, 
until  then  in  English  possession,  and  established  an  Overseas 
Bank.^  On  August  20,  the  Chancellor  notified  Bleichroder 
and  von  Hansemann  tliat  all  their  settlements  would  be  placed 
under  the  samie  imperial  protection  3.3  that  affoided  South- 
west Africa,  as  soon  as  they  should  be  freed  from  the  claims 
of  other  powers."  And  on  December  23,  1884,  Bismarck 
notified  the  Powers  that  German  imperial  protection  had  been 
extended  to  settlements  on  the  North  Coast  of  the  New 
Britain  archipelago.^  Thus  the  nucleus  of  a  very  respectable 
colonial  empire  was  acquired  in  an  astonishingly  brief  space 
of  timie.  The  actual  existence  of  such  an  embryonic  over- 
seas Germany  proved  a  potent  weapon  in  the  Chancellor's 
hand  when  it  came  tO'  his  final  struggle  with  his  refractory, 
obstructionist  Reichstag. 

The  vigorous  prosecution  of  overseas  expansion  required 
some  explanation  from  the  Government.  In  fact  the  Op- 
position vehemently  demanded  such  a  statement  of  purpose 
and  plan  at  the  very  outset.  The  manner  in  which  Bismarck 
responded  to  the  demand  constitutes  his  second  stratagem  in 
defeating  the  parliamentary  Opposition.  He  diplomatically 
presented  his  program  bit  by  bit.  He  gradually  evolved  it 
throughout  the  year  and  he  did  not  attempt  to  force  thr(->ugh 
an  inflexible,  determined  policy,  which  would  have  afforded 
opportunity  for  greater  resistance  and  would  have  jeopard- 
ized his  entire  plan.     The  Chancellor  anticipated  that  he 

^  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  jy.  ■ 

» I  hid.,  p.  80. 
» Ihid.,  p.  81. 


l8o      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i8o 

would  be  called  upon  to  define  and  delimit  the  new  colonial 
policy  as  soon  as  it  was  launched  and  consequently  he  gave 
the  .matter  careful  attention.  He  instructed  von  Kiisserow 
to  draw  up  a  program  for  colonization,  and  that  official  duly 
presented  one  to  the  Chancellor  O'n  April  8,  1884.  Von 
Kusserow's  plan  provided  for  the  extension  of  the  same 
governmental  protection  to  the  commercial  colonialists  as 
was  implied  by  the  Royal  Charters  of  England,  but  not  for 
the  acquisition  of  territory  directly  by  the  state.  It  left  all 
responsibility  to  the  merchants  and  involved  for  the  empire 
"  no  expense  except  for  warships  and  consuls."  ^  On  April 
28,  1884,  Bismarck  elaborated  von  Kusserow's  scheme  at 
a  meeting  of  merchants  attended  by  von  Kiisserow,  Woer- 
mann,  Dyes  of  Bremen,  and  Luderitz.  The  Chancellor 
summed  up  his  opinion  as  follows :  "  The  German  Empire 
cannot  carry  on  a  system  of  colonization  like  France's.  It 
cannot  send  out  warships  to  conquer  overseas  lands,  that  is. 
it  will  not  take  the  initiative;  but  it  will  protect  the  German 
merchant  even  in  the  land  zvhich  he  acquires.  Germany 
will  do  what  England  has  always  done,  establish  Chartered 
Companies,  so  thai  the  responsibility  entirely  rests  ivith 
them."  - 

The  definition  and  limitation  of  Germany's  new  policy 
laid  down  by  the  Chancellor,  in  close  cooperation  with  the 
commercial  colonialists,  first  found  public  expression  when 
the  Chaticellor  expounded  it  in  the  Budget  Commission  on 
Tune  23,  1884.^  And  on  June  26,  in  the  Reichstag,  Bismarck 
skilfully  met  the  objections  of  Richter  that  a  colonial  policy 
would  involve  expense  and  naval  power  and  would  precipitate 
wars,  by  falling  back  upon  his  apparently  cautious  and  un- 

'  Zimmermann,  op.  cit.,  p.  64. 

'  Herrfurth,  "  Bismarck  als  Kolonialpolitiker,"  Zeitschrift  fur  Kolo- 
nialpolitik  etc.,  1909,  p.  "jT)^. 

^  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  42. 


l8l]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      jgi 

ambitions  program  which  repudiated  all  conscious  creation 
of  colonies :  "  I  would  follow  the  example  of  England  in 
granting  to  these  merchants  something  like  Royal  Charters. 
...  I  do  not  wish  to  found  provinces,  but  to  protect  com- 
mercial establishments  in  their  own  development.  .  .  .  We 
hope  that  the  tree  will  flourish  in  proportion  to  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  gardener,  but  if  it  does  not,  the  whole  respon- 
sibility rests  with  him  and  "not  with  the  empire,  which  will 
lose  nothing."  ^ 

The  Chancellor  made  his  task  of  dealing  with  the  Oppo.-i-  ^  / 
tion  much  easier  by  adopting  a  limited  colonial  program  at 
the  very  outset,  raither  than  by  insisting  upon  the  immedi- 
ate imperial  annexation  of  territory.  Very  likely  also,  at 
this  stage,  Bismarck  was  convinced  of  the  unwisdom,  from 
an  international  viewpoint,  of  embarking  at  once  upon  any 
vigorous  policy.  There  are  many  indications,  however,  that 
as  the  struggle  progressed,  and  as  he  grew  more  and  more 
confident  of  ultimate  success  in  winning  national  support,  he 
expanded  his  first  unpretentious  and  unassuming  plan.  Early 
in  1885,  we  find  him  noi  longer  talking  merely  about  the 
empire's  duty  to-  protect  commercial  settlements,  with  all 
responsibility  relegated  to  merchants,  but  about  the  value  of 
colonies  for  their  own  sake.  Indeed,  he  began  to  stress  their 
economic  aspect  and  he  prophesied  the  greatest  national 
benefit  therefrom.  He  thought  that  Germany  should  ht 
made  economically  independent.  "  Colonies  would  mean  the 
winning  of  new  markets  for  German  industry,  the  expansion 
of  trade,  and  a  new  field  for  German  activity,  civilization 
and  capital." "  he  said,  and  also.  "  Consider  what  it  would 
mean  if  part  of  the  cotton  and  the  coffee  which  we  must 

^  Hahn-Wippeimann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  24. 

'  Verhandlungen  des  Dentschen  Rcichstages,  March  16.  1885,  p.  1864. 
Vide,  also,  ibid.,  January  10,  1885,  p.  524,  and  June  26.  1884.  p.  1073. 


l82      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [182 

import  could  be  grown  on  German  territory  overseas. 
Would  that  not  bring  an  increase  of  natio'ual  wealth?  "  ^ 

To  sum  up,  Bismarck  never  set  forth  a  complete  and 
exact  colonial  program  but  administered  it  in  homeopathic 
doses.  As  he  himself  remarked,  "  We  have  not  evolved  a 
fully  developed  colonial  system,  which  like  Minerva  sprang 
from  the  head  of  Jove  and  appeared  full  grown  at  once,  but 
we  have  allowed  it  to  develop  and  shape  itself."  The  Chan- 
cellor preferred  to  present  a  flexible  program  which,  on  the 
one  hand,  would  be  vague  and  elastic  enough  to  escape  the 
explicit  criticism  of  the  Oppo'sition,  and.  on  the  other,  would 
be  susceptible  to  change  and  addition  as  opportunity  offered. 
As  Fabri  expressed  it,  "  Bismarck  limited  his  program  of 
colonial  podicy  to  individual  experiments  withjut  any  initia- 
tive on  the  part  of  the  government.  This  quieted  suspicion 
and  criticism  and  the  responsibility  appeared  much  less."  ^ 

Nevertheless,  despite  the  rapidity  of  achievement  in  actu- 
ally establishing  a  colonial  empire  and  the  dexterity  with 
w'hich  he  introduced  a  colonial  program,  Bismarck  found 
himself  well  nigh  hopelessly  blocked  by  the  Parliamientary 
Opposition.  One  more  way  oif  overcoming  his  enemies  re- 
mained— that  of  inciting  a  national  patriotic  enthusiasm  for 
colonies,  an  enthusiasm  great  enough  to  submerge  their  ob- 
jections :  and  to  this  never  failing  stratagem  the  Chancellor 
finally  had  recourse.  He  was,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a 
consummate  master  in  swaying  popular  sentiment  and  he 
no'W  put  forth  his  best  efiforts.  His  plan  was  to  stir  up 
German  ire  against  England  for  her  attempts  to  block  Ger- 
p.iany  in  the  colonial  field.  Thus  he  would  win  to  his  side 
and  to  the  side  of   German   colonization   all  his  patriotic 

'  V erhandlnngen  des  Deutschen  Rcichstages,  March  13,  1885,  pp.  1800 
et  seq. 

'Fabri,  Fimf  Jahre  Dcutscher  Kolonialpolitik  (Gotha,  1889),  p.  15. 


183]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      183 

countryimien,  while  he  would  be  able  to  brand  the  Opposition 
as  unpatriotic  and  pro-British.  Moreover,  so  great  was  the 
pressing  need  of  winning  popular  support  against  the  Reich- 
stag that  he  no  longer  felt  the  necessity  of  following  that 
path  of  impeccable  scrupulousness  which  he  had  hitherto  pur- 
sued in  his  dealings  with  England.  He  would  stoop  to 
sharp  practices  to  gain  his  ends.  He  attempted  both  to  ex- 
clude Great  Britain  from  various  colonial  areas,  and.  at  the 
same  time,  to  delude  his  own  nation  with  the  idea  that  Great 
Britain  was  monopolistically  crowding  Germany  out  of  those 
very  districts. 

The  Chancellor  began  his  campaign  by  reciting  in  the 
Budget  Commission,  on  June  23,  1884,  the  whole  story  of 
England's  shabby  treatment  of  Germany  in  the  Angra 
Pequena  affair ;  he  pointed  out  that  England  had  never  re- 
plied to  his  note  of  December,  1883,  and  had  only  just  re- 
cognized on  the  previous  day  (June  22)  Germany's  claims 
in  Southwest  Africa.^  The  recital  was  an  attempt  to  arouse 
sympathy  for  his  policy  from  the  Opposition,  but  it  failed 
completely.  The  Chancellor,  enraged  by  the  stubborn  parti- 
san animosity  of  his  opponents,  openly  declared  war.  "  I 
am  diplomat  enough  tO'  understand  this  policy  of  obstruction 
and  I  do  not  say  '  Good-bye '  to  the  Subsidy  Bill,  but  only 
'Auf  Wiedersehn  '.-...  The  administration  will  employ 
the  inter\'al  before  the  next  session  in  securing  the  approval 
of  the  new  Reichstag  for  the  bill."  ^ 

In  executing  his  threat  Bismarck  strained  every  nerve  to 
influence  public  opinion,  and  left  no  stone  unturned  in  order 
to  outstrip  England  in  the  coloial  game,  as  well  as  to  stir  up 
feeling  against  her  in  Germany.     In  fact,  he  anticipated  this 

1  Cf.  supra,  p.  168,  note  2. 

*  Verhandlungen  dcs  Deutschen  Rcichstages,  June  26,  1884,  p,  106.2. 
'  Poschinger,  Bismarck  a!s  Volkswirt,  vol.  ii.  p.  1S8,  letter  to  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  at  Freiburg, 


1 84      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [184 

policy  in  April  when  he  sent  forth  Dr.  Nachtigal  with  in- 
structions to  place  under  imperial  protection  the  territory  in 
West  Africa.  At  the  same  time  he  notified  England  that, 
*'  Nachtigal  goes  to  Africa  merely  to  verify  information 
about  the  state  of  German  commerce  in  that  region."  ^  al- 
though the  Kolnische  Zeitung  made  no  secret  of  announcing 
his  purpose  of  annexation,  confirmed  later  by  the  German 
protectorate  which  was  formally  established  in  West  Africa 
in  July.  Again,  as  if  to  secure  allies  for  Germany  at  Ca^^e 
Colony,  the  Chancellor  arranged  a  Convention  between  Ger- 
many and  the  Transvaal.  He  also  received  delegates  from 
the  Transvaal  at  Berlin  on  July  8,  1884,  gave  them  a  special 
audience  with  the  Emperor  and  feted  and  petted  them  so  as  to 
imbue  them  with  a  preference  for  German  Kultiir  and  a  fear 
of  Great  Britain's  monopolistic  designs."  Likewise  in  the 
South  Seas,  Bismarck,  on  the  one  hand,  openly  sought  and 
gained  the  cooperation  of  England  in  securing  a  joint  com- 
mission to  settle  the  extension  of  either  nation's  claim's  in 
New  Guinea,^  while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  secretly  promised 
imperial  protection  to  lands  acquired  by  the  New  Guinea 
Company  and  even,  on  August  19,  suggesited  the  raising  of 
the  German  flag  over  areas  in  New  Britain  and  New  Guinea.* 
In  reply,  England,  urged  on  by  the  incessant  demands  of 
her  Australian  colonies,  who  were  always  in  terror  of  Ger- 
man expansion,  annexed  New  Guinea  on  September  19,  with 
the  exception  of  a  part  of  the  North  Coast.  Bismarck's 
protest  that  England's  act  was  contrary  to  the  agreement, 
forced  Lord  Granville,  on  October  2,  to  limit  the  English 
annexation  to  the  South  Coast,  "  if  all  other  claims  are  left 

'  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  24. 
"^Annual  Register,  1884,  p.  299. 
'  Haihn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  80,  81. 
*Ihid.,  p.  80. 


185]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      185 

to  negotiation."  Bismarck  interpreting  this  stipulation  to 
read,  "  Germany  could  make  acquisitions  but  England  was 
debarred  therefrom,"  proceeded  to  appropriate  officially  the 
North  Coast  of  New  Guinea  and  the  islands  in  the  New 
Britain  archipelago. 

Furthermore,  the  Chancellor  directed  hii  foreign  policy 
with  the  purpose  of  arousing  national  animosity  against 
England :  he  isolated  her  in  her  Egyptian  schemes  by  drawing 
closer  and  closer  to  France.  He  had  already  forged  a  link 
with  France  by  their  rapprochement  on  the  Congo  question. 
The  despatch  which  he  prepared  on  May  5,  1884,  for  trans- 
mission to  England,  proves  that  his  policy  was  deliberate : 
he  stated  therein  that  England  cotdd  be  veiy  useful  in  help- 
ing Germany  in  her  new  colonial  policy,  in  return  for  which 
service,  Germany  would  support  England  in  Egypt;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  England's  help  should  prove  unsatisfactory 
or  insufficient,  he  would  approach  France.^  The  despatch, 
though  never  sent,  was  remarkable  as  showing  the  import- 
ance which  the  Chancellor  attached  to  his  colonial  policy. 
Bismarck  evidently  deemed  it  more  profitable,  in  view  of 
England's  unfavorable  attitude  in  Africa,  to  associate  him- 
self with  France  and  to  use  England  as  a  red  rag  to  incite 
German  public  opinion  in  favor  of  colonies.  In  pursuance 
of  this  policy,  therefore,  he  pushed  the  plans  for  the  calling 
of  an  International  Congress ;  and  many  notes  on  the  subject 
passed  between  Germany  and  France  indicating  an  har- 
monious understanding  between  them.  Fhially.  on  October 
2,  1884,  France  notified  Germany  of  her  complete  agreement 
with  the  latter's  arrangements  and  the  German  Government 
issued  the  invitations  for  the  Congo  Congress,  on  October 
6,  1884. 

When  the  new  Reichstag  opened  in  November.  1884. 
Bismarck  apparently  felt  ven,-  confident  of  the  success  of 

^  Hahn-Wippermann,  ol>.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  88. 


l86      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i86 

his  summer's  efforts  in  shaping  public  opinion ;  he  amended 
the  Steamship  Subsidy  Bill  by  adding  another  line  to  Africa, 
which  would  raise  the  annual  state  subsidy  from  4,000,000 
M.  to  5,400,000  M.,  and  he  publicly  indicted  the  Clerical- 
Radical  majority  for  hindering  national  progress. 

The  Opposition,  all  along,  had  placed  themselves  in  that 
extrem'ely  disadvantageous  position  where  they  could  be  as- 
sailed as  unpatriotic.  Bismarck  had  branded  them  as 
cowards  in  June,  when  they  had  argued  that  a  colonial  policy 
would  precipitate  a  war  with  the  Great  Powers.  Referring 
to  Bamberger's  speech,  at  that  time.  Bismarck  had  said, 
"  His  entire  argument  bore  the  stamp  of  submission  if  not 
of  cowardice  towards  Europe,  and  the  words  of  the  Chan- 
cellor in  1866  '  that  fear  found  no  echo  in  Germlan  hearts  '. 
would  no  longer  find  any  response  in  these  political 
factions."  ^ 

Bismarck  did  not  spare  the  factions  in  any  way  but  strove 
to  arouse  the  indignation  of  the  whole  nation  against  them 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  trying  toi  overthrow  the  Gov- 
ernment and  to  control  foreign  policy  contrary  to  the  inter- 
ests of  national  honor.  He  said  in  November,  1884:  "  You 
say  you  will  not  be  coerced  by  the  Bundesrat.  I  say  that  I 
will  not  be  coerced  by  a  Reichstag  majority.  Indeed  I  have 
never  allowed  myself  to  be  coerced  even  by  Europe.  You 
are  not  the  first  who  have  tried  it.  .  .  .  Your  parties  are 
fighting  for  control  in  state  and  empire.  We  are  in  control 
of  the  Government  for  our  Kaiser  and  you  are  attempting 
to  overthrow  us.  .  .  .  You  do  not  oppose  these  bills  because 
you  disapprove  of  them,  but  because  the  Government  is  not 
in  your  hands.  It  will  then  be  a  battle  for  supremacy,  one 
fighting  for  the  Kaiser,  another  for  ecclesiastical  control,  and 
another  for  himself." 

^  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  June  26,  1884. 
'  Verhandlungen  des  Deut.  Reichstages,  Nov.  26,  pp.  32  et  seq. 


187]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      jgy 

Naturally,  the  effect  of  this  attack  upon  the  Opposition 
was  to  aggravate  their  antagonism  towards  Bismarck.  They 
decided  to  pay  him  back  in  his  own  coin.  Hence  they  not 
only  blocked  the  Subsidy  Bill,  but  cut  down  the  proposed 
appropriation  for  the  exploration  of  Africa  from  150.000  M. 
to  50,000  M.  Their  hostility  was  thorough -going  and 
petty.  They  opposed  the  smallest  measure  favored  by  the 
Government ;  they  rejected  even  an  appropriation  of  2700  M. 
for  extra  clerks  in  the  Chancellor's  office,  and  one  of  20,000 
M.  for  a  second  Director  in  the  Foreign  Office ;  and  they 
defeated  any  increase  of  the  consulate  in  Africa.^  They 
made  a  fatal  mistake,  however,  in  carrying  obstruction  so 
far.  In  their  contemptuous  treatment  of  Bismarck,  they 
gained  for  hinii  the  sympathy  and  support  of  an  undoubted 
majority  of  the  German  people.  Expressions  of  confidence 
began  to  pour  in  upon  the  Chancellor  from  all  parts  of  the 
empire,  accompanied  by  offers  of  personal  subscriptions  to 
the  amount  required  to  finance  a  second  Director  in  the 
Foreign  Office. 

The  Chancellor  now  realized  as  never  before  the  force  of 
public  opinion  which  could  transcend  the  Reichstag,  and  he 
resolved  to  rally  every  factor  of  it  which  he  could  muster  to 
defeat  his  intolerable  political  opponents  and  force  through 
his  colonial  policy.  He  perceived  that  he  could  count  on  the 
righteous  indignation  of  those  who,  whatever  opinions  they 
might  entertain  on  the  value  of  a  colonial  ix)licy,  were  unani- 
mous in  condemning  the  petty,  irritating  attacks  against  the 
"  Founder  of  the  Empire."  Happily  for  Bismarck,  coin- 
cident with  the  parliamentary  deadlock,  came  the  news,  on 
December  2t,.  that  the  German  flag  waved  over  parts  of  New 
Ireland,  New  Britain,  and  New  Guinea.  Moreover,  the 
Congo  Congress  had  commenced  its  sessions  in  Berlin  on 
Novemiber  15.  at  Bismarck's  invitation  and  under  his  guid- 

'  Eiiropdischer  Geschichtskalender,  1884,  pp.  135.  136. 


1 88      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [i88 

ance,  to  discuss  questions  of  international  colonial  policy, 
which,  by  implication  at  any  rate,  aligned  Germany  with  the 
great  national,  colonizing  Powers.  Could  the  "  Honor  of 
the  Fatherland  "  afford  to  permit  its  own  and  its  Chancellor's 
prestige  to  be  tarnished  or  the  external  influence  of  Germany 
to  be  jeopardized  by  the  disgraceful  repudiation  of  the 
national  colonial  policy  in  the  Reichstag?  No,  the  empire 
was  entertaining  prominent  guests ;  it  must  discipline  its  re- 
fractory children  into  a  semblance  of  family  unity. 

Fully  appreciating  the  significance  of  all  the  elements  in 
the  situation  which  he  had  himself  created  Bismarck  pro- 
ceeded openly  and  directly  to  apply  the  torch  of  patriotic 
fire — anti-English  sentiment.  The  ChancelloT  initiated  an 
entirely  new  and  unwonted  policy  for  Germany;  he  pub- 
lished a  series  of  White  Books,  all  of  which  attempted  to 
show  the  unjust  treatment  sustained  by  Germlany  at  the 
hands  of  England.  The  first  three  books  appeared  during 
the  height  of  the  parliamentary  crisis,  on  December  4,  12 
and  13,  and  dealt  respectively  with  the  Congo^  District  and 
Biafra  Bay,  Angra-Pequena  and  Samoa.  To  the  German 
people,  they  not  only  showed  the  stupendous  difficulties  which 
Bismarck  had  encountered  in  his  dealings  with  England, 
but  also  proved  that  England  had  been  obliged  to  retreat 
before  his  superior  diplomacy.^ 

To  supplement  the  effect  of  the  White  Books,  events 
played  into  the  Chancellor's  hands  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1885.  The  news  then  reached  Germlany  that  the  first 
German  blood  had  been  shed  for  the  cause  of  colonial  rights, 
that  disturbances  had  broken  out  between  the  natives  and 
the  Germans  in  Kamerun,  and  that  King  Old  Bell  Town 
and  Hickory  Town  had  been  JDurnt  on  December  20.^     The 

1  Weissbuch,  1885,  pts.  i,  ii,  iii. 

^  Europdischer  Geschichtskalender,  1884,  p.  438. 


189]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      189 

Chancellor  immediately  seized  the  opportunity  to  accuse  the 
EngHsh  of  inciting  the  natives  against  Germany,  as  a  means 
of  dislodging  her  from  Kameroon.  He  produced  not  a 
particle  of  real  proof  to  support  his  accusations.  However, 
he  presented  as  evidence  a  report  which  he  claimed  to  have 
received  on  November  24,  1884,  from  the  Hamburg  Syndi- 
cate, complaining  of  the  actions  of  representatives  of  the 
English  firm  of  J.  Holt  and  Company,  and  of  Buchanan, 
the  British  Vice  Consul,  in  stirring  up  the  war.^  Bismarck- 
further  supported  the  illusion  of  England's  aggression  b}' 
sending  a  note  to  England  demanding  Buchanan's  dis- 
missal "  and  by  reviving  the  quarrel  with  England  over  the 
New  Guinea  question,  since  after  Germany's  annexations, 
announced  on  December  23,  1884,  England  had  resumed  her 
liberty  of  action  and  annexed  what  was  left  of  New  Guinea.* 
Furthermore,  the  Chancellor  personally  attacked  Malet.  the 
English  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  for  England's  colonial  greedi- 
ness. Perhaps  the  report  of  their  conversation  will  illumin- 
ate the  situation  and  prove  Bismarck's  pre-deterinhied  plan 
to  quarrel  with  England  and  thus  to  arouse  national  ill-will 
against  her.  In  the  report,  Malet  told  how  the  Chancellor 
had  accused  England  of  unparalleled  egotism  in  claiming  all 
the  territory  in  Africa  which  other  powers  had  not  appro- 
priated, and  how  he  had  administered  a  severe  rebuke,  say- 
ing that  he  had  the  feeling  that  England  was  not  treating 
Germany  as  an  equal.  He  was  so  vehement  in  his  charges 
that  Malet  begged  him  to  state  definitely  what  he  wanted. 
-  Malet  said :  "  Was  it  parts  of  New  Guinea  which  we  had 
annexed?  Was  it  Zululand?  I  thought  that  a  knowledge 
of  his  wishes,  whatever  they  might  be,  would  be  better  than 

^  Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen  RcicU^tages.  Jan.   10.    1S85,   pp.   5-:5 
et  seq. 
*  Hahn-Wippermann.  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  29. 
nbid.,  pp.  86-87. 


igo      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [jgo 

onr  acting  in  the  dark  and  consequently  colliding  with  each 
other.  Bisimlarck  replied,  however,  that  his  understanding 
with  France  placed  it  beyond  his  power  to  come  to  any  such 
understanding  with  England,  so  long  as  England  had  re- 
jected his  offer  of.  cooperation  of  May  5,  1884."  ^ 

The  despatch  of  May  5,  1884,  containing  the  offer  of  co- 
operation, had,  as  we  have  already  learned,  never  been  sent 
to  England;  it  had  been  countermanded  by  Bismarck  him- 
self. As  Gladstone  said  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March 
12,  1885  :  **  I  regret  that  the  Chancellor  Bismarck's  despatch 
of  May  5.  1884,  was  never  sent.  ...  If  the  despatch  had 
been  comimtunicated  to  this  country,  it  would  have  attracted 
all  the  attention  and  have  received  all  the  friendly  consider- 
ation which  it  would  well  have  deserved."  " 

Indeed,  Bismarck  lost  all  restraint  in  his  quarrel  with 
England.  He  published  two  more  White  Books,  one  on  the 
South  Seas,  February  6,  1885,  and  one  on  Fiji.  January  19, 
1885;^  h^  attacked  England  in  both  the  Bundesrat  and  the 
Reichstag,  and  he  employed  every  means  to  discredit  her 
colonial  designs  and  to  justify  those  of  Germany.  He  was 
later  forced  to  modify  his  position  somewhat,  because  his 
attacks  reacted  against  hiimL  The  Opposition  cited  his  quar- 
rel with  England  as  an  illustration  of  their  major  objection 
that  a  colonial  policy  would  lead  inevitably  to  friction  with 
neighbor  nations  and  surround  Germany  with  enemies.  He 
then  attempted  cleverly  to  shift  the  responsibility  foe  Ger- 
many's ill  treatment  from  the  English  Government  to  her 
agents  and  (mierchants;  and  he  asserted,  all  the  while  that 
he  was  condemning  her,  that  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
were  on  the  best  of  terms.     "  The  colonial  net  of  England 

1  Hahn-Wippermann,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  89.    Cf'.,  also,  supra,  p.  185. 

*  Hansard,  vol.  ccxcv,  March  12,  1885,  p.  978. 

3  Eiirop'discher  Geschichtskalender,  January  19,  February  6,  1885. 


.♦■i 


jgi]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      ujl 

is  SO  all-embracing  that  it  is  well  nigh  impossible  for  her  to 
supervise  the  actions  of  all  her  agents."  ^  .  .  .  "  We  are  not 
surrounded  by  enemies.  We  are  on  good  terms  with  Great 
Britain.  But  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  when  her 
cousins,  the  land  rats,  take  to  the  water,  she  is  surprised,  as 
she  believes  that  '  Britannia  Rules  the  Waves.'  "  " 

The  Chancellor  repeated  to  the  National  Assembly  Glad- 
stone's remark,  '*  If  Germany  becomes  a  colonial  power,  I 
wish  her  God-speed,"  and  then  he  commented.  "  Has  Glad- 
stone more  love  and  understanding  of  the  German  nation 
than  Windthorst  ?  "  ^ 

Bismarck's  campaign  of  inciting  German  resentment 
against  England  could  not  fail  tO'  bear  results.  England, 
finally  aroused  to  Germany's  real  purposes  and  colonial  plans, 
began  to  checkmate  her  in  every  direction  and  to  frustrate  all 
of  her  designs.  Her  actions  succeeded  in  imparting  a  reality 
to  the  illusion  of  rivalry  and  competition  so  carefully  created 
by  the  Chancellor.  Indeed,  after  January  lo.  1885,  the  tide 
of  opposition  in  Germany  began  tO'  turn.  The  elements  of 
hostility  to  the  Chancellor  were  forced  to  bend  before  the 
pressure  oi  a  popular  indignation,  raised  to  white  heat  by 
the  patriotic  fervor  w'hich  swept  the  country.  On  January 
10,  the  parliamentary  Opposition  began  to  weaken:  it  con- 
sented to  an  appropriation  of  150,000  M.  for  ships  to  be 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Governor  of  Kamerun :  on 
January  23,  it  voted  for  the  proposed  sum  for  African  ex- 
ploration and  on  March  2,  appropriated  150.000  M.  for  the 
extension  of  the  consular  service  in  the  overseas  territory.* 
All  parties  except  the  Poles  and  the  Democrats  supported 

^  Verhandluugeii  dcs  Deutschen  Rcichstagcs,  Jan.  10,  1885,  p.  525. 

*  Ihid.,  pp.  532  et  seq. 

» Ibid.,  March  14,  18S5,  P-  1825. 

*  Europaischer  Geschichtskalender,  January  10,  23,  March  2.  1885. 


192      ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM     [192 

the  Chancellor.  Even  the  speakers  of  the  Centre  assured 
Bismarck  that  the  majority  of  the  Reichstag  would  never  be 
found  wanting  when  it  was  a  question  of  defending  the 
honor  and  prestige  of  the  empire,  and  that  the  Catholic  party 
would  find  it  possible  to  agree  thoroughly  with  the  Chan- 
cellor's colonial  plans  if  they  provided  for  a  well  balanced 
and  not  a  merely  coimmercial  colonial  policy.  These  vic- 
tories were  interpreted  as  signs  that  a  large  majority  of  the 
people  were  in  favor  of  colonizatioin  and  all  opposition  was 
gradually  withdrawn.  On  March  13,  1885,  Bismarck  made 
his  famous  patriotic  speech  wherein  he  stated  that  a  new  spirit 
was  now  actuating  the  German  people,  that  he  had  at  last 
found  the  "  popular  support ','  which  he  had  demanded  nine 
years  before  as  indispensable  to  the  execution  of  any  colonial 
policy.^ 

Finally,  on  March  23,  1885,  the  Steamship  Subsidy  Bill 
passed  the  Reichstag  with  a  large  imajority.  A  part  of  the 
Deiitsch-Freisinnige  and  the  Centre,  the  Social  Democrats 
and  the  Poles  alone  voted  against  it.  Bismarck  could  well 
indulge  on  April  i,  1885,  in  a  glorious  celebration  of  his 
seventieth  birthday  and  of  the  twentieth  anniversary  of  his 
chancellorship.  He  received,  as  an  added  token  of  confid- 
ence, a  gift  of  more  than  2,000,000  M.  from  his  devoted 
countrymen. 

National  inauguration  of  colonialism  had  been  a  difficult 
struggle.  At  last,  the  colonial  party  and  the  Government 
had  triumphed.  Concentration  upon  the  passage  of  the 
Steamship  Subsidy  Bill  had  overthrown  the  Opposition ; 
while  the  vigorous  construction  of  a  small  colonial  empire, 
the  close  cooperation  of  administration  and  merchants  and 
the  skillful  promulgation  of  a  colonial  program  had  all  united 
to  achieve  national  ratification  of  state-directed  colonialism. 

*  V erhandlungen  des  Deutschen  Reichstages,  March  13,  1885,  p.  1801. 


193]     NATIONAL  INAUGURATION  OF  COLONIALISM      193 

Above  everything  else,  in  its  ultimate  effect,  had  been  the 
fire  of  chauvinistic  patriotism),  so  carefully  prepared,  lighted 
and  kept  alive  by  Bismarck;  it  had  reduced  the  Opposition 
to  silence  or  consent  and  had  completely  destroyed  the  last 
obstacles  to  the  adoption  of  a  national  colonial  policy. 


CONCLUSION 

Our  research  has  revealed  the  two  dominating  influences 
responsible  for  modern  Gennan  colonialism— the  economic 
class  in  Germany,  and  Bismarck. 

Throughout  the  entire  period,  merchants  and  traders  both 
pushed  and  led  the  imiovement ;  business  interests  and  oppor- 
tunities rendered  circumstances  conducive  to  its  progress. 
The  Hanse  merchants  first  began  commercial  colonialism; 
they  converted  colonial  theory  into  colonial  practice.     They 
alone  brought  sufficient  pressure  upon  the  Government  to 
secure  protection  for  overseas  enterprises  and  they  formed 
the  colonial  party,  whose  vanguard  first  proposed  a  national 
colonial  ix>licy  during  the  debates  over  the  Samoan  treaty. 
Economiic  appeals  and  arguments  were  most  potent  in  the 
mass  of  colonial  propaganda  which  appeared  in  1879.     Busi- 
ness men  acquired  such  power  over  the  Government  as  to  in- 
volve it  financially  in  colonial  enterprises  that  precipitated  the 
crisis  of  1880  and  the  subsequent  publicity  and  discussion  of 
the  entire  subject.     Business  men  were  the  leading  spirits  in 
the  formation  of  the  Kolonialverein  and  promoted,  above 
every  other  element,  the  struggle  from- 1881  to  1885.     More- 
over, economic  forces  created  the  crisis  in  the  business  world 
which  demanded  expansion  for  markets  and  capital;  eco- 
nomic forces  occasioned  the  huge  emigration ;  they  produced 
a  social  unrest  that  impelled   the  Chancellor  tO'  distract 
popular  attention  by  overseas  projects;  and  finally  they  in- 
fluenced Bismarck  to  turn  from  free-trade  to  protection  and 
decided  his  consequent  espousal  of  the  colonial  cause. 
194  [194 


195]  CONCLUSION  ip5 

As  for  Bismarck,  himself,  the  study  has  attempted  to 
contradict  the  prevailing  opinion  that  the  Chancellor  opposed 
cO'loniaJism  until  1883  and  that  he  was  then  reluctantly  forced 
into  it  by  the  efforts  of  the  merchant  class.  He  ^\^s,  on 
the  contrary,  in  hearty  if  cautious  sympathy  with  the  move- 
mient  from  the  year  1876;  and  he  grew  more  and  more  its 
advocate  through  the  reversal  of  his  economic  policy  from 
free-trade  to  protection.  His  attitude  Avas  wholly  consonant 
with  his  final  repudiation  of  liberalism  and  his  retuni  to 
conservatism  in  1879.  All  the  evidence,  as  we  read  it,  clearly 
proves  that  when  the  Chancellor  appeared  to  oppose  colonial- 
ism he  was  merely  applying  the  brakes  as  a  diplomatic 
stratagem',  that  he  was,  at  the  same  time,  feeding  fuel  to  the 
engine,  and  that  he  gave  his  whole-hearted,  if  secret,  support 
to  the  movement  from  1879  onwards.  Bismarck's  one 
over-niling  purpose  and  aim,  it  is  true,  was  to  establish  the 
hegemony  of  Germany  in  Europe;  but  instead  of  colonial- 
ism clashing  with  that  object,  as  it  has  been  the  custom'  to 
assert,  it  became  essentially  subordinated  to  it.  After  found- 
ing the  empire,  the  Chancellor  came  to  perceive  that  in  order 
to  secure  and  maintain  a  position  of  supremacy.  Germajiy 
too  must  enter  the  new  game  of  imperialistic  colonialism. 
Without  overseas  expansion,  Germany  could  not  hope  to 
compete  with  the  other  nations  or  attain  her  great  ideal. 

The  study  has  further  shown  that  the  circumstances  of  its 
origins  stamped  modem  Gernian  colonialism  with  its  salient 
characteristics.  Briefly,  they  were:  the  limitation  at  first  of 
all  colonial  activity  to  individual  initiative,  the  slow  growth 
of  administrative  effort  and  control,  not  completely  estab- 
lished until  the  year  1906,  the  enduring  connection  of  the 
colonial  question  with  political  and  partisan  opposition,  and, 
finally,  the  over-emphasis  upon  the  economic  motives  for 
colonization  which  contributed  to  the  excessive  influence  of 


196 


ORIGINS  OF  MODERN  GERMAN  COLONIALISM 


[196 


"  big  business  "  in  national  affairs  and  the  resulting  disas- 
trous economic  imperialism. 

The  first  chapter  of  imodern  Gennan  colonialism  closes 
with  the  year  1885.  It  leaves  colonial  policy  in  ccmtrol  of 
the  dominating  forces  of  its  origin,  the  economic  class  sup- 
ported by  the  Government^  It  thus  forms  a  logical  intro- 
duction to  tlie  second  chapter,  the  period  of  the  Commercial 
Companies,  to  whom  Bis'marck  intrusted  the  foundation  of 
the  Gennan  colonial  empire. 


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Leroy-Beaulieu,    P.,    De    la    colonisation    chez    les    peuples    niodernes. 
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20I  ]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  20I 

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Sosiale  Zeitfragen. 


il 


INDEX 


Africa,  East,  28,  32,  27,  38,  50,  171, 

178 
Africa,  South,  49,  50,  55 
Africa,  Southwest,  34,   I57.   165-6, 

169,  179.  183 
Africa,  West,  38-9,   150,   I59.   I7i. 

178,  184 
America,     25,     47-8,    see     United 

States 
America.  South,  13,  62,  137 
Angra    Pequena,    157-8,    165.    167, 

178,  183,  188 
Anglo-French     Convention,     156, 

164 
Anglo- Portuguese    Treaty,    164-5, 

169 
Apia,  48,  66,  74,  114,  158 
Augsburge     Allgemeine     Zeifung, 

127,    138,    162 
Australia,  48,  162 

Bamberger,  81,  105.  in.  112.  121- 
4,  132,  174  176 

Baring  Bros.,  114,  176 

Bismarck,  7,  17-8,  20,  47-9,  55,  57, 
62-3,  67,  74-5,  77-80,  lOI-III, 
1 15-6,  118,  120-1,  124,  128-9, 
131,  ^33,  151-7,  160-3,  165-70, 
172-75,  177-80,  182,  184-87,  189- 
92 

Brazil,  28,  42,  45,  49,  55 

Bremen,  37,  47,  107-8,  117,  121, 
127,  141,  159,  164,  180  See  Hanse 
Towns 

Brenner,  R.,  32,  50,  149 

Bucher,  L.,  19,  29.  63 

Billow,  von,  64,  72-3,  io5.  III,  112 

Briiggen,  von  der,  140 

'Cape  Colony,   166-7 

'Caroline  Islands,  41 

Catholic   Centre  Party.  (:6,    101-3, 

105,  109,  124-5,  177.  192 
Centralverein  fur  Handclsgcogra- 

phie   etc.,   51,    82,   90,    134.    137. 

173 

203] 


China,  46,  48,  55-6,  81 

iCoaling     stations,    67-8,     71,     seg 

naval  bases 
Cochin-China,  18,  40.  45,  47 
Colonial  Party,  76,  82,  99,  136,  148 
Congo  Congress,  165.  185,  187 
Congress  of  Berlin,  80 
Conservative  Party,   101-6,  109-10, 

119,  124-5,  ^73<  U7 
Consuls,  in  Apia,  158,  162 
Consul,  in  Levuka,  57,  64 
Consul,    in    Samoa,    17,    48,    see 

Weber 
Consuls,  in  Sydnej',  51,  57.  163 

Der  Export.  52,  83,  127 
Deutsche   Handels-imd-Plantagen- 

gescUschaft    der   Sii-See-Inscln, 

1 13-4.   117,  150 
Deutsche         Seehaudlungsgesells- 

chaft,   11=;,    117,  121,   129 
Die  Deutsche  Kolonialgesellschaft, 

145 
Die     Gesellschaft     fur     Deutsche 

Kolonisation,  145.  614,  178 
Diskonto  Company,  110 
Droysen,  27 
Duke  of  York  Islands.  71.  130.  150 

East  India  Company,  24-5 
Ellice  Islands,  71 

Emigration,  societies  for,  30-1,  79 
Emigration,    statistics,  42,  79,   89, 

92 
England,    iq.    37,    50.    56-S.    61-2. 

69-71.  74.  78.  89.  114.  13^.  131--. 

158,  161,  163-8,  180,  182,  1S5.  i83- 

90.  sec  Great  Britain 
Explorers.  31-2 

Fabri.   34.    78.   ?^-7,   91-2.   94.   9^ 

134.  T^37,  141.  143.  182 
Fiji  Islands,  41,  47.  56.  62,  64,  70. 

79.  133      . 
Fijians,    claims  of,    57.  64,    160-1. 

168 

203 


204 


INDEX 


[204 


France,  18,  71,  78-9,  133,  151,  158, 

164-5,  180,  185 
Frederick  the  First  of  Prussia,  25 
Frederick  William  the  First,  25 
Friedel,  Ernst,  29 

German  African  Society,  164 
Gladstone,  W.  E.,  75,  190- 1 
Godeffroy,    House    of,    39-41,    48, 

57-8,  107,  III,  1 13-19,  122-5,  129, 

150 
Godeffroy,  Senator,  108,  no 
Gold  Coast,  24,  34,  39,  ISO,  159 
Great  Britain,  88,  169,  183^  190-1, 

see  England 
Great  Elector,  24-6,  146 
Guinea,  24-5 

Hamburg,  25,  36,  38-8,  41,  47,  86, 
107,  1 12-13,  117,  121-2,  127,  150, 
159,  164,  174,  179,  see  Hanse 
Towns 

Hanse  merchants,  2Z,  138,  164 

Hanse  Towns,  36,  39,  103,  141, 
159 

Hohenlohe-Langenberg,  120,  138- 
40,  142,  144 

Hiibbe-Schleiden,  86-90,  92,  94, 
96,  139,   141,   147,  153 

Imperialism,  61,  79-80 
Industrial  Revolution,  15 
International  Africa   Association, 

Jannarsch,  Dr.,  83,  134 

Kameroon,  38,  87,  188-9,  191 
Kapp,  Frederich,  19,  67,  95-6,  105 

134 
Kersten,  Otto,  32,  50,  52,  83 
Kolnische  Zeitung,   114,    126,   147, 

184 
Kolonialverein,  136-7,  139-45,  149, 

152-4,  172-4 
Kolonialceitung,   144,    147 
Kiisserow,    von,    61,    63,    y^,    105, 

119,   154,  176,  180 

Lagos,  37 

Laisses-faire,  19,  28 
List,  F.,  19,  28-30 
Liyonius,  Admiral,  14-5,  19 
Liibeck,    2,7,    107,     141,     159,    see 
Hanse  Towns 


Liideritz,  F.  A.  L.,  7,  49,,  77,  150, 
157-8,  165-7,  169,  180 

Maltzan,  von,  138-40,  144,  153 
Manchester  School,  ig,  75,  126 
Marshall  Islands,  35,  71 
Meier,  46,  104,  122,  124,  141,  143 
Missionaries,  34,  39 
Missionary  societies,  33-4 
Mosle,  A.  G.,  45,  80-1,  104-5,  108- 

9,    120,    130,   133,   138,   149,   154, 

170 

Nachtigall,  Dr.,  2,2),  178,  184 
National    Liberal    Party,    101-109, 

124,  133,  173,  177 
Navy,  14,  19 
Navy,  Bill,  14 
Naval  stations,   14,  28,  46,  67,  77, 

see  coaling  stations 
New    Britain,   40-1,    71,    150,    158, 

179,  i8s,  187 
New  Guinea,  35,  41,  47,  60,    130, 

162,   176,   184-5,   187,   189 
Norddeutsche     AUgemeine     Zeit- 

ung,  29,   118,  125,   127,  176 
North   Borneo,   35,   50-1,  55,    130, 

133,  150 
North  German  Confederation,  i>7, 

2,7,  40 
North  German  Lloyd,  46 

Oceania,  40,  see  South  Seas 

Peters,  Karl,  145 

Petitions,  of  merchants,  45,  47-8 

Portugal,  17,  164 

Portuguese,  23,  168 

Progressives,  102-05,  107,  122,  124, 

133 
Propaganda,  47,  86,  95,  146 
Protective  tariff,  75 
Protectorate,  28,  74 
Prussia,  7,  23-5,  32,  131 
Prussia,  colonization,  23,  26,  146 

iRalick  Islands,  71 

Reichstag,  45,  66,  72,  77,  80,  loi, 
104,  108,  no,  113,  116,  118,  120, 
124,  126,  128-34,  152,  155-6,  170- 
72,  i7(>-7,  179-80,  183,  185,  i88, 
190,  192 

Rholfs,  22,  142,  178 

Richter,  174  180 

Roscher,  19,  30,  146 


205] 


INDEX 


205 


Saigon,  45-6,  55,  104 

tSamoa,  17,  40,  47-8,  55.  5^.  00.  oo- 

69-70,  74-5,  116,  124-6,  128,  171, 

see  South  Seas 
Samoan  Islands,  35,  39 
Samoan  Treaty,  60,  65,  69,  71-2, 

75,  77,  82,  105,  III 
Samoan  Subsidy  Bill.  113,  117-22, 

124-148,  150,  169,  171 
Socialists,   32,    102,    124,    133,    148, 

177.    182 
Society  Islands,  71 
South   Seas,   34,  40-1,   51,   55,  61, 

80,   107,   III,    113,   115,   117,   123, 

127,  129-30,  150,  154,  155,  162-3, 

179,  184,  sec  Samoa 
Spain,  48,  61-4,  67,  179 
Stanley,  33 
Steamship    Subsidy    Bill,     170-73, 

175-6,  183,  186-7,  192 
Steinberger,    Colonel    A.    B.,    58, 

60,  69 
Sturz,  J.  J.,  28,  32 

Teutonic  Knights,  23 
Togoland,  34,  39,  150,  178 
Tonga  Islands,  42,  70,  132 


Tonga   Treaty,   65-7,   69,    72,    77, 

104,  III,  118,  171 
Treaty,  Frankfort,  44-5,  47.  55 
Transvaal,  49-SO,  77^  79,  184 
Treitschke,  27 

United  States,  17,  19,  48,  56,  5^, 
60,  62,  69-70,  74,  114,  see  Amer- 
ica 

Wagner,  Adolph,  92 

Wagner,  Herman,  19,  90,  92 

Wappaus,  19,  30 

Weber,  E.  von,  49,  90,  92,  94.  98, 

134 
Weber,   T.,    17,   39-40,  48,   55.  69, 

124 
West-Deutsch  Verein,  86,  137,  143 
Wituland,  Sultan  of,  32,  149 
Woermann,    firm    of,    38,    49,    87, 

no,  138,  150,  158,  177,  180 

Zanzibar,  15 

Zanzibar,  Sultan  of,  37-8,  50,  55 

ZoUvcrem,  2,7,  107 

Zulu,  Islands,  61,  62,,  67,  69 

Zulu,  Sultan  of,  18,  50-1 


I 


in  tlx^  Cittj  of  W^j^xo  %}ov^ 

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WEALTH :   A  BRIEF   EXAMINATION  OF   THE  CAUSES  OF  ECO- 
NOMIC WELFARE 

By  Edwin  Cannan,  M,  A.,  LL  D. ,  Professor  of  Political  Economy  in  the  Uni- 
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MONEY  :  ITS  CONNEXION  WITH  RISING  AND  FALLING  PRICES 

By  Edwin  Cannan,  M.A.,  LL  D.,  Professor  of  Political  Economy  in  the 
University  of  London.     Third  Edition.     2s.  t>d. 

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GOLD  PRICES,  AND  THE  WITWATERSRAND 

By  R.  A.  Lehfeldt,  Professor  of  Economics  at  the  South  African  School  of 
Mines  and  Technology,  Johannesburg.     5s. 

Chapter  I,  The  Gold  Supply ;  II,  The  Requirements  of  Commerce :  III,  Paper  Substitutes  ; 
IV,  Influence  of  the  War  ;  V,  Position  of  the  Witwatersrand ;  Appendix  :  Statistical  Tables. 
Appendix  :  The  Valuation  of  Mines. 

THE  PAPER  POUND  OF  1797-1821 

Reprint  of  the  report  of  1810  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  High  Price  of 
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well  deserving  the  attention  of  all  students  of  economics." 

WAR  FINANCE 

By  J.  Shield  Nicholson,  M.A.,  Sc.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political  Econ- 
omy in  the  Univereity  of  Edinburgh.  Second  Edition,  with  three  additional 
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State  for  all  the  services  required  by  the  war  cannot  be  gainsaid.  .  .  .  "; 

INFLATION 

By  .J.  Shield  Nicholson,  M.A. ,  Sc.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political  Econ- 
omy in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.     3s.  6d. 

Times:  "  Professor  Nicholson  has  now  done  a  public  service To  the  general  reader, 

who  desires  to  obtain  as  simple  a  view  as  possible  of  the  economic  considerations  bearing  on 
the  very  practical  question  of  the  mischief  involved  in  "inflation"  (whether  of  the  cur- 
rency, or  even  more  fundamentally  of  credit),  the  value  of  this  little  book  is  that  it  brings 
theiu  succinctly  together." 

HISTORY  OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND 

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1.  Tlie  Divorce  Problem.    A  Study  In  Statistics. 

By  Walter  F.  Willcox,  Ph.D.     Price,  75  ccnti. 
«.  The  History  of  Tariff  Administration  In  the  United  States,  from  Colonial 
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8.  History  of  Municipal  Land  Ovrnershlp  on  Manhattan  Island. 

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A.  Financial  History  of  Massachusetts. 

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VOLUME  II,  1892-93.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  [5]  The  Economics  of  the  Russian  Village. 

By  Isaac  A.  Hourwich,  Ph.D.     (Out  0/ print). 
H.  [6]  Bankruptcy.    A  Study  In  Comparative  Leelslatlon. 

BySAMUKLW.  DuNsco.MB,  Jr.,  I'h.D.     {Not  sold sfparaUty.) 

3.  [7J  Special  Assessments  ;  A  Study  In  Municipal  Finance.  • 

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VOLUME  III,  1893.    465  pp.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  [8]  *Hl8tory  of  Elections  In  American  Colonies- 

By  Cortland  F    Bishop,  Ph.D.     (AW  sold  separatily.) 
^.  [9]  The  Commercial  Policy  of  England  toward  the  American  Colonies. 

By  George  L.  Beer,  A.  M.     (Out  o/ print.) 

VOLUME  IV,  1893-94.    438  pp.    (See  note  on  last  page.) 

1.  [10]  Financial  History  of  Virginia. 

By  William  Z.  Ripley,  Ph.D.     (Not  sold  separately.) 

2.  [Ill*  The  inheritance  Tax.  ByMAX  West. Ph.D.     Second  Edition  1908     Price.|3  00 

3.  [la]  Hlstcv  of  Taxation  la  Vermont.      By  Frkdfrick  .\.  Wodd,  p.i  u  (Out  o/ptint.( 

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1.  [13]  Double  Taxation  In  the  United  States. 

By  Francis  Walkbr,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1  00. 
"S.  [14]  The  Separation  of  Governmental  Powers. 

By  William  BoNDY.LL.B.,  Ph.D.     Pri..c,  Ji.oo. 
,  a.  [15]  Municipal  Government  In  Michigan  and  Ohio. 

By  Dblos  F.  Wilcox,  Ph.D.     Price,  .<t  00. 

VOLUME  VI,  1896.    601  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50 ;  Paper  covers,  $400. 

£16]  History  of  Proprietary  Government  In  Pennsylvania. 

By  William  Robert  Shkpmkku,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  VII,  1896.    512  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [17]  History  of  the  Transition  from  Provincial  to  Commouweallh  t;ov- 

ernment In  Massachusetts.  By  Harky  A.  Gushing,  Ph.D.    I'ruc,  #jco. 

H.  [18]*SpeculatIon  on  the  Stocli  and  Produce  Exchanees  of  the  United  States 

By  Henry  Cku^uy  Emskv,  Ph.D.     Price,  Jl.so. 

VOLUME  VIII,  1896-98.    551  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $4.00. 

1.  [19]  The  Struggle  betvireen  President  Johnson  and  ConBro=5s  over  Keoon- 
Structloil.  By  Charles  Kknksi' Chausbv.  Ph. 1>.     I'rice.yiuo. 

a.  [SO]  Recent  Centralizing  Tendencies  in  State  Educational  Administra- 
tion. By  William  Clakenck  W  kbstkr,  th.D.     Price,  75  cents. 

3.  [« 1]  The  Abolition  of  Privateering  and  the  Uoclnratlou  of  Paris. 

By  Francis  K.  Stakk,  LI,  1'..,  Ph  D.     Price,  «i  00. 

4.  [82]  Public  Administration  In  Massachusetts.    The  Rolntlon  of  Central 

to  Local  Activity.  By  Robert  HakVky  WumBK,  i'li.D.     Price,  .  i.oo. 

VOLUME  IX,  1897-98.    617  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4  00. 

1.  l«3]  *Engllsh  Local  Government  of  To-day.  A  Study  of  the  Relations  of 
Central  and  Local  Government.  By  Milo  Roy  Maltbik.  Ph.D.    Pncc,  »j.oo. 

■*.  [84]  German  Wage  Theories.    A  History  of  their  development. 

By  James  W.  Crook,  Ph. 1>.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

8.  [86]  The  Centralization  of  Administration  in  New  York  State. 

By  John  Archiuald  Fairlis,  Ph.D.     Pnce.Ji.oo. 


VOLUME  X,  1898-99.    409  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [86]  Synipatbetlc  Strikes  and  Sympatlietic  Lockouts. 

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2.  [37]  *Rliode  Island  and  the  Formation  of  Ihe  Union. 

By  Frank  Greene  Bates,  Ph.D.     Price,  S1.50. 

3.  [28].  Centralized  Administration  of  liiquor  Laws  In  the  American  Com*  1 

monwealths.  By  Clement  Moore  Lacky  Sites,  Ph.D.     Price,  jji.oo. 

VOLUME  XI,  1899.    495  pp.    Price,  clotli,  4.00;  paper  covers,  $3.50. 

'  ^9]  Tlie  Growth  of  Cities.  By  Adna  Ferrin  Wbbbk  Ph.D, 

VOLUME  XII,  1899-1900.    686  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

[oO]  History  and  Functions  of  Central  Labor  Unions. 

By  William  Maxwell  Burke,  Ph.D.     Price,  $i.oo. 
s^,  [01.]  Colonial  Immigration  Law^s. 

By  Edward  Emerson  Proper,  A.M.     Price,  75  cents, 

3.  [32]  History  of  Military  Pension  Legislation  in  the  United  States. 

By  William  Henry  Glasson,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

4.  [33]  History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Kousseau. 

By  Charles  K.  Merriam,  Jr.,  Ph.D.    Price,  J1.50. 

VOLUME  XIII,  1901.    570  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [34]  The  Legal  Property  Relations  of  Married  Parties. 

By  IsiDOR  LoBB,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji. 50. 

2.  [35]  Political  Natlvlsm  in  New  York  State. 

By  Lotus  Dow  Scisco,  Ph.D.     Price,  $2.00. 

3.  [38]  The  Reconstruction  of  Georgia.        By  Edwin  C.  Woolley,  Ph.D.    Price.  $1.00. 

VOLUME  XIV,  1901-1902.    576  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

J.,  [37]  Loyallsm  in  2\  ew  York  dui'lng  the  American  Revolution. 

By  Alexander  Clarence  Flick,  Ph.D.     Price.  J2.00. 

2.  [38]  The  Economic  Theory  of  Risk  and  Insurance. 

By  Allan  H.  Willktt,  Ph.D.     Price,  J1.50. 

3.  [39]  The  Eastern  Question:  A  Study  in  Diplomacy. 

By  Stephen  P.  H.  Duggan,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.00. 

VOLUME  XV,  1902.    427  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  Paper  covers,  $3.00. 

[40]  Crime  in  Its  Relation  to  Social  Progress.       By  Arthur  Cleveland  Hall,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XVI.  1902-1903.    547  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [41]  The  Past  and  Present  of  Commerce  in  Japan. 

By  YuTAKO  Kinosita,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

5.  [43]  The  Employment  of  Women  in  the  Clothing  Trade. 

By  Maeel  Hurd  Willbt,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 
3.  [43]  The  Centralization  of  Administration  in  Ohio. 

By  S.^MUEL  P.  Orth,  Ph.D.     Price,  J1.50. 

VOLUME  XVII,  1903.    635  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1,  [44]  *Centrallzing  Tendencies  in  the  Administration  of  Indiana. 

By  William  A.  Rawles,  Ph.D.     Price,  ?2.50i 

2.  [45]  Principles  of  Justice  in  Taxation.     By  Stephen  F.  Weston,  Ph.D.    Price,  j52.oo. 

VOLUME  XVIII,  1903.    753  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $4.50. 

1.  [46]  The  Administration  of  low^a.       By  Haroid  Martin  Bowm.in,  Ph.D.    Price,  J1.50. 

2.  [47]  Turgot  and  the  Six  Edicts.  By  Robert  P.  Shepherd,  Ph.D.    Price,  ^1.50. 

3.  [48]  Hanover  and  Prussia,  1795-IS03.       By  Guy  Stanton  Ford,  PhD.    Price,  I2.00. 

VOLUME  XIX,  1903-1905.    588  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [4  9]  JosiahTucker,  Eccnomlst.  By  Waltbr  Ernest  Clark   PhD.     Price, $1.50. 

2.  [50]  History  and  Criticism  of  the  Lahor  Theory  of  VrIi  o  in  English  Polit- 

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3.  [51]  Trade  Uuiuns  and  the  La-w  in  K"eT5^  York. 

By  George  Gorham  Groat,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

VOLUME  XX,  1904.    514  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $3.50. 

1.  [53]  The  OSace  of  the  Ju.stlce  of  the  Peace  In  England. 

By  Charles  Austin  Biard,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

S.  [53]  A  History  of  Military  Gov  era  tnent  in  Kewly  Actinire<\  Territory  of 

the  United  fetates.  By  David  Y.  Thomas,  Ph.D.     Price,  ga.oo. 

VOLUME  XXI,  1904.    746  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [54]  *Treaties,  their  Making  and  Enforcement. 

By  Samuel  B.  Crandall,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 

2.  [55]  The  Sociology  of  a  New  York  City  lUock. 

By  Thomas  Jesse  Jones,  Ph.D.     Price,  gi.oo. 

3.  [56]  Pre-Malthusian  Doctrines  of  Popu  atlon 

By  Charles  E.  Stangbland,  Ph.D.     Price,  $1.50. 


VOLUME  XXII.  1905.    520  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  paper  covers,  $3.00. 

{57]  The  Historical  Development  of  tlie  Poor  Law  of  Connecticut. 

liy  LuwAKu  W.  Ca^f.n,  Ph.  D. 

VOLUME  XXIII,  1905.    594  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $4.00. 

1.  [58]  The  Economics  of  Land  Tenure  In  Geori^la. 

liy  Enoch  Marvin  Banks,  Ph.D.     Pric<:,  Ji.oo. 
3.  [50]  Mistake  In  Contract.    A  Study  In  Comparative  . I  url.sprudtsnce. 

lly  Edwin  C.  McKbag,  Ph.D.     Price,  f  i.oo. 

3.  [60]  Combination  In  the  Mining  Industry. 

•^y  Hbnbt  R.  Mussey,  Ph.D.     Pri;e.  (lixo. 

4.  [61]  The  English  Craft  Guilds  and  the  Government. 

By  Stella  Krambr.  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

VOLUME  XXIV,  1905.    521  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [eS]  The  Place  of  Magic  In  the  Intellectual  History  of  Europe. 

liv  Lynn  Thornuikb,  Ph.D.     Price,  |i.oo. 

2.  [63]  The  Ecclesiastical  Edicts  of  the  Theodbslan  Code. 

By  William  K.  Boyd.  Ph.D.     Price.  Jli.oo. 

3.  [64]  •The  International  Position  of  Japan  as  a  Great  Powei*. 

By  Skiji  G.  Hisiiiua,  Ph.D.     Price,  (a.ock 

VOLUME  XXV,  1906-07.    600  pp.    (Sold  only  in  Sets.) 

1.  [65]  *MunleIpal  Control  of  Public  Utilities. 

By  O.  L.  Pond,  Ph  D.     (AW  sold  sfparalely.) 
3.  [66]  The  Budget  in  the  American  Common>vealths. 

By  EuGBNE  E.  Agger,  Ph.D.     Price,  ^'-so- 

3.  [67]  The  Finances  of  Cleveland.  By  Charles  C.  Williamson,  Ph.D.    Price,  Ja.oa, 

VOLUME  XXVI .  19'>7.    559  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [68]  Trade  and  Currency  In  Early  Oregon. 

By  Jambs  H.  Gilbert,  Ph.D.     Price,  fx.oa. 
'^.   [69]  Luther's  Table  Talk.  By  PRKStRVKU  Smith,  Ph.D.     Price,  Ji.oo. 

a.  L70]  The  Tobacco  Industry  In  the  United  States. 

By  ^Ieyek  Jagobstbin,  Ph.D.    Price,  >i  50. 

4.  [71]  Social  Democracy  and  Population. 

Py  Alvan  A.  Tbnney,  Ph.D.     Price,  7s  cent*. 

VOLUME  XXVII,  1907.    578  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [78]  The  Economic  Policy  of  Robert  Walpole. 

By  NoRRis  A.  Bbisco,  Ph.D.  Price,  Ji.ja 

3.  [73]  The  United  States  Steel  Corporation.  ^  ^ 

By  Abraham  Berglunu,  Ph.D.  Price,  f.\  50. 
3.  [74]  The  Taxation  of  Corporations  In  Massachusetts. 

By  Harry  G.  Friedman,  Ph.D.  Price,  J1.50. 

VOLUME  XXVni.  1907.    564  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [75]  I>e"WItt  Clinton  and  the  Origin  of  tlie  Spoils  System  In  New  York. 

By  Howard  Li:k  McBain,  rii.  J.).     Piicc,  J1.50. 

2.  [76]  The  Development  of  the  Legislature  of  Colonial  Vlrerlnln. 

By  Elmer  1.  Millek,  Ph  D.     Price,  51.50. 

,3.  [77]  The  Distribution  Of  Ownership.  „,  ^     „ 

By  Joseph  Harding  Undirwood,  Ph.D.     Price,  f  1.50. 

VOLUME  XXIX,  1908.    703  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50 

ly  New  EnKlaiid  To>vns.  By  Ai 

l8.  170']  New  Hampshire  as  a  Royal  Province.      „,  „  ^       t,^  t>     « 

'  By  William  H.  Fry,  Ph.D.     Price,  J3.00. 

VOLUME  XXX,  1908.    712  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50  ;  Paper  covers,  $4.00. 

80]  The  Province  of  New  Jersey,  166  4-173S.  By  Fpwin  P.  Tanner,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XXXI,  1908.    575  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

.  [81]  Private  Freight  Cars  and  American  Railroads.  ou  t^     t,        ., 

Hy  I-.  D.  H.  Weld,  Ph.D.     Pnce,  fi.so. 
82]  Ohio  before  1850.  By  Rodert  E.  Chapdock.  Ili.D.     Price,  ^1.50. 

83]  Consanguineous  Marriages  In  the  American  Population. 

B,-  Georgb  B.  Louis  Arner.  Ph.D.     Pnce.  75  cents. 
.  [84]  Adolphe  Quetelet  as  Statlstfclau.        By  Frank  H.  Hakkins,  Ph.D.     Pnce,  f  i.:<;. 

VOLUME  XXXII,  1908.    705  pp.    Price,  cloth,  4.50;  paper  covers,  $4.00. 

~85]  The  Enforcement  of  the  Statutes  of  Laborers.  tt  t,  ov.  r. 

By  Bertha  Havkn  Pi-tnam,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XXXIII,  1908-1909.    635  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

.  [86]  Factory  Legislation  In  Maine.                    By  E.  Stagg  Whitin,  A.B.    Price,  Ji.oa. 
;.  [87]  •Psychological  Interpretations  of  Society.  tjv  r>     0        <i 

'  By  Michael  M.  Davis,  Jr.,  PhD.     Price,  ^.<x». 

;.  [88 1  *Au  Introduction  to  the  Source^  relating  to  the  tiermaiiic  Invasions. 

"    J'v  O.iiiroN  J.  h.  Hayes,  Ph.D.    Pnce.  Ji.s(v 


1.  [78]  Eax'ly  New  EnKland  Towns.  By  Anne  Bush  MacLrar,  Ph.D.    Price,  |t. 50. 

8.  IT'  ~  "  -  -  _  - 


l:( 


VOLUME  XXXIV.  1909.    628  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50.  -,, 

^   *t    „   „,,H   Tri  rill  atrial  Development  In  the  Middle  "W  est. 
1.  [89]  Transportation  and  Industrial  ^®^%",*;^„  p.  Okphart.  Ph.D.    Pncc.ja.o*. 

S.  [90]  Social  Reform  and  the  R^'o^^^^^^^^cob  Salwvn  Schapiro,  Ph.D.    Price,  $i..s. 

„  ,„^     , f.^,^-       "^  By  Philip  A.  Parsons,  Ph.D.    Price,  $1.30. 

S.  [91]  Responsibility  for  Crime.  "> 

VOLUME  XXXV.  1909.    568  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [921  The  conflict  over  the  Judicial  Powers^ in  the^Unlted  St^t^ 

«.  [93]  A  Study  of  th.  Population  of  Manhattanvniie.^^^^^^^^^  ^^^     p^.^^^  ^^  ^^ 

8.  [94]  •  Divorce:  A  Study  in  Social  Causation^  ^  lichtenbbkg.r,  Ph.D.    Pric*.  Ji.s». 

VOLUME  XXXVI,  1910.    542  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

.      rr.^...— .=       RvChari-bs  William  Ramsdell,  Ph.D.     Price,  |2.5»- 

VOLUME  XXXVn,  1910.    606  pp.    Price,  cloth.  $4.50. 

1.  [971  standards  of  Reasonableness  in  Local  Freight  Dl^scrl^^^^^^  ^^^^ 

«.  [98]  Legal  Development  In  Colonial  Massachusetts. ^^^^^^^  ^^^     PHce,$i..s. 
8.  [99]  •  Social  and  Mental  Trait,  of  the  Negro.^^^^^^  ^  ^^^^  p^  P     p^,^  ^.^^ 

VOLU]iIE  XXXVm.  1910.    463  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50. 

1.  [lOOl  The  Public  Domain  and  Democracy .^^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  pj^  ^  Price,  !..••. 
«.  [lOl]  Oreanlsmlc  Theories  of  the  State.  ^^  francis  W.  Coker.  Ph.D.    Price,  fi.f*. 

VOLUME  XXXIX,  1910-1911.    651  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [102]  The  Making  of  the  Balkan  States .^^^^^^^  ^^^^^  Murray.  Ph.D.    P"«.  «J;Sf' 
«.  [1031  Political  History  of  Ne^  Yorl.  ftate^durlng  the^Perl^^^^       the  Civil 
War.  ' 

VOLUME  XL,  1911.    633  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [104]  A  Survey  of  Constitutional  Developmentin  Chlnaj^^^  p^^  ^  p^.^^^  ^^^ 
«.  [105]  Ohio  Politics  during  the  Civil  War  Perlod^.^  ^  p^^^^^  p^^  ^^  p^,^^  ,,^5, 
8.  [106]  The  Territorial  Baslsof  Government  under  the^^^^^^^^^ 

VOLUME  XLI,  1911.    514  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $3.50;  paper  covers,  $3.00. 

[107]  Ne^  Jersey  as  a  Royal  Province.  By  Eooar  Jacob  F.shrk.  Ph.  D. 

VOLUME  XLII,  1911.    400  pp.    Price.cloth.  $3.00;  paper  covers,  $2.50. 

(108]  Attitude  of  American  Courts  In  Labor  Cases.^^^^^  Gorham  Groat.  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  XLin,  1911.    633  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1,  [1091  .industrial  Causes  of  Congestion^of^PopxUat^lon  In^New  York^l^^^^^ 
^  +1,^  T^n^f.^  By  F.  Stuart  Chapin,  Ph.D.    Price.  75  ceatt. 

S:  [llSl  i^^^r^^t^l^h^C^onri^l^n'-t^he  Con W-^ Y. Bo.ham,  Jk.. P^^^     PHce.,.-.| 

VOLUMES  XLIV  and  XLV,  1911.    745  pp. 
Price  for  the  two  volumes,  cloth,  $6.00;  paper  covers,  $5.00. 

(11«  and  113]  The  Economic  Principles  of  Confucius  and  hlsSchool.  ^^^ 

VOLUME  XLVI,  1911-1912..  623  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4. 50.    ^ 

o       .    i«=<-c  By  Esther  LowENTHAL.Ph  D.    Price.$i.«« 

J:  [1111  ?.H.lSS?f iL»^.^S°rkl!k'V=i.e^.  o^,  8u,e^^^^^^  ,..^ 

1. 11181  .syndicausm  inrrance.^  ^^^  ^J^S...^^^o.'^:S:&.  ?£  V^S. 

4.  [117]    A  Hoosler  Villago. 


VOLUME  XL VII,  1912.    544  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 
1.  [118]  The  Politics  of  Michigan,  1865-1878, 

^     ,  ,^  „  Hy  HarriettkM.  DiLLA,  Ph.D.     Price,  la. oo. 

S.  [1 19]  *The  United  States  Beet  Sugar  Industry  and  tlie  Tariff. 

^  By  Roy  G.  Blakky,  Ph.D.     Price,  |a .00. 

VOLUME  XL VIII,  1912.    493  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

1.  [ISO]  Isldop  of  Seville.  By  Ernest  Brchaut,  Ph.  D.     Price,  M<». 

a.  [131]  Progress  and  Uniformity  In  Chlld-T.ubor  I.otjislatlon. 

By  William  Fielding  Ogburn,  Ph.D.     Price,  $i  .75. 

VOLUME  XLIX,  1912.    592  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

>   1.  ri2S]  British  Radicalism  1791-1797.  By  Walter  Phblps  Hall.    Price,|3.oo. 

ii.  [133]  A  Comparative  Study  of  the  L.aw  of  Corporations. 

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S.  [1S4]  *The  Negro  at  Work  In  Nev«r  York  City. 

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VOLUME  L,  1911.    481  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

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VOLUME  LII,  1912.    489  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

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S.  [129]  *The  Distribution  of  Income. 

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8.  [130]  *The  Finances  of  "Vermont.  By  Frederick  a.  Wood,  Ph.D.     Price,  fi.ix,. 

VOLUME  LIII,  1913.    789  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50;  paper,  $4.00. 
[131]  The  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction  In  Florida.        By  W.  W.  Davis.  Ph.D. 

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1.  [132]    *  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  Citizens  of  the  United  States. 

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4*  [133]    The  Supreme  Court  and  Unconstitutional  Legislation. 

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-S.  [134]  *Indian  Slavery  In  Colonial  Times  -witliin  tlie  Present  Limits  of  tlio 

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1.  1 135]    *A  Political  History  of  the  State  of  New  York . 

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-a.  [1361    *The  Early  Persecutions  of  the  Christians. 

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1.  [137]  Speculation  on  the  New  Yoi-k  Stock  Exchange,  1904-1907. 

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2.  [188]  The  Policy  of  the  United  States  towards  Indnstrinl  Monopoly. 

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VOLUME  LVII,  1914.    670  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

1.  [139]  *The  Civil  Service  of  Great  Britain. 

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H,  [140]  The  Financial  History  of  New  York  State. 

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VOLUME  LVIII,  1914.    684  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50;  paper,  $4.00. 

[141]  Reconstruction  in  North  Carolina. 

By  J.  G.  DE  Roi'LHAC  Hamilton,  Ph.D. 

VOLUME  LIX,  1914.    625  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.50. 

!•  [142]  The  Development  of  Modern  Turkey  by  means  of  its  Press. 

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•«.  [143]  The  System  Of  Taxation  In  China,  1614-191.1.     ^         „,   ^  ,^_.      . 

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«.  [1441  The  Currency  Problem  in  China.  By  Wen  Pin  Wei,  Ph.D.  Price,  $1.35- 

•4.  [145]  *Jewlsh  Immigration  to  the  United  States.  nu  ,>  «        .^ 

By  Samuel  Joseph,  Ph.D.  Price.  ^.50 


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VOLUME  LXIX.    1916.    489  pp.    Price,  cloth,  $4.00. 

,  [164i  Railway  Mouopoly  and  Rate  Regulation. 

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[166J  Mohammedan  Theories  of  Finance 

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VOLUME  LXXIII.    1917.    616 


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[171]  *The  Social  and  Economic  Aspects  of  the  „„«.  ...ot,  Auuvtjinent. 

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[173]  Chartism  and  the  Chnrches.  By  H.  U.  Faulkner,  Ph.D.    Piice.>i.»5 

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[174]  >H.J 


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